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Abstract
This thesis investigates the issues related to unconventional monetary
policy implementation and is organized in four chapters. Chapter 1
compares unconventional measures in the United States (2007-2010)
with the first big-scale unconventional experience in Japan (1999-
2006). First, we discuss the way non-orthodox measures were imple-
mented by the Fed and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and we argue that
the U.S. unconventional balance-sheet management was “asset-driven”
whereas the Japanese more “liabilities-driven”. Second, we investigate
the impact of non-standard measures on the private banks’ balance
sheets, and in particular on lending to other banks, companies and
households. The interbank lending slowed down in both countries but
in the U.S. to much bigger extent. On the contrary, the lending to
companies diminished more in Japan as there was double deleveraging
process in firms and financial institutions. Third, we discuss the empir-
ical evidence for the effectiveness of the Fed and BOJ unconventional
monetary policies. In Japan “policy duration effect” contributed to
lowering long-term yield, whereas in the U.S. the portfolio rebalancing
effect proved more effective. Finally, we discuss risks connected to un-
conventional policies. While inflation does not seem to be immediate
danger, the important credit risk on the Fed’s balance sheet brings
up concerns about overstepping into fiscal policy and threatens the
Fed’s independence. On the other hand, the reluctance of the BOJ to
employ credit and quantitative easing more aggressively undermined
its effectiveness in countering deleveraging pressures and deflation.
Chapter 2 evaluates empirically the impact of unconventional and con-
ventional monetary policies in the United States on the Libor-OIS
spread, long-term interest rates and long-term inflation expectations.
To this purpose we investigate the behavior of selected asset yields
on the days of monetary policy announcements. We find that liq-
uidity facilities had weak impact on three-month Libor-OIS spread.
The QE1 purchases of longer-term Treasury securities and agency
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debt/MBS lowered nominal long-term interest rates. Furthermore,
we find evidence that the Fed’s rescue operations and QE2 raised
long-term inflation expectations. We also consider the impact of fiscal
policy announcements. We find that the government bailouts reduced
the three-month Libor-OIS spread while the fiscal stimulus announce-
ments raised long-term inflation expectations.
Chapter 3 investigates the effect of the ECB unconventional monetary
policies on banks’ and governments’ borrowing costs in the euro zone
via event-based regression. Specifically, we measure the response of
money market, covered bond and sovereign bond spreads on the days
of monetary policy announcements. The results show that among ECB
unconventional measures, long-term sovereign bond purchases (SMP)
proved the most effective in lowering longer-term asset yields. The
effects are the most important for the sovereign spreads in periphery
euro-zone countries. The strong impact in the euro zone, exceeding the
impact of similar measures in the U.S. and the U.K., suggests that the
central bank intervention in sovereign market is particularly effective
when the sovereign risk is important. The SMP also reduced the
longer-term refinancing costs for banks as represented by covered bond
spreads. Furthermore, covered bond purchase programs (CBPP 1 and
2) reduced covered bond spreads, sovereign bond spreads and to some
extent the money market spreads. The 3-year LTRO announcement
on the other hand was effective in reducing bank refinancing cost, via
smaller money market spreads and covered bond spreads, but did not
result in smaller government borrowing costs.
Chapter 4 incorporates a small and time-varying “disaster risk” à la
Gourio (2012) in a New Keynesian model in order to account for in-
crease in risk premia that motivated unconventional monetary inter-
ventions. In our model, a small change in the probability of disaster
may affect macroeconomic quantities and asset prices. In particular, a
higher disaster probability is sufficient to generate a recession without
effective occurrence of the disaster. By accounting for monopolistic
competition, price stickiness, and a Taylor-type rule, this paper pro-
vides a baseline framework of the dynamic interactions between the
macroeconomic effects of rare events and nominal rigidity, particu-
larly suitable for further analysis of conventional and unconventional
monetary policy.
2
General Introduction
1. Monetary policy in unconventional times: transformation
of the role of the central bank
The last five years have been a major challenge for the theory and prac-
tice of monetary policy. The Lehman Brothers collapse, on September
15, 2008, was followed by a dramatic increase in risk premia and a
generalized panic on financial markets that spread from the United
States to other parts of the world. As a result the interest rates on
many assets increased and the credit in the economy became much less
available. The central banks reacted to the increase in risk premia by
lowering their main interest rates. Interest rate setting is known as
conventional monetary policy and it proved effective in the past in
influencing borrowing conditions. Therefore, in both economic theory
and practice, the models in which the interest rate rule characterizes
the monetary policy were commonly used by researchers (Woodford,
2003) and central bankers (Smets and Wouters, 2003).
However, since the beginning of the subprime crisis the transmission of
central bank rates to other interest rates, which is a key channel of con-
ventional monetary policy, has been severely impaired. The premia in
interbank markets attained unseen level as the uncertainty about the
banks’ balance sheet health soared. In the United States, the mortgage
and asset-backed security spreads increased while asset-backed com-
mercial papers could hardly find acquirers. In Europe, the sovereign
debt crisis has lead to large sovereign spreads and euro-zone financial
market segmentation. As a result, huge disparities appeared in refi-
nancing conditions for governments, banks and companies among the
member countries despite the common monetary policy.
Another constraint faced by conventional monetary policy is a zero
lower bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates. This is already the
case in the United States and in Japan where since December 2008
the target range for the policy rate has been set respectively between
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0 and 0.25% and between 0 and 0.1% since. Furthermore, in the
United Kingdom and in the euro-zone the target policy rates are set
at historically low levels, respectively at 0.5% and 0.75%.
Some anecdotal experience from the past shows that there are times
when monetary policy can and should do more than just setting the
interest rates according to inflation target and output gap. The Hong
Kong Monetary Authority made a very unconventional move during
the Asian crisis, in October 1998. Hong Kong was in a currency board
and the Authority was in a difficult position when the speculators
were, at the same time, selling the local currency and short-selling
the Hong Kong stocks. If the Authority, as speculators expected,
played its conventional monetary policy card and raised interest rate
to defend the currency, the value of the stocks would go down, making
the short-sales of stock very profitable. However, the HK Monetary
Authority managed to deter speculators by directly purchasing the
stocks in order to increase their price. This unconventional monetary
policy allowed the HK Monetary Authority to foil the self-fulfilling
speculative attack and support the economy without having to give
up its primary objective of exchange-rate target.
The Hong Kong example shows that there are situations where con-
ventional monetary policy cannot respond to challenges set by finan-
cial markets and economic environment. However, it was in Japan
between 1999 and 2006 when unconventional monetary policies were
implemented at the large scale on regular basis. After the housing and
asset bubble collapse, the banks’ balance sheets were of poor quality
because of the accumulated non-performing loans. The sharp rise in
risk premia led to banking crisis in 1997-1998. The double deleveraging
process in banking sector and companies that followed was accompa-
nied by the economic stagnation. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) decreased
its target policy rates to zero in April 1999 but real interest rates re-
mained positive as deflation and deflationary expectations persisted.
Faced with the ZLB constraint the BOJ at first committed to keep-
ing the interest rates at zero level until the deflationary tensions are
dispelled. Furthermore, it implemented the Quantitative Monetary
Easing Policy (QMEP) in March 2001 together with stronger com-
mitment on keeping the zero interest rates. The QMEP consisted in
setting the target for the excess reserves that commercial banks held
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at the BOJ. The increase in reserves was obtained thanks to long-term
government bond purchases and short-term lending to banks. More
generally, the BOJ unconventional monetary policies can be catego-
rized according to Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) into three groups:
• Expectation management strategy. Central bank commitment can
affect the expectations of the future interest rates and therefore
the long-term interest rates.
• Changes in the composition of the central bank balance sheet by
purchasing unconventional (risky) assets (credit easing).
• Expansion of monetary base by providing banks with excess re-
serves at the central bank (quantitative easing).
The deflation period in Japan and the BOJ non-orthodox measures
were perceived as an isolated experiment that was irrelevant for the
conduct of monetary policy in other developed countries. And yet,
since the subprime crisis outburst in 2007 the central banks around
the world have implemented some kind of unconventional monetary
policy and their innovative policies have by far exceeded the Japanese
measures.
Even though unconventional monetary policies can be classified into
three categories described above, in practice each country designed its
own “unconventional policy toolkit” depending on the country eco-
nomic situation and the central bank operational constraints. We
first recall the majors unconventional policies carried out by the Fed-
eral Reserve (Fed), the Bank of England (BOE) and the European
Central Bank (ECB).
As soon as the first signs of the subprime crisis were publicly known,
in August 2007, the Federal Reserve made an unusual commitment
of providing reserves as necessary through open market operations to
promote trading in the federal funds market at rates close to its target
rates. Furthermore, it reduced the spread between the primary credit
rate (discount rate) and the target federal funds rate to 50 basis points
and began to allow the provision of primary credit for terms as long
as 30 days. As using discount window was considered by banks as
sending a bad signal about their financial stending, the Fed has im-
plemented in December 2012 a special liquidity facility designed to
lend to depository institutions: Term Auction Facility (TAF). Under
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this program Fed auctioned collateralized loans of 28 and 84 days.
At the same time it initiated currency swap agreements (swap lines)
with other central banks (BOE, ECB and BOJ among others). Under
these arrangements the Fed provided dollars to other central banks
for use in their jurisdictions. After the collapse of Bear Stearns, the
Fed announced two lending facilities for primary dealers: Term Se-
curity Lending Facility (TSLF) providing term loans of Treasury se-
curities, and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) providing
discount window loans. The failure of Lehman Brothers was followed
by creation in September 2008 of the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) designed to
support money market funds and the market for ABCP. In October
2008, the Fed established the Money Market Investor Funding Facility
(MMIFF) designed to provide liquidity to US money market investors,
and the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) providing a liq-
uidity backstop to US issuers of commercial paper. Finally, in March
2009 in cooperation with the Treasury the Fed launched the Term
Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) intended to revive the
market for ABS.
In addition to temporary liquidity and lending facilities for specific
financial sectors that are now all terminated, the Fed purchased im-
portant quantities of longer-term Treasury bonds and Agency1 bonds
and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In November 2008 the Fed
announced purchases of Agency debt and MBS (overall final amount
reached $1450 bln) and in March 2009 purchases of longer-term Trea-
sury bonds ($300 bln). These purchases are called a first round of
quantitative easing (QE1). The second round was announced in Novem-
ber 2010 and consisted in purchasing only Treasury securities ($600
bln). Furthermore in September 2011, the Fed implemented the Ma-
turity Extension Program (MEP, also called “Twist Operation”) that
involved selling $400 billion in short-term Treasuries in exchange for
the same amount of longer-term bonds (amount increased in June
2012 by $267 bln). In September the third round of quantitative eas-
ing (QE3) was decided and concerned purchases of MBS ($40 bln per
month). The particularity of the third round was that the end of the
program was not announced and the Fed committed to continue them
1Namely Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, whose principal activity consisted in expanding the secondary market in
mortgages. They were effectively nationalized in September 2008.
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“if the outlook for the labor market does not improve substantially”.2
Finally, the Fed used expectation management strategy to reduce
longer-term interest rates when the target fed funds were reduced prac-
tically to zero in December 2008. More precisely it promised to keep
exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time. This
commitment was subsequently reinforced and in September 2012 the
Fed stated that the economic conditions are likely to warrant excep-
tionally low levels of the federal funds rate at least through mid-2015.
In this way, the Fed communicated to markets its commitment to
lower the path for future interest rates and hence reduce long-term
interest rates.
In the United Kingdom, the BOE also enhanced liquidity provisions,
supported dysfunctional financial markets and implemented large-scale
asset purchases. Unlike the Fed however, it did not commit to keep
future short-term interest rats at exceptionally low levels. In April
2008, it introduced Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS) allowing banks to
exchange illiquid mortgage-backed securities for Treasury Bills with
the maturity up to three years. After the Lehman Brothers collapse,
the BOE increased longer-term repos substantially from around £12
bln before the crisis to £180 bln in early 2009 (Cross et al., 2010).
It also started providing liquidity in dollars thanks to currency swaps
with the Fed (September 2008). Furthermore, the BOJ introduced
in Autumn 2008 a Discount Window Facility (DWL) to allow banks
borrowing government bonds, for 30 or 364 days, against a wide range
of collateral. The Discount Window Facility was designed to remain
in place as a permanent feature of the BOE monetary policy, but the
Special Liquidity Scheme ended in January 2012. As in case of the
Fed’s TSLF, the security swaps programs introduced by the BOE (SLS
and DWL) did not appear on the BOE’s balance sheet.
Initially, the expansion of the BOE’s balance sheet was due to in-
crease in fine-tuning operations and longer-term reverse repo opera-
tions. However, as the target policy rate was decreased to 0.5%, the
BOE initiated in March 2009 the Asset Purchase Facility (APF) in-
tended to boost nominal demand growth and to ensure meeting the
2% inflation target in the medium term. The APF enabled the BOE to
2FOMC statement of September 13, 2012.
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purchase UK government securities in the secondary market and high-
quality private sector assets, including commercial paper and corpo-
rate bonds. The first round of purchases was set at £200 billion worth
of assets, mostly UK Government debt. The program was further in-
creased with additional purchases of £75 billion in October 2011 and
in February 2012 the Committee decided to buy an additional £50
bln. In July 2012 the BOE announced the purchase of a further £50
bln to bring total assets purchases to £375bln.
At the beginning of the subprime crisis, the European Central Bank
as other central bank increased significantly liquidity provisions to
banks via additional fine-tuning operations, more important main re-
financing operations and supplementary 3-month longer-term opera-
tions (LTROs). In Autumn 2008, the ECB intensified further liquidity-
providing operations by reducing the corridor of its standing facilities,
implementing fixed-rate full-allotment procedure (FRFA) and length-
ening the maturity of LTROs. The FRFA procedure was an excep-
tional measure allowing banks to satisfy all their liquidity needs at
fixed rate (MRO rate) in all operations in euro and in foreign cur-
rency conducted by the ECB. The maturity of LTROs were initially
increased from three months to one year during the global crisis but
the adverse development of the euro-zone debt crisis made the ECB
propose to banks in December and February 2012 the three-year loans
(3Y LTRO).
The ECB also proceeded to outright purchase of assets. In May 2009
the first covered-bonds purchase program started (€60 bln), followed
by second program in October 2011 (€40 bln). Covered bonds were
important source of bank longer-term financing and the ECB intended
to diminish the banks’ borrowing cost and also ease the strains on in-
terbank market. The ECB was the last of the three central banks
to start sovereign bonds purchases. In May 2010, it introduced Se-
curities Markets Programme (SMP) designed to purchase longer-term
sovereign bonds amid the euro-zone debt crisis. In September 2012
it announced creation of Outright Monetary Transations (OMT) in
order to buy short-term government securities.
While all these banks expanded their balance sheet significantly in the
recent years, and therefore experienced quantitative easing, the assets
they accumulated differ importantly. The United States where the fi-
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nancing of the economy passes to the greatest extent through financial
markets, it seemed important that the central bank support directly
these market segments that were the most disrupted: mortgage mar-
kets, CP, ABCP, and ABS. As a result, the claims to private sector
on the Fed balance represent around 30%. In the euro zone on the
other hand, two-thirds of the external financing of firm is allowed by
banks. The claims on banks represent therefore the major part of the
ECB claims.
The approach to sovereign debt purchases is another difference among
the central banks. While the claims on public sector represent a ma-
jor part of the Fed claims and the quasi totality of the BOE claims,
it constitutes much smaller part of the ECB assets. The particular
operational framework of the ECB makes it difficult to proceed to
sovereign debt purchases. In fact, the euro zone is constituted of 17
countries and the purchases of a debt of a particular country can be
politically difficult to accept, especially if this means a wealth transfer
from one country to another.
The central bank communication associated with government bonds
purchases seems also important for this measure’s effectiveness. With
this respect, the ECB had different approach to the Fed. While the
latter precisely described its quantitative easing modalities, the ECB
remained unclear about the amounts of the debt purchased and the
duration of the first sovereign debt program (Securities Markets Pro-
gramme, SMP). The purchases stopped and resumed with no clear
guidelines. Even though the ECB is independent in its actions, it
seems clear that the fierce opposition to bond purchases in Germany
had an impact on the design of the program. The conditionality at-
tached to the second sovereign bond purchases (Outright Monetary
Transactions, OMT) is also a result of the particular euro-zone con-
struction. The ECB can only intervene if the country accepts the
structural reforms and budget consolidation. With this respect, the
ECB exceeds its traditional role as it de facto facilitates governments
financing but also indirectly imposes on them the economic reforms.
The ECB case is not isolated. All central banks implementing un-
conventional monetary policy see their roles transformed whether it
is intended or not. Even though the critics warn against the dan-
gers of increasing and modifying the central bank balance sheet, the
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central banks continue to implement unconventional measures.3 It
seems important to investigate these new central bank functions as
the ZLB constraint is likely to be present for a long time4 and the
unconventional monetary policies may soon consolidate their position
and become a new standard.
The new roles of central banks are linked to sudden increase in aggre-
gate uncertainty: market participants are unwilling to lend funds and
start hoarding liquidity for precautionary reasons. The central banks
can use unconventional monetary policies to diminish the amount of
risk held by private agents in several ways.
First of all, they exercise their lender of last resort (LLR) function and
provide the funds to illiquid banks. In these operations the monetary
authority takes over the liquidity risk by accepting illiquid assets in
return for central bank money or other liquid assets. During the crisis
all central banks provided ample amounts of liquidity in form of excess
reserves or government bonds5 in exchange for less liquid assets. How-
ever, the particularity of the recent five years is that the central banks
practically substituted themselves for the interbank market. The Fed
extended significantly the number of counterparties eligible to its liq-
uidity facilities, the ECB provided banks with unlimited liquidity at
fixed rate (Fixed-rate full-allotment procedure). As the first chapter
of this thesis shows in detail, the availability of the cheap central bank
money while the uncertainty concerning the counterparty risk is high,
can limit the incentive to participate in interbank market which in
turn becomes less liquid.
According to Bagehot (1873)’s conception of the lender of last re-
sort, the lending should be made “on all good banking securities”
and more largely “on every kind of current security, or every sort on
which money is ordinarily and usually lent”. With this respect the
central banks exceeded the conventional conception of the LLR as
they enlarged eligible collateral for their lending operations and also
directly purchased unconventional risky assets. In other words, the
central banks took on their balance sheet the credit risk that the pri-
3ECB announced unlimited sovereign bonds buying program (OMT) on September 6, 2012; Federal Reserve
announced mortgage-backed securities purchases (Quantitative Easing 3) on September 13, 2012; Bank of Japan
increased the total size of its Asset Purchase Program by 10 trillion of yen (14% increase).
4On September 13, the Federal Reserve announced that it would keep the target policy rate in a range 0-0.25% at
least through mid-2015.
5The Fed lent government bonds through Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF).
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vate agents did not want to hold. The Fed for instance exposed its
balance sheet to important amounts of MBS, ABS and the assets of
AIG and Bear Sterns, the ECB distributed unlimited three-year loans
to banks and the Bank of Japan and the Bank of England purchased
commercial papers and corporate bonds. The central bank purchases
of risky assets and accepting them as collateral aimed at reducing the
private cost of credit risk.
Furthermore, the purchases of longer-term government debt, conducted
by four central banks mentioned above to different extent, dimin-
ished sovereign risk held by private agents. Additional consequence
of longer-term government bonds purchases is that they helped the
government to increase the borrowing without having to face higher
interest rates. This is true, especially in the United States, the United
Kingdom and Japan where the long-term interest rates remain at a
very low level (respectively around 1.7%, 1,7% and 0,8%) even though
the governments increased substantially their debt. The central bank
role in financing governments is a controversial one, and the monetary
authorities never stated it as their objective.
New balance sheet management and new functions of the central banks
during the crisis may have important consequences on the behavior of
market participants that are yet difficult to evaluate. The malfunc-
tioning of the interbank market seems permanent now which raises
important questions concerning the future of that market and the im-
pact on the overall health of the banking system. Indeed, an easy
access to funding and little collateral requirements can make the weak
banks with insufficient capital dependent on the central bank’s liquid-
ity. The funding can therefore contribute to maintain “alive” insolvent
banks which would not start lending to the companies and households
even with additional liquidity. This argument was often made with
respect to BOJ accused of artificially maintaining “zombie” banks and
in this way postponing the recovery. During the Japanese crisis the
important provision of liquidity had indeed no impact on aggregate
lending. Only once the disposal of bad loans and recapitalization of
the banks took place the banks started lending again. Therefore, the
central bank liquidity relives banks with funding difficulties but also
lessens the pressure on banks to reform.
Another important issue is linked to the credit risk that the central
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banks accepted on their balance sheet. As the central banks’ profits
are transferred in fine to the Treasury, the taxpayers are directly im-
pacted by the monetary policy decisions. The central banks protected
themselves by imposing important haircuts on accepted collateral and
purchased assets. However, these assets are intended to be kept at
the central banks for a long time. As long as the economy recovers
as planned, they will make profit on these assets. If however another
shock hits the economy and the existing problems are not solved, the
central bank could bear losses and face the dilemma whether to ask the
government for rescue (recapitalization, lending of sovereign bonds) or
just monetize the loss. Both of these outcomes seem undesirable. Mon-
etizing of losses threatens credibility of the central bank and can cause
inflation. On the other hand, covering the losses by the government
brings up the risk of overstepping into fiscal policies. Traditionally, the
central bank would buy securities at the same prices as other financial
market participant would buy them. Since the recent crisis however,
the central banks purchased the assets that were unattractive to pri-
vate agents and arbitrarily decided which market participants would
benefit from its lending operations.
Finally, the critics mention the inflation threat as a consequence of un-
conventional measures. However, the impact of unconventional mone-
tary policies on inflation is more complex. First, it is not certain from
empirical and theoretical point of view that such an effect would ap-
pear. Second, if inflation is a potential danger, it can be at the same
time a beneficiary effect in deflationary environment. We treat this
question in more detail in the first and second chapter of this thesis.
The new roles that the central banks endorsed are vividly criticized
by some researchers and policy-makers and strongly encouraged by
others. The theoretical models currently used by central bankers do
not take into account financial markets disruptions, uncertainty and
the role of the central bank in this environment even though the liter-
ature that takes these features into account is growing rapidly (Adrian
and Song Shin, 2010; Cùrdia and Woodford, 2011; Gertler and Karadi,
2011).
In the next section, we review the transmission channels, according to
existing theory, through which the unconventional monetary policies
might work. We present transmission channels for: (I) Expectation
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management; (II) Expansion of monetary base; (III) Changes in the
composition of the central bank balance sheet. Additionally, we dis-
cuss “financial stability channel”.
2. Unconventional monetary policies transmission channels
A) Expectations management
When the nominal short-term interest rate is close to zero the mone-
tary policy can still stimulate the aggregate demand by affecting the
entire expected future path of short real rates. The central bank can
announce that it will keep the policy rates at exceptionally low levels
or alternatively that it will tolerate more inflation in the future. In
fact, according to New Keynesian models (Eggertsson and Woodford,
2003) current demand depends not only on the current interest rate
but also on the future expected short-term rates and expected infla-
tion. This relationship is expressed by a consumption Euler equation,
derived from the maximization problem of a representative household
(IS curve):
Yt = Et {Yt+1} − σ [it − Et {pit+1} − rnt ]
where Yt is the deviation of output from its natural level, it is the
short-term nominal interest rate, pit is inflation, Et is an expectation
operator and rnt is a natural rate of interest following an exogenous
shock process.
The above equation IS can be reiterated in a following way:
Yt = −σEt
 ∑
0≤k≤∞
(it+k − Et+k {pit+k+1} − rnt+k)

where Et {∑0≤k≤∞(it+k − Et+k {pit+k+1})} can be considered as a real
long-term interest rate. Long-term real interest rates are the crucial
transmission mechanism of monetary policy and have an important
effect on durable goods expenditures and business investment. More-
over, from the finance perspective, long-term rates are fundamental
determinants of mortgage prices, derivatives and other long-term fi-
nancial assets. Therefore, the monetary policy can still be effective at
zero lower bound and spur the aggregate demand by making a credible
commitment about the expected path for future interest rates and fu-
ture inflation. The central bank should commit to set the interest rates
at the lower level then the Taylor rule might call once the economy
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starts to recover. The Fed implemented this strategy since it lowered
its policy rates to 0-0.25% range. An alternative to committing to
lower interest in the future, nominal GDP target path, was proposed
by Romer (2010) and Woodford (2012). According to this proposition
the Fed would pledge to maintain the funds rate target at its lower
bound as long as nominal GDP remains below a deterministic target
path. This strategy equals to tolerating higher inflation in the future
until the nominal GDP target is met.
Nevertheless, expectation management strategy suffers from intertem-
poral credibility problem as the Fed has an incentive to raise interest
rates when the economy recovers. The market participants expect the
Fed to give up on its promise when the inflation increases and, as a
result, do not change their expectations. The central bank has how-
ever additional tool to make its commitment more credible: monetary
base expansion via longer-term assets purchasing. In this context,
raising interest rates would automatically diminish the value of the
central bank assets and even create losses. This “signaling channel”
of monetary base expansion will be discussed in the subsection C) of
this Introduction.
B) Changes in the composition of the central bank balance
sheet (Credit easing)
Another tool at the disposal of the central bank when the interest
rates are close to zero is to purchase, or accept as collateral, assets
that are not traditionally accepted by the central bank. Indeed, in
normal times the central bank sets the short-term rates close to the
target rate via open market operations in which it buys or sells govern-
ment securities (usually short-term). In a period of financial distress
however, it can modify the composition of its assets by purchasing
the securities that suffer from temporary liquidity problems or are un-
dervalued by the financial markets. The effectiveness of this policy is
based on the “portfolio balance effect”. The theoretical basis of the
open-market purchases of non-standard assets were set by Eggerts-
son and Woodford (2003). Their representative agent model predicts
no effect for such operations on price level or output. However, this
result holds only under following assumptions: (1) the assets being
bought and sold are valued only for their pecuniary returns, and (2)
all investors can purchase and sell unlimited quantities of these assets.
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These assumptions are likely not to hold during crisis, especially the
latter, as there exist binding constraints on participation in particular
markets. One example of general equilibrium analysis in which these
constraints exist and credit easing affects asset prices is Cùrdia and
Woodford (2011). As for the first assumption, Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) show that US government debt possesses
non-pecuniary qualities that are valued by the financial sector above
their pure pecuniary returns as the Treasuries are often required as
collateral in repo transactions. Furthermore, replacing a representa-
tive agent with no preference between markets and assets by heteroge-
neous agents can also provide rationale for central bank asset purchas-
ing. The recent model of Vayanos and Vila (2009) based on preferred
habitats of investors provides a theoretical basis for the portfolio re-
balancing effect in case of long-term government bond purchases. In
their model, the interest rates of all maturities are determined through
the interaction between risk-averse arbitrageurs and investor clienteles
with preferences for specific maturities. In this framework the central
bank purchases of long-term Treasuries can lower the long-term yields
because they shorten the average maturity of government debt and
therefore the duration risk held by market participants.
Changing the composition of the central bank balance sheet can take
several forms depending on the central bank objective and its oper-
ational constraints. Fist, the central bank can buy or accept as col-
lateral specific assets that it considers as particularly touched by the
crisis and at the same time important to the economy. In doing so
it intends to increase their prices and as a result the wealth of eco-
nomic agents. The Fed supported MBS, ABS, commercial papers and
asset-backed commercial papers for example while the ECB bought
covered bonds and the BOE corporate bonds and commercial papers.
While delivering private agents from the risk linked to these assets,
the central bank accumulated it on its own balance sheet.
Longer-term liquidity providing operations are also a part of central
bank balance sheet composition change. Traditionally, the loans to
banks are of maximum three-month maturity. This maturity was ex-
tended by many central banks and reached 3 years in case of the ECB
longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs). The interbank market
was not functioning anymore and the central bank wanted to give to
15
banks insurance of obtaining the longer-term funding they need. As
a consequence, the ECB took on its balance sheet the risk of such
longer-term lending, including eventual default of borrowing banks
and maintaining insolvent banks operational.
Accumulation of public debt on central bank balance sheet is another
form of credit easing. The central bank purchases of government bonds
can affect their prices via portfolio rebalancing effect mentioned earlier
but also by diminishing the risk of sovereign default. This second
channel was particularly important in the euro-zone as some member
countries lost access to market refinancing. Monetary policy cannot
in principle guarantee public debt. However, the sovereign debt crisis
showed that when agents are pricing in the supposed default of a
given country, it can lead to self-fulfilling bad equilibrium outcome
and large purchases of public debt can prevent it. Even though the
specific European stability facilities were created (EFSF/ESM), only
the central bank can commit to unlimited purchases of the debt.
“Pure” credit easing would consist of purchasing risky assets while sell-
ing safe assets that the central banks held already on its balance sheet.
An example of this policy is given by “Twist Operation” conducted by
the Fed since September 2011 which consists in buying long-term gov-
ernment securities while selling short-term Treasury bills. However, in
most of the cases, the purchases of risky assets or accepting them as
a collateral entail monetary base increase. Table 1.2 of the Chapter
1 presents schematically the difference between pure quantitative and
qualitative easing.
C) Monetary base expansion (Quantitative easing)
Expansion of monetary base is also a controversial policy from a the-
oretical point of view. Traditionally, the reduced-form quantitative
theory of money argued that increase in money supply will result in
higher inflation. However, this theory requires that the velocity of
money is constant over time which is not empirically verified. Also,
this theory refers to the supply of money and not monetary base. New
monetarists underline for instance that according to Divisia M3 and
M4 monetary indices the money supply in the U.S. today is no higher
than in early 2008.
The old Keynesian literature (Keynes (1936) and Hicks (1937)) em-
phasized on the other hand that increasing money supply when the
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policy rate is close to zero would not have effect on either output or
prices. Additional money provided by the central bank is not used to
purchase securities as the agents expect the interest rate to increase
and the prices of securities to fall. Therefore they are in a “liquid-
ity trap” and hold money instead. New Keynesian theories, such as
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Woodford (2012), confirm the
ineffectiveness of monetary base expansion in a general equilibrium
framework. They claim that at the zero lower bound quantitative
easing cannot stimulate the output nor raise the prices. As in case
of credit easing, when financial frictions are present and liquidity of
assets is affected, quantitative easing may be non-neutral. In par-
ticular, increase in money supply could reduce the liquidity premium
and therefore reduce long-term interest rates (Andres et al., 2004) and
stimulate investment (Kiyotaki and Moore, 2012).
In addition to the quantity effect (portfolio rebalancing) which af-
fects risk premium, there exist another channel which has an impact
on private sector’s expectations of the future monetary policy. This
transmission channel is called “signaling effect”. Important expansion
of the central bank’s balance sheet often requires purchasing long-term
Treasury bonds or other risky assets that the central bank plans to
keep on its balance sheet for an extended period of time. Raising
interest rates would expose the central bank to capital losses on the
assets it holds. Therefore important increases of monetary base can
be associated by financial markets with a signal that the monetary
easing will continue longer than previously expected. In this respect,
managing expectations about the future money supply is more im-
portant than the current money supply. For instance, committing to
permanent increases in monetary base could increase private sector’s
inflation expectations (Auerbach and Obstfeld, 2005). Credible com-
mitment about permanent monetary expansion makes agents expect
that the interest rates will remain low even when the zero lower bound
does not bind anymore, especially if it conducted via risky asset pur-
chases.
The link between monetary base expansion and inflation is there-
fore not straightforward. The experience of the central banks that
increased substantially their balance sheet, BOJ between 2001 and
2006 among others, has not provided evidence of inflation expecta-
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tions unanchoring. The main risk linked to monetary base expansion
seem to be the important amount of risky assets that the central bank
accepted on its balance sheet (See Chapter 1).
D) Supporting financial stability
The additional channel through which the three types of unconven-
tional monetary policies described above could affect the economy is
by stabilizing the financial system. In a 2008-2009 financial crisis the
overall functioning of the financial system was impaired due to the
malfunctioning of interbank money markets. Increased risk and liq-
uidity premia on large segments of financial market froze the credit
channel of the monetary policy. Various unconventional monetary
policies were designed to encourage the flow of credit to firms and
households and thus contribute to minimizing the economic downturn.
Indeed, the central bank can have stabilizing effects on financial mar-
kets by making credible commitment about maintaining target rates
at very low level for a long time, by injecting liquidity to the sys-
tem and supporting specific segments of money and credit markets.
These measures may be effective in stabilizing the system for several
reasons. First, they relieve the liquidity constraints of financial insti-
tutions and therefore reduce the incentive to sell their assets to meet
their own refinancing needs. They also reduce the banks’ uncertainty
with respect to funding liquidity of other market participants and
therefore diminish counterparty risk premia. Finally, the additional
funding source from the central bank should decrease the demand for
banks to excessively hoard liquidity for precautionary reasons. The
liquidity constraints of financial institutions have negative impact on
their lending capabilities and may result in credit crunch. The cen-
tral bank unconventional measures by ensuring funding liquidity can
diminish these adverse effects.
3. Objective and organization of the thesis
Unconventional monetary policies are relatively recent phenomenon
and there are vivid debates on theoretical and empirical level aiming
to establish which policies and under what conditions are desirable.
This thesis makes a contribution to this debate and its objective is
twofold. First, we intend to bring new evidence on the effectiveness of
unconventional measures and contribute to their better understanding
(Chapters 1, 2 and 3). Furthermore, we build a theoretical frame-
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work that accounts for a disaster probability perceived by investors,
a particular feature that prepares the background for unconventional
monetary policy intervention (Chapter 4).
The first chapter of the thesis highlights the multiple ways of un-
conventional monetary policy implementation and the importance of
choosing appropriate measures according to country-specific problems.
More precisely, it compares recent unconventional measures in the
United States (2007-2010) with the first big-scale unconventional ex-
perience in Japan (1999-2006). Both central banks implemented three
types of unconventional monetary policy: expectation management,
monetary base expansion and purchases of risky assets. We argue
however that the U.S. unconventional balance-sheet management was
“asset-driven” whereas the Japanese more “liabilities-driven”. While
the BOJ intended to increase the excess reserves to banks so that they
expand their lending, the Fed intervened directly in financial markets
they wanted to support. We investigate the impact of non-standard
measures on the private banks’ balance sheets, and in particular on
lending to other banks, companies and households. The interbank
lending slowed down in both countries but in the U.S. to much bigger
extent. On the contrary, the lending to companies diminished more
in Japan as there was double deleveraging process in firms and finan-
cial institutions. Furthermore, we discuss the empirical evidence for
the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policies in Japan and in
the U.S. It appears that in Japan “expectation management strat-
egy” contributed to lowering long-term yield, whereas in the U.S. the
sovereign bond purchases proved more effective (portfolio rebalancing
effect). The different effect of non-orthodox tools in Japan and in
the U.S. can be attributed to overall strategies of the central banks:
the Fed purchased aggressively risky assets while the BOJ intended
to provide large amounts of excess reserves to banks without taking
too much risk. Finally, we discuss risks connected to unconventional
policies. While inflation does not seem to be immediate danger, the
important credit risk on the Fed’s balance sheet brings up concerns
about overstepping into fiscal policy and threatens the Fed’s indepen-
dence. On the other hand, the reluctance of the BOJ to employ credit
and quantitative easing more aggressively undermined its effectiveness
in countering deleveraging pressures and deflation.
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Chapters 2 and 3 evaluate, via econometric techniques, the effective-
ness of unconventional monetary policies in the United States and in
the euro zone. Chapter 2 measures the impact of unconventional and
conventional monetary policies in the U.S. on the Libor-OIS spread,
long-term interest rates and long-term inflation expectations. To this
purpose we investigate the behavior of selected asset yields on the
days of monetary policy announcements. We find that liquidity fa-
cilities other than TAF reduced the three-month Libor-OIS spread.
The QE1 purchases of longer-term Treasury securities and agency
debt/MBS lowered nominal long-term interest rates. Furthermore,
we find evidence that the Fed’s rescue operations and QE2 raised
long-term inflation expectations. We also consider the impact of fiscal
policy announcements. We find that the government bailouts reduced
the three-month Libor-OIS spread while the fiscal stimulus announce-
ments raised long-term inflation expectations.
Chapter 3 assesses the impact of the ECB unconventional monetary
policies on banks’ and governments’ borrowing conditions in the euro
zone via event-based regression. The market borrowing conditions
for banks are represented by the changes in money market spreads
and covered bonds spreads while the sovereign bonds spreads reflect
the euro-zone government borrowing costs. The results show that
among ECB unconventional measures, the two sovereign bonds pur-
chasing programs (SMP and OMT) proved the most effective in low-
ering longer-term asset yields. The effects are the most important for
the sovereign spreads in the Southern European and range from 35
basis points (Italy) to 476 basis points (Greece) in case of SMP. As
a comparison, the U.S. and U.K. sovereign spreads also fell follow-
ing the quantitative easing implemented by the Fed and the Bank of
England but the magnitude of the effect was much smaller: 5 and 9
basis points respectively. The strong impact in the euro zone suggests
that the central bank intervention in sovereign market is particularly
effective when the sovereign risk is important. The SMP had also
the strongest impact on covered bonds spreads. Furthermore, covered
bonds purchases programs reduced covered bond spreads, sovereign
bond spreads and to some extent the money market spreads. The
3-year LTRO announcement on the other hand succeeded in reducing
bank refinancing conditions but was ineffective in diminishing govern-
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ment borrowing costs.
In the fourth chapter we initiate a theoretical work that reproduces im-
portant feature of recent crisis: a sudden increase in disaster risk that
generates a recession, a fall in inflation, a flight to quality in terms of
asset demand, depresses investment and labor, as well as lowers con-
sumption. More precisely, we incorporate a small and time-varying
“disaster risk” à la Gourio (2012) in a New Keynesian model. A small
change in the probability of disaster may affect macroeconomic quan-
tities and asset prices. In particular, a higher disaster probability is
sufficient to generate increase in risk premium and leads to recession
without effective occurrence of the disaster. By accounting for mo-
nopolistic competition, price stickiness, and a Taylor-type rule, this
chapter provides a baseline framework of the dynamic interactions be-
tween the macroeconomic effects of rare events and nominal rigidity,
particularly suitable for further analysis of monetary policy. This the-
oretic set-up allows taking into account particularities of the 2007-2010
crisis, namely the agents’ perception of risk. This particular feature
of the crisis was the rationale for the unconventional central bank in-
tervention, policy rates being close to zero and ineffective. We also
set up our next research agenda aimed at assessing the desirability of
several unconventional policy measures in case of a variation in the
probability of rare events.
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1 Unconventional monetary policies in the
United States (2007-2010) in the light of
the Japanese experience (1999-2006)1
1.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the subprime crisis, the Federal Reserve (Fed)
reacted very promptly to turbulence on financial markets by changing
its usual monetary policy. The implemented unconventional monetary
policies can be regrouped into three categories2: i) expectation man-
agement, ii) central bank balance sheet expansion and iii) changing
the composition of the central bank balance sheet. The first consisted
in credibly committing to lower future short-term interest in the fu-
ture, and therefore reduce long-term interest rates. The second type
of policy consist in increasing the monetary base and provide banks
with excess reserves in order to stimulate asset prices increase and
lending to economy. Finally, the third strategy requires purchasing or
accepting as collateral unconventional, risky assets in order to affect
their yields and prices.
These policies were previously carried out in Japan between 1999 and
2006 during the deflation period. However, the intensity and modal-
ities of these unconventional measures were different in the United
States and in Japan as the two countries have different economic and
financial structures. Moreover, the Fed could use the Japanese expe-
rience to better design their unconventional monetary policy toolkit.3
While evaluating the effectiveness of unconventional monetary poli-
cies, it seems particularly important to take into consideration country-
specific factors as well as the intensity with which each unconventional
tool was employed.
1I would like to thank my supervisors Pierpaolo Benigno and Henri Sterdyniak for their guidance and valuable
advice. I am also grateful to Agnès Benassy-Quéré for helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors are mine.
2For the details of these policies and their theoretical transmission channels see General Introduction (Section 2)
of this thesis.
3President of the Fed, Ben Bernanke, before joining the Fed carried out research on Japanese unconventional
monetary policies (Bernanke and Reinhart (2004); Bernanke et al. (2004)).
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This paper compares the non-standard measures implemented by the
Fed during the recent financial crisis with the first large-scale uncon-
ventional monetary experience in Japan from 1999 to 2006, with a
particular focus on the balance sheet management in both countries.
The analysis of the Japanese experience seems interesting as the Fed
used a wide range of tools that were previously employed by the BOJ.
There are many concerns concerning their effectiveness and the time
past since these measures were wound up in Japan allows necessary
perspective to analyze their effects.
First, we argue that the U.S. unconventional balance-sheet manage-
ment was “asset-driven” whereas the Japanese more “liabilities-driven”.
Different balance sheet management reflects different underlying eco-
nomic problems in the U.S. and Japan (bad security vs bad loan issue)
and different expected results (lowering specific asset prices vs fight-
ing deflation). Accordingly, the Fed’s exit strategy is more challenging
that the BOJ’s exit and requires additional tools.
Second, we investigate the impact of non-standard measures on the
private banks’ balance sheets, and in particular on lending to other
banks, companies and households. The interbank lending slowed down
in both countries but in the U.S. to much bigger extent. On the
contrary, the lending to companies diminished more in Japan as there
was double deleveraging process in firms and financial institutions.
Finally, we discuss the empirical results of unconventional policies in
the United states and in Japan. The money market disruption be-
ing much more important in the U.S., the empirical evidence on the
impact of non-standard measures on interbank lending rates is much
more available for the U.S. market. The effectiveness of liquidity mea-
sures in reducing money market spreads is overall rather weak. This
results, joint with the evidence from commercial banks balance sheets,
support our argument that money markets are less relevant as the Fed
substituted itself for the interbank market.
The impact of unconventional measures on long-term interest rates is
not the same in the United States and in Japan. As Fed government
purchases were implemented on much larger scale, they succeeded in
reducing long-term interest rates via “portfolio rebalancing” channel.
In Japan on the other hand, the long-term interest rates were dimin-
ished via “expectation management” channel.
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1.2 Implementation of unconventional monetary policies in the United States and Japan
While inflation does not seem to be immediate danger, the impor-
tant credit risk on the Fed’s balance sheet brings up concerns about
overstepping into fiscal policy and threatens the Fed’s independence.
On the other hand, the reluctance of the BOJ to employ credit and
quantitative easing more aggressively undermined its effectiveness in
countering deleveraging pressures and deflation.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. The following
section presents the way unconventional monetary policies were im-
plemented in the U.S. and in Japan, with particular focus on balance
sheet management. Section 1.3 analyzes the impact of non-standard
measures on private banks balance sheets. Section 1.4 reviews empir-
ical evidence on effectiveness of the non-standard measures on long-
term interest rates, money market rates and inflation expectations.
In section 1.5 we discuss risks linked to unconventional balance sheet
management. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Implementation of unconventional monetary policies in the
United States and Japan
1.2.1 Unconventional monetary policies implemented in the United States
and Japan
Bank of Japan (1999-2006)
The Bank of Japan was the first to implement unconventional mone-
tary policies during the prolonged stagnation following the burst of the
asset price bubble in the early 1990s. During that period, it also faced
some serious deflationary pressures for about a decade. Negative in-
flation rates measured by the consumer price index (CPI) change first
appeared in 1998 and lasted until the autumn 2005. To counteract
the deflationary pressure, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) adopted various
unconventional policies. First, in 1995, it lowered the target of the
uncollateralized overnight call rate from 1.75 percent to 0.5 percent.
Second, it decided to encourage the uncollateralized call rate to be
at about zero percent in February 1999. This was the introduction
of the so-called “zero interest rate policy (ZIRP)”. Afterward, at the
BOJ governor’s press conference in April 1999, the BOJ committed
to continue ZIRP “until deflationary concerns were dispelled”. Third,
in March 2001 the BOJ adopted “quantitative monetary easing policy
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(QMEP)” with a large expansion of the monetary base. In doing so,
the BOJ had also made a stronger commitment to maintain this pol-
icy package until the core CPI inflation rate registered zero percent or
higher on a sustainable basis.4 The QMEP framework included em-
ploying by the BOJ the outstanding current account balances (CABs)5
as an operating target for monetary market operations. In addition, it
was also declared that the BOJ was ready to increase the purchase of
long-term government bonds if necessary to provide ample liquidity.
The BOJ also proceeded to purchases of other risky assets: purchased
asset-backed securities (from July 2003 to March 2006) and stocks held
by commercial banks (from October 2002 to September 2003). The
QMEP was exited in March 2006 when the conditions for the exit had
been satisfied, i.e. both the development of actual inflation rate and
outlook of inflation rate were above zero percent.
Federal Reserve (2007-2011)
During the 2007-2010 crisis, other central banks also used alternative
monetary tools. The generalized uncertainty regarding the healthiness
of bank balance sheets generated frictions in the financial and mone-
tary markets. In that context, lowering the central bank interest rates
did not affect the interbank rates to the extent it used to do. As a con-
sequence, monetary policy remained unable to lower the cost of credit.
The Federal Reserve responded to this problem in a number of ways.
First of all, it introduced new liquidity facilities. It also expanded the
maturities and range of eligible collateral, the frequency of operations
and the number of counter-parties. As the crisis got worse, especially
after the failure of Lehman Brothers, the unconventional monetary
policies were implemented even more intensively. The Fed started its
interventions in specific market segments and initiated the asset pur-
chase programs including commercial papers, agency debt and MBS
as well as longer-term government debt. The Fed also conceded swap
lines to other central banks to enable them to provide further dollar
liquidity. Figure 1.1 illustrates the way the unconventional policies
affected the Fed’s balance sheet. Since the beginning of the crisis the
composition of the Fed’s assets was significantly altered and the size
of the balance sheet more than doubled. In addition to the balance
4The commitment was further specified in October 2003.
5Current account balances (CABs) are the reserves that the commercial banks keep at the BOJ.
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sheet management policy, the Fed committed to keeping the interest
rates at “exceptionally low levels for an extended period of time”. This
commitment was subsequently reinforced as Fed stated that the eco-
nomic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the
federal funds rate at least through mid-2015.6
1.2.2 From Japanese Quantitative Easing to the U.S. Credit Easing
Expectations management, credit easing and quantitative easing were
implemented both by the Fed and by the BOJ (Table 1.1). However,
there were important differences in the implementation of the policies,
especially as far as balance sheet management is concerned. Uncon-
ventional balance sheet management can depart from its conventional
structure (Table 1.2a) and can take form of the changes in the com-
position of the balance sheet (Table 1.2b), balance sheet expansion
(Table 1.2c), or the mix of both (Table 1.2d). The President of the
Fed, Ben Bernanke, in his speech on January 13, 2009 (Bernanke,
2009) stressed the differences between the BOJ and the Fed’s balance
sheet management approach. While implementing the quantitative
easing the BOJ focused on the liability side of the balance sheet and
therefore set the excess reserves targets to attain. The Fed on the
other hand put attention on the asset side of the balance sheet and
on its composition in particular. The core of the crisis in the Fed’s
point of view was a credit crisis and the fact that increased uncertainty
discouraged private lenders from lending to each other. In addition,
securitization of certain assets was a particular characteristic of the
subprime crisis. Once the crisis started the general uncertainty about
the quality of several segments of the financial market made the private
agents reluctant to buy these financial instruments. As a result the
Fed concentrated on the types of assets it wanted to support substitut-
ing itself as a main “market maker”. This “credit easing” approach is
particularly well reflected on the Fed’s balance sheet in the first stage
of the crisis. The Fed wanted to improve the market functioning by
introducing new lending facilities (see Table 1.3 for the description of
the programs) and lending to banking and non-banking institutions.
Figure 1.2b shows that between August 2007 - September 2008 the
asset side of the Fed’s balance sheet changed its composition, while
6The FOMC decision of September 13, 2012.
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the composition of liabilities remained the same. These balance sheet
developments are an illustration of the “pure credit easing” as they did
not lead to the balance sheet expansion. After the Lehman Brothers
collapse, the Fed’s balance sheet started to inflate (Figure 1.2c). The
expansion was due to the large-scale purchases of mortgage-backed
securities and agency and Treasury debt (Quantitative easing 1), fol-
lowed by another important Treasury debt purchases (Quantitative
easing 2). Even though the Fed did not set the target for excess re-
serves as the BOJ did in Japan between 2001-2006, the excess reserves
increased dramatically. During this period of the crisis the Fed imple-
mented a mix of credit and quantitative easing. While changing the
composition of its assets by increasing holding of unconventional as-
sets such as long-term Treasury bonds, MBS and the loans to rescued
financial institutions (AIG, Bear Stearns etc.), the Fed also increased
the size of the balance sheet.
The BOJ also implemented a mix of credit and quantitative easing
but focused mainly on the liability side. There is a difference between
these two approaches even though they are not mutually exclusive. By
focusing principally on the composition of the asset side, the Fed posi-
tioned itself as a “market maker of last resort” and in fact substituted
itself for private financial intermediation. On the other hand, the lia-
bility management and in particular the increase in excess reserves is
a way to provide the banks with the buffer for funding liquidity risk.
There was also an intended effect on investor’s portfolio rebalancing:
the excess reserves were supposed to be used by banks to purchase
riskier assets and distribute credit, eventually leading to inflation in-
crease. Therefore, in Japan the asset side composition changed mainly
as a result of increases in targeted current account balances on the li-
ability side. The BOJ explicitly considered the purchases of the long-
term JGBs as a part of its QMEP and as a mean to attain its CAB
target. On the contrary, in the United States, the liability side followed
the asset side expansion at the Fed. The U.S. monetary authority de-
cided to acquire specific financial assets and as a consequence of these
purchases it credited the private banks accounts at the Fed (excess
reserves increased). Unlike the BOJ they did not mention that these
purchases would increase the money supply which would in turn have
a positive effect on the economy. The effect of these operations on
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the economy was not supposed to come from changing the supply of
banks reserves but by changing the quantity of risky assets held by
the Fed.
The different approach to unconventional balance sheet management
can be partly explained by the differences in the source of the eco-
nomic crisis in Japan and in the United States. In both countries the
housing bubble preceded the crisis and the bubble burst had an ad-
verse impact on the activity of financial institutions that used to lend
to property-related businesses. Even though the non-performing loans
were a problem in both countries, the specificity of the crisis that hit
the U.S. was that the mortgage loans were securitized and there was an
increased uncertainty about the health of financial institutions hold-
ing these securitized assets. Therefore, the Japanese crisis was more
linked to a “bad loan problem” whereas the financial crisis in the U.S.
to a “bad security problem”. Given that the initial bad-security prob-
lem was enhanced by the lack of transparency on the quality of these
instruments after the crisis started, the couterparty risk increased as
a consequence and the Fed’s intervention in particular segments of
market seems justified. Another explanation for the different weight
attributed to purchasing targeted assets (credit easing) rather than
simply providing excess liquidity (quantitative easing) is linked to the
different primary objective of the Bank of Japan and the Fed during
the crisis. The former intended principally to fight deflation whereas
the latter had an objective of financial stability, even though the de-
flation concern was also present in the United States. Finally, the
possible rationale for the Fed to intervene directly and aggressively
on credit markets and Treasury and agency bonds market was that it
doubted that the simple monetary base increase could be enough to
stimulate the economy.7
In the next section we will describe in more details balance sheet
management in Japan and in the United States.
1.2.3 Balance sheet management in the US
Asset management
The is no unique choice of the unconventional assets that the central
bank can buy or accept as a collateral as part of its unconventional
7The empirical evidence shows that monetary expansion in Japan was not successful (see section 1.4).
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monetary policy. The choice depends on the nature of the shock hit-
ting the economy and on the economy’s financial structure. In the
beginning of the subprime crisis the general uncertainty about banks’
liquidity and solvency made banks reluctant to lend to each other. The
interest rates on interbank markets historically followed very closely
the Fed’s target rate but since August 2007 the spread between inter-
bank rate (Libor) and expectations of future policy rate (OIS) widened
significantly (Figure 1.3a). To counter the tensions on the interbank
market the Fed launched the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program
designed to lend to depositary institutions. Given that primary dealers
are important part of the U.S. financial system, after the bankruptcy
of Bearn Sterns the Fed introduced two facilities providing primary
dealer with discount window loans (PDCF) and Treasury securities in
exchange for the risky assets (TSLF).
As the crisis worsened after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the
markets for several debt instruments were severely damaged making
it difficult for the financial and non-financial institutions to refinance
themselves. The commercial paper and asset-backed commercial pa-
per markets were particularly disrupted. The Fed introduced new
funding facilities to diminish the spreads on these markets (Figure 1.3b
and Figure 1.3c). Finally, in March 2009 in cooperation with the Trea-
sury the Fed launched the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facil-
ity (TALF) intended to revive the market for ABS. In 2009 the Fed
started purchasing longer-term Treasury debt as well as the Agency
debt and mortgage-backed securities (QE1). By changing the demand
for these assets the Fed intended to lower their yields. In 2010 the
purchases of the longer-term Treasury debt resumed. All these opera-
tions contributed to the change of the composition and the size of the
Fed’s balance sheet. Whereas the liquidity facilities were temporary
and are not any longer present on the Fed’s balance sheet, the large
amount of MBS, longer-term Agency and Treasury debt and credit
to financial institutions (AIG, Bear Sterns) are still part of the Fed’s
assets.
Liability management
Before the crisis, the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet is mostly
composed of the currency in circulation (Figure 1.2a). In the first
stage of the crisis, the Fed sterilized the purchases of unconventional
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assets by selling its holdings of short and medium-term Treasury se-
curities. Unlike the asset side, the composition of the liability side re-
mained unchanged during this period (Figure 1.2b). Nevertheless, af-
ter the Lehman Brothers collapse the sterilization operations could not
cover the the supplementary liquidity and lending programs launched
by the Fed and its balance sheet started to expand (Figure 1.2c). Ini-
tially, the increasing volumes of Fed’s assets were accompanied by
increasing the Treasury account at the Fed.8 This approach could not
last as the Treasury could not issue debt without limits. Therefore,
in order to increase its lending and asset purchases, the Fed started
to credit the commercial banks’ accounts at the Fed with the excess
reserves.
In normal times, increase in amounts of excess reserves would have
immediately lowered overnight federal funds rates and stimulated ag-
gregate lending. Figure 1.3 shows that the average overnight rate
stays indeed often below the target rate during the crisis period but
this decline is very small compared to liquidity injected. Indeed, as we
will discuss in the next section, the uncertainty concerning the finan-
cial heath of financial institutions made the banks hold most of their
excess reserves idle at the Fed rather than lending them out. Given
the possibility that once the economy recovers, the banks should be
willing to use their funds to make new loans the Fed introduced mea-
sures that would encourage banks to keep their reserves at the central
bank. First of all, it decided to pay an interest on excess reserves.
Figure 1.3 shows the impact of the announcements about the inter-
est rates payments on the effective overnight Fed Funds rate and the
spread between the effective rate and the target which became neg-
ative. Announcements about raising interest paid on excess reserves
seem to make deposits at the Fed more attractive and as a result
increase the effective overnight rate.9
The Term Deposit Facility introduced in May 2010 was another tool
8In practice, this cooperation between Treasury and the Fed can be seen as two simultaneous operations: purchase
of the risky asset from commercial bank by the Fed and the purchase of the government security from the Treasury
by the commercial bank. More specificaaly, the Fed buys unconventional assets from a commercial bank and
increases its account at the Fed. At the same time, Treasury sells a Treasury securities to the commercial bank.
The commercial bank’s account at the Fed is reduced and the money is transferred to the Treasury account at
the Fed. As a result, the Treasury account at the Fed increases while the excess reserves of a commercial bank
remains unchanged.
9Nevertheless, the effective rate is still lower than the target rate even when the interest rates on excess reserves
equals the target rate. This can be explained by the fact that not all interbank participants have accounts at
the Fed. Additionally, the arbitrage is is made unprofitable when the interest rates are close to zero as the banks
have to pay the fees when withdrawing funds from the Fed.
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designed to encourage the banks to keep the reserves at the Fed. Term
deposits are interest-rate bearing instruments with maturity of 84 days
or less. This facility allows the Fed to lock up funds for longer time.
Interest on reserves and term deposit accounts give commercial banks
incentive to keep their newly created reserves at the Fed. By im-
plementing these measures the Fed attains two goals. First, it can
continue to manage the asset side according to its objectives, i.e. pur-
chase targeted assets and lend to specific segments of financial markets,
which require expanded balance sheet. Second, it sends signal to the
markets that the Fed has tools to prevent the excess reserves to be
transformed into credit and eventually create inflation. However, this
approach has some potential drawbacks. It makes the Fed become
the major actor of the interbank market as the banks prefer to keep
the funds at the central bank rather than to lend to each other or
to companies and households. Also, it supposes that the Fed has a
better understanding than financial markets of what assets should be
purchased.
This analysis of the balance sheet management of the Fed shows that
it focused indeed on credit easing and intended the changes in relative
asset supplies to reduce liquidity and risk premia in dysfunctional
markets. This approach differs from that adopted by the Bank of
Japan which concentrated on the liabilities side management.
1.2.4 Balance sheet management in the Japan
Liability management
When the BOJ started quantitative monetary easing policy (QMEP)
on March 19, 2001 it switched its main operating target from the
uncollateralized overnight interest rate to the outstanding balances of
current account balances (CABs). The target was at first fixed at ¥5
trillion and then raised several times to ¥30-35 trillion (the required
reserves amounted to ¥4 trillion). Indeed, the excess reserves that
commercial banks held at the BOJ increased in previously unseen
pace (Figure 1.4 ). As a consequence the money market rates went
virtually to zero (Figure 1.5).
The BOJ did not pay the commercial banks interests on excess reserves
as its goal was to encourage banks to expand lending. In March 2006
the BOJ terminated QMEP and announced that the CABs would be
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reduced within seven months according to the money market condi-
tions. The winding down of the quantitative easing was successful and
did not create interbank money market tensions.
Asset management
To meet the CABs target the BOJ proceeded to outright purchases
of long-term Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs). These purchases
accounted for the highest percentage of assets acquired in exchange
for the Current account balances at the BOJ (Figure 1.4 B). These
purchases gradually increased to match the CABs target to attain to
1.2 trillion yen in May 2004. In the pursuit of QMEP, the BOJ had
also implement longer-dated intervention in the money market, in par-
ticular it extended the maximum maturity for outright purchases of
bank bills and purchases of JGSs with repurchase agreements to up to
one year. In fact, given the negative real interest rate it was difficult
to find borrowers willing to pay positive interest rate at short maturi-
ties. Therefore, to meet the CABs target the BOJ had to lengthen the
maturity of outright purchases of bills (the lending maturities) from
the three-month operations in 2001 to 11-month in 2005 and also ex-
pand the range of counterparties in these operations (Maeda et al.,
2005). The purchases of bank bills was an important part of short-
term liquidity provisions and played an important role in the BOJ exit
strategy.
Apart from changes in asset composition induced by QMEP, the BOJ
also implemented the credit easing strategy to reduce risk and liquid-
ity premia on selected markets. These operations were executed on a
much smaller scale compared to purchases of JGBs (Figure 1.4) and
were linked to non-performing loans of financial institutions. Faced
with the credit crunch of 1998 the BOJ decided to take commercial pa-
per (CP) as a collateral in repo operations. As the NPL problem reap-
peared in late 2002, the BOJ purchased subsequently the stocks held
by commercial banks from October 2002 to September 2003. Addi-
tionally, from July 2003 to March 2006 it also purchased asset-backed
securities (ABS) and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) as it
wanted to improve the transmission of monetary policy to credit mar-
kets. Given the importance of the banking system in the financing of
the Japanese economy, most credit easing measures, with the excep-
tion of limited ABS purchases, were designed to address the problems
33
Chapter 1
Unconventional monetary policies in the United States (2007-2010) in the light of the Japanese
experience (1999-2006)
of the banks.
1.2.5 Exit strategies
During the troubled times the excess reserves that banks hold at the
central bank do not transform into lending and they do not constitute
an inflationary threat. Once the economy recovers, the central banks
have several tools at their disposal to prevent the banks from using
the injected liquidity to distribute credit to economy. First, they can
encourage private banks to keep funds at the central bank by paying
interest on excess reserves or proposing term-deposits to private banks.
They can also issue central bank debt or, depending on the monetary
framework, they can raise the interest rate for the emergency loans
(discount rate in the United States or Basic Discount rate in Japan).
However the exit strategy from unconventional balance sheet manage-
ment requires the size and composition of the balance sheet to get
back to normal. This can be achieved via traditional reverse repur-
chase agreements or outright sales of conventional and unconventional
assets. Moreover, the central banks can let some assets mature and not
reinvest the proceeds which naturally diminishes their balance sheet
size. Given the significant differences in balance sheet management,
the exit strategy seems much more challenging for the Fed than to
Bank of Japan.
1.2.5.1 Japan
The Bank of Japan announced the exit from the QMEP on March
9, 2006 indicating clearly that the reduction of the excess reserves
amount would be conducted through adjustments of its liquidity op-
erations and not by a immediate reduction of its holdings of Japanese
government securities.10 The BOJ did not want to proceed to large-
scale sales of long-term JGBs in order to preserve their value and
prevent long-term interest rates increase. The portfolio of long-term
bonds would decline naturally as some of the securities mature. In-
10The BOJ announcement on March 9, 2006: “The outstanding balance of current accounts at the Bank of Japan
will be reduced towards a level in line with required reserves. . . . the reduction in current account balance is
expected to be carried out over a period of a few months, taking full account of conditions in the short-term
money market. The process will be managed through short-term money market operations. With respect to
the outright purchases of long-term interest-bearing Japanese government bonds, purchases will continue at the
current amounts and frequency for some time.”
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stead, the BOJ decided to reduce the amount of excess reserves by ad-
justing short-term liquidity provisions. In particular it stopped rolling
over the short-term bank bills acquired during QMEP as a comple-
ment for its long-term JGB purchases. As a consequence both excess
reserves and banks bills on the BOJ balance sheet diminished very
quickly without disturbing financial and money markets (Figure 1.6).
In fact, this exit strategy worked well and the interbank market got
back to its normal functioning. This was a necessary condition for the
BOJ to change its official targets from CABs to overnight uncollater-
alized interest rate as the call money market was affected by the crisis
(Figure 1.14).
1.2.5.2 The United States
The balance sheet expanded much more in the United States than
in Japan. The Fed also purchased incomparably bigger amounts of
longer-term government bonds and held on its balance sheet huge
quantities of unconventional assets including mortgage-backed securi-
ties. Therefore, the Japanese way of exiting unconventional policies
does not seem possible for the Fed. In fact, the exit in case of the
United States seems to be a multi-stage process and the Fed’s Presi-
dent, Ben Bernake, communicated extensively on the options that the
Fed had at its disposal (Bernanke, 2010b). First of all, some liquidity
and credit facilities were designed to be attractive only in troubled
times as the pricing of accepted assets included important haircuts.
Therefore, some of these facilities expired smoothly as the economic
conditions improved and the private agents could get better borrow-
ing conditions on the financial markets. Furthermore, the loans had
the duration of three months or less and the Fed had a possibility to
simply let them expire just as BOJ did. Indeed, the Fed managed to
wind up all liquidity facilities in the beginning of 2010.11
However, there are other assets of much longer maturity that the Fed
took on its balance sheet. In particular, the Fed extended credit to
Maiden Lane LLC and Maiden Lane II LLC following the rescue of
Bear Stearns and AIG. These assets are likely to remain on the Fed’s
balance sheet for a long time as their liquidity and value are not well
defined. In addition, the Fed acquired important quantities of longer-
11The last liquidity facility, TALF expired on June 30, 2010.
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term Treasury and agency securities. Also, as some of these long-
term securities matured (MBS), the Fed decided to reinvest them in
longer-term Treasury bonds. In September 2011, the Fed decided to
implement the maturity extension program, under which it would sell
$400 billion of shorter-term Treasury securities and buy longer-term
Treasury securities. In September 2012 additional MBS purchases
were announced (QE3). Given these circumstances, any large scale
selling operation of longer-term Treasury or MBS is likely to raise the
yields of these assets.
Given the balance sheet structure of the Fed, it seems more probable
that it gives incentives for the banks to keep their reserves at the
central bank rather than proceeds to the proper exit strategy any
time soon.
1.3 Impact on commercial banks’ balance sheet
The ultimate objective of most of unconventional measures imple-
mented in Japan and in the United States was to stimulate lending
to companies and households. However, the increase in the monetary
base did not trigger higher credit increase as Figure 1.7 illustrates. In
order to get some preliminary evidence on the effectiveness of uncon-
ventional monetary policies, it is useful to analyze in more details the
evolution of the private banks’ balance sheets.
1.3.1 Impact on commercial banks’ balance sheet in the United States
In the United States, aggregate lending and in particular loans and
leases (real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans) slowed down
at the beginning of 2008 and started to decline at the end of 2008 as
shown on Figure 1.8.12
The commercial banks’ holdings of securities continued to increase but
it composition changed after the start of the crisis. Since the begin-
ning of 2008 holdings of government securities increased reflecting the
“flight to quality”. On the other hand, holdings of more risky assets
declined Figure 1.9.
12Intermediate increase is due to inclusion of off-balance assets of the banks.
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The most visible impact of unconventional monetary policies can be
noticed on the interbank loans. Since September 2008 the interbank
loans have rapidly declined. The sudden decrease of interbank lending
in September 2008 was partly offset in December 2008 as the Fed
announced several new easing measures.13 Nevertheless, the interbank
lending started to decline again a few months later (Figure 1.10a)
Figure 1.10b shows the cash assets of the bank and interbank lending.
The amount of cash assets, which includes the deposits at the Fed,
increased dramatically while the interbank lending was slowing down.
Commercial banks preferred to keep their funds at the Fed rather than
lend them in the interbank market. It appears that the unconventional
monetary policy measures led to de facto substitution of the Fed for
the interbank market.
This phenomenon can be further noticed when comparing fed funds
loans and reverse repos with banks and non-banks which do not have
access to the central bank excess reserves (Figure 1.10c). Indeed, the
fed funds and reverse repos to non-banking institutions (i.e. brokers
and dealers) started to increase in October 2009, while the similar
loans to banks continued to decline. The volumes of these loans ac-
corded to non-banks are now much higher than those allowed to banks.
In the past, it was generally the case that the loans to non-banks were
smaller.
The analysis of the commercial banks’ balance sheets suggests that
since the beginning of the crisis the Fed progressively took a role of
the interbank intermediation. The volumes exchanged on the inter-
bank market declined significantly as the commercial banks had suffi-
cient liquidity at the Fed and did not have to borrow funds from other
banks. When the economy showed signs of recovery, commercial banks
started to lend these funds to non-banks which did not have access to
central bank liquidity. The substitution of the Fed for the interbank
market is an important feature of this crisis. The dramatic increase in
the spread between the interbank rate (LIBOR) and the expectations
of future Fed Funds rate (OIS) can be seen in a different light given
this evidence. Indeed, this spread seems less relevant given that the
banks were financing themselves directly at the Fed. Moreover, the
13On December 16th announced the new target policy rate between 0 and 0,25% and made a commitment to
maintain fed funds at exceptionally low levels for some time. The Fed also repeated its intention to buy agency
debt and MBS and eventually to expand these purchases. The FOMC also announced that they were evaluating
the benefits from purchasing longer-term Treasury securities.
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smaller trading volumes might have contributed to the increase of the
spread. Therefore, unconventional measures can have two opposite
effects: they reduce the spread it as they diminish liquidity and credit
risk, but they also increase it by reducing trading volumes and leav-
ing on this market the institutions that do not have direct access to
central bank money. From this point of view, measuring effectiveness
of Fed’s liquidity facilities according to decline in interbank spreads
is not sufficient. This may explain the lack of consensus in empirical
literature on the effectiveness of new liquidity facilities (see Section
1.4).
1.3.2 Impact on commercial banks’ balance sheet in Japan
After the burst of a bubble in Japan in the beginning of the 1990s the
traditional transmission channels of monetary policy, and in particular
the credit channel, did not function correctly. Bank lending remained
stagnant and started to decline rapidly since the banking crisis in
1997-1998 (Figure 1.11).
The quantitative easing and the current account balances (CABs) at
the BOJ were intended to be used for lending. The concerns regard-
ing financial institutions’ standing led to tensions in money and credit
markets and increased the risk and liquidity premia. To the extent
that the banks were liquidity constrained, ample liquidity provisions
by the central banks accompanied by the commitment to continue
these provisions should have had positive impact on bank lending.
However, these huge amounts of funds were not transformed into loans.
After asset and real estate bubble collapse, firms were facing the dra-
matic asset prices decrease and had to start deleveraging in order to
restore the health of their balance sheets and improve their credit rat-
ings. At the same time, the banks which lent to these firms had to de-
clare increasing volumes of non-performing loans and restrained their
lending. This double balance-sheet adjustment from both firms and
banks produced downward pressure on the economy. Moreover, banks
reduced their holdings of Japanese stocks and increased their holdings
of safe assets (government bonds) and more profitable foreign assets
(Figure 1.12) worsening further the positions of the Japanese firms.
In these conditions, unconventional monetary policies, zero interest
rate policy (ZIRP) and quantitative monetary easing policy (QMEP),
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were not able to stimulate lending and investment. Even though
interest rates were close to zero since 1995 and the excess reserves
were freely available to banks, both demand and supply of credit were
blocked. Bank lending started to recover in 2005 when the non per-
forming loans (NPL) issue was finally resolved14 and the corporate
demand for funds started to grow. Bowman et al. (2011) present em-
pirical evidence that the expansion of reserves likely boosted the flow
of credit. However, this effect is small and only valid in the initial
years of QMEP when the banking system was very weak. Finally, it
was partly offset as at the same time banks reduced their lending to
each other.
Indeed, Figure 1.13 shows that the increasing deposits at the BOJ were
accompanied by a decline in deposits held at other commercial banks.
When QMEP ended in 2006 the deposits in other banks rose signifi-
cantly. There were several incentives for the commercial banks to keep
their deposits at the BOJ rather that in other banks. The banks were
not certain about their counterparty’s balance sheet standing and the
perceived default risk was high. Moreover, they were required by the
Bank of International Settlements (BIS) to hold capital for their de-
posits at other commercial banks whereas the deposits at the central
bank did not require any capital provision.
Moreover, in Japan as in the United States but to a smaller ex-
tent, the large increase in excess reserves diminished the activity in
Japanese interbank market (call market). The institutions turned to
the BOJ for funding, especially for longer-term and uncollateralized
loans (Figure 1.14). However, after the initial decline, the interbank
outstanding amounts started rising again in 2003 for collateralized
loans, and in 2004 for uncollateralized loans.
The reduced interbank activity was at first due to the failures of sev-
eral important security houses between 1997 and 1998 (for example
Sanyo Securities and Yamaichi Securities). Their defaults on claims
in the uncollateralised call money market led lenders in the interbank
market to reevaluate the credit risk. The volatility of the overnight
rates in the uncollateralised call money market increased and the vol-
umes lent declined, reflecting higher credit risk premia. The subse-
quent nationalization of several banks which had become insolvent
14Takenaka plan 2002-2003.
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increased the risk premia even more. Even though several recapital-
ization programs were initiated between 1997-2001, they were not big
enough and they did not force banks to make correct evaluation of
their underestimated NPL. New minister in charge of Financial Ser-
vices Agency, Heizo Takenaka, proceeded to more rigorous evaluation
of banks’ assets in September 2002. The Takenaka plan increased
the regulatory pressure and led to a important change in loan clas-
sifications by the banks in 2002 which increased the volume of NPL
declared by the banks (Figure 1.15). Following Takenaka’s reform,
the number of NPL decreased and the banks started to rebuild their
capital. Increased capital of the banks encouraged them to lend to
firms and the aggregate lending went up in the beginning of 2006.
Even though QMEP contributed to lower interbank lending activity,
this decline was much smaller than in the U.S. and did not last for a
long time. In fact, once the NPL problem was resolved in 2003 banks
started to lend to each other again even though they still had the
possibility to finance themselves at the BOJ directly. The substitution
of central bank liquidity for interbank liquidity was much shorter and
less pronounced than in the U.S.
The comparison of the impact of unconventional monetary policies in
Japan and in the United States confirms that the important amounts
of excess reserves are not sufficient to encourage banks to supply loans.
Their willingness to extend lending is determined more by the quality
of their own and other banks’ balance sheet, the perceived liquidity
and counterparty risk and the demand for loans from companies and
households. It is however interesting to notice that the deleveraging
process and decline in lending was much smaller in the U.S. where
credit easing operations were done on a much larger scale.
1.4 Empirical evidence of the effectiveness of unconventional
monetary policies in Japan and in the United States
This section reviews the evidence on the effectiveness of the uncon-
ventional monetary policies implemented in the United States during
the 2007-2010 crisis and in Japan between 1999-2006. We focus on
the effectiveness of unconventional policies in relieving the strains on
money markets, lowering long-term interest rates and raising inflation
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expectations.
1.4.1 Impact on money market spreads
Several unconventional monetary policy tools were designed to reduce
the tensions on interbank markets and improve the transmission chan-
nels of monetary policy. In the United States, the tensions on inter-
bank market appeared in August 2007 and intensified after the collapse
of Lehman Brothers. Indeed, the generalized uncertainty concerning
the health of banks’ balance sheets made the banks unwilling to lend
to each other. In particular, the Libor-OIS spread which is considered
as a barometer of interbank market distress widened significantly.15
To address this issue, the Fed implemented new liquidity facilities.
There is a discussion in the recent literature concerning the effects of
new liquidity facilities on the Libor-OIS spread. Taylor and Williams
(2009a) claim the liquidity facilities like TAF (Term Auction Facility)
cannot have an impact on the Libor-OIS spread because its widening
is mostly due to credit risk and not liquidity risk. On the other hand,
Wu (2011) claims that the spread was caused by the misallocation of
liquidity and that the financial strains in the interbank money mar-
ket were alleviated after TAF was implemented. Aït-Sahalia et al.
(2010) consider all macroeconomic and financial sector policy an-
nouncements in the United States, the United Kingdom, the euro
area and Japan and find that both macroeconomic and financial sector
policy announcements were associated with reductions in the Libor-
OIS spreads. Szczerbowicz (2011) considers the impact of all policy
announcements in the United States but takes a different approach:
regression-based event study, which allows to estimate the effect of all
policies simultaneously. She finds that announcements related to TAF
do not affect the Libor-OIS spread. The news related to other liquid-
ity facilities (TSLF, PDCF, AMLF, CPFF, MMIFF, AMLF) reduced
the spread but the overall impact is quite weak.
As discussed earlier, the lack of strong evidence confirming the ef-
fectiveness of unconventional measures on interbank spreads can be
attributed to unconventional monetary policies themselves. The ex-
15The London interbank offered rate (Libor), is an average interbank borrowing rate published daily by the British
Bankers’ Association (BBA). The overnight-indexed swap (OIS) rate represents market expectations of the funds
rate over the future months. There is no exchange of principal and only the net difference in interest rates is
paid at maturity, so there is very little default risk in the OIS market.
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cess reserves freely available at the Fed reduced the incentive for the
banks to lend to each other and the volumes exchanged on the mar-
ket declined, possible increasing the liquidity premium. Secondly, the
spread itself seems less relevant as a measure of banks refinancing
conditions given the possibility to obtain funds from the Fed.
In Japan, the interbank money markets were the most destabilized
in the period from the fall 1997 to the end of 1998. There was still
some turbulence during the ZIRP period but after the introduction of
QMEP in March 2001 spreads stabilized. The tensions reappeared to
much smaller extent in late 2001 as a consequence of the IT bubble col-
lapse and subsequent bankruptcies of both financial and nonfinancial
corporations. Figure 1.16 presents short-term money market spreads:
negotiable certificate of deposit (NDC) spread and TIBOR spread,
which are indicators of money market tensions. The QMEP period
is indeed characterized by relatively stable and small money market
spreads which contrasts with the important money markets spreads
observed in 2008-2009 in the United States (Figure 1.3a).
The “Japan premium” is another an indicator of the health of Japanese
banking system. The Figure 1.17 shows the “Japan premium” in
euroyen market as a difference between 3-month TIBOR (Japanese
banks) and 3-month yen-denominated LIBOR. The positive “Japan
premium” from 1997 to 1999 reflected increased credit risk of Japanese
banking institutions. The yen-denominated loans to Japanese banks
on Tokyo interbank market were more expensive than yen-denominated
loans to big international banks on London interbank market.16 The
“Japan premium” was negative in the beginning of the 2008-2009 crisis
as the credit risk of banks from Europe and the US was more impor-
tant that this of Japanese banks. During the ZIRP and QMEP period
the Japan premium was quite small and stable.
Both Japanese money market spreads and the “Japanese premium”
show that the problems on money markets were much less severe in
Japan during the ZIRP and QMEP period than in the U.S. during
the 2008-2009 crisis. This could be attributed to the effectiveness of
the BOJ ample liquidity provisions and non-payment of interest on ex-
cess reserves that had maintained the market stability and encouraged
16LIBOR contributing banks (Abbey National, Barclays Bank, BNP Paribas, Commerzbank, Credit Suisse,
Deutsche Bank, HBOS, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, Merril Lynch (a part of Bank of America), RBS Group,
UBS AG).
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banks to lend to each other. On the other hand, the money market
tensions might have been less severe as the financial institutions finally
resolved the NPL problems.
There exist few empirical studies that have measured the impact of un-
conventional monetary policies on the money market spreads in Japan
which seems to confirm that the strains on the interbank market were
not the main issue during the QMEP period. Most studies focused
on the impact of unconventional measures on Japanese government
bonds yield rather than on the the credit risk premia paid by financial
institutions. This seems to reflect the BOJ focus on providing liquid-
ity to banks via current account balances rather than implementing
the liquidity or lending facilities targeting money markets disruption.
However, the BOJ easing policies could have reduced money market
risk premia indirectly. There might be in particular a spillover effect
resulting from arbitrage activities across money markets, which would
lower the interest rates paid on the instruments which were not di-
rectly used in the BOJ’s money market operations. Another possible
possible explanation is that the easy monetary policy environment and
low returns induced by QMEP and ZIRP encouraged investors to seek
for higher returns and purchase more risky assets.
Baba et al. (2006) measure the impact of unconventional monetary
policy in Japan on the funding costs of financial institutions and the
risk premia in money market. Specifically they report that the dis-
persion of issuance rates of negotiable certificate of deposits (NCD)
by major banks rose sharply during the banking crisis period in 1997-
1998 and fell below the pre-crisis level after the ZIRP was introduced.
After the launching of QMEP the dispersion rate declined even fur-
ther. They provide empirical evidence that this decline in dispersion
cannot be attributed solely to creditworthiness of Japanese banks af-
ter 1999. Their results show that the ZIRP and QMEP dummies,
as well as the BOJ’s bill purchasing operations on the money mar-
ket contributed significantly to reducing the NCD spreads. On the
other hand the higher levels of CABs were not significant as explana-
tory variables. The authors conclude that it was a commitment to
maintain the zero policy rate until inflation is steadily above zero that
reduced the spreads.
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1.4.2 Impact on long-term interest rates
When the official rate is close to zero, the central bank can still stim-
ulate the economy by reducing long-term interest rates. Some of un-
conventional policies in the United States, in particular the purchases
of longer-term Treasury bonds and agency securities, directly aimed
at diminishing long-term yields.17 The impact of the Fed’s long-term
debt purchases within Quantitative Easing 1 (QE1) on long-term in-
terest rates was analyzed among others by Hamilton and Wu (2012),
Gagnon et al. (2011) and (Szczerbowicz, 2011). They found that QE1
indeed lowered nominal long-term interest rates. Gagnon et al. (2010)
argue that this reduction was due to portfolio rebalancing effect and
decrease in the risk premium. (Szczerbowicz, 2011) finds evidence that
unlike QE1, QE2 did not significantly lowered long-term rates.
Interest-rate commitment is another unconventional monetary policy
that was intended to lower long-term interest rates. In December
2008, the FOMC’s stated that it would maintain the federal funds
rate at “exceptionally low levels” for “extended period of time”. The
expectation theory says that long-term interest rates equal an average
of current and expected future short-term interest rates. Therefore,
the Fed’s commitment to lower the path for future interest rates was
supposed to reduce long-term interest rates. However, Gagnon et al.
(2011) and (Szczerbowicz, 2011) find that signaling a commitment
to keep policy rates low for an “extended period of time” did not
contribute to reducing long-term interest rates in the United States
during the 2007-2010 crisis.
The empirical evidence concerning Japanese unconventional monetary
policy effectiveness (ZIRP and QMEP) shows that they were effective
via the commitment channel (expectations management) included in
ZIRP and QMEP. Several studies (Oda and Ueda (2007), Okina and
Shiratsuka (2004), Baba et al. (2005)) show that the “policy dura-
tion effect” of the ZIRP and of the QMEP, i.e. committing to not
raising the the policy rate even when the economy and prices enter a
recovery rate, had significant impact on the expected short-term rates
and therefore lowered long-term yields. On the other hand, the mon-
etary base expansion via current balances account provision was not
17Chairman Ben Bernanke stated in his speech on December 1, 2008 (Bernanke, 2008) that the Fed’s purchases of
longer-term Treasury or agency securities on the open market “might influence the yields on these securities,
thus helping to spur aggregate demand”.
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found to be effective in reducing long-term government yields (Oda
and Ueda (2007)) even though there is some evidence that these op-
erations might have been effective in some phases via the signaling
effect. This effect has an impact on private sector’s expectations of
the future monetary policy. Important expansion of the central bank’s
balance sheet often requires purchasing long-term Treasury bonds or
other risky assets that the central bank is planning to keep on its
balance sheet for an extended period of time. Raising interest rates
would expose the central bank to capital losses on the assets it holds.
Therefore important increases on monetary base can be associated by
financial markets with a signal that the monetary easing will continue
longer then previously expected.
Finally, Oda and Ueda (2007) do not find any significant effect of the
BOJ purchases of JGB either on risk premia or the expected future
short-term rates. These results differ from the U.S. experience where
the purchases of long-term government bonds were found to be effec-
tive via rebalancing effect and not via the commitment about future
short-term rates.
The different impact of the U.S. quantitative easing and the Japanese
quantitative easing on long-term interest rates can be attributed to
several factors. Fist of all, the quantities purchased by the BOJ were
much smaller than the amounts purchased by the Fed. Second, the
Fed clearly insisted on the intended transmission channel of longer-
term bond purchases and expected that the private agents portfolio
rebalancing would reduce long-term interest rates. The BOJ on the
other hand considered bond purchases as a mean to attain the CABs
target and avoided relying solely on JBG purchases to achieve the
CAB target as they did not want to distort the prices on the JGB
market.18
1.4.3 Impact on inflation expectations
While the impact of alternative monetary policies on money market
distress and long-term interest rates was largely discussed in the pre-
vious literature, there are not many studies providing empirical ev-
idence on their effect on the long-term inflation expectations. Even
though there was a disconnection between narrow and broad money
18See Maeda et al. (2005).
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(Figure 1.7) in the U.S., some of the Fed’s unconventional measures
were perceived as inflationary by the markets. The liquidity facilities
were intended to be short-term but there was still inflationary risk
related to them. The markets feared that the huge amounts of liq-
uidity injected could not be easily absorbed once the crisis would be
over. The risk linked to longer-term Treasuries purchases was twofold.
They were followed by an important expansion of the overall size of
the Fed’s balance sheet and they changed the maturity structure of the
Treasury debt held by the Fed. By preferring the longer-term debt,
the Fed took some risk on its balance sheet as the price of long-term
bonds fluctuate with time. The outright purchases of agency securities
and lending directly to specific financial institutions (Bear Stearns or
AIG) was also perceived as risky. These assets were meant to stay on
the Fed’s balance sheet for long time.19 Market participants were wor-
ried that the Fed would not be able to sell them at the desired price.
Subsequent Fed’s losses would be covered either with the help of the
Treasury via donation of Treasuries for example or by printing money
if cooperation of Treasury were not possible. Fed’s losses would also
have consequences on the Treasury’s budget and might incentivize the
government and the Congress to put pressures on the Fed, which in
turn could compromise the Fed’s independence and credibility.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) find that QE1 and QE2
increased long-term inflation expectations and therefore reduced real
long-term rates. (Szczerbowicz, 2011) results suggest that among all
unconventional monetary policies implemented QE2 and rescue op-
erations of individual financial institutions increased far-ahead for-
ward inflation expectations. This increase in long-term inflation ex-
pectations seems to be a desirable effect that counters deflationary
tendency and brings inflation expectations to their historical levels
(Figure 1.18).
Unlike in the United States, the unconventional monetary policies
implemented by the BOJ were clearly intended to have inflationary
impact as the deflation became a major problem in Japan. The large
increase in CABs were designed to encourage Japanese banks to extend
lending to economy. However, the worsening of firms’ and banks’ bal-
ance sheet problems impaired this transmission mechanism. Indeed,
19Bernanke (2010b).
46
1.5 Risks of unconventional monetary policies
according to the survey of empirical analysis on the effectiveness of
QMEP conducted by Ugai (2007), the impact of an increase in the
monetary base on the inflation rate and price level are small or not
identified at all.
Based on this evidence, it seems that the Fed’s unconventional mea-
sures had bigger impact on inflation expectations. This might be due
to the timing of the Fed’s intervention. It is very difficult to go out
from the liquidity trap once the deflation is present and the Fed reacted
to banks’ difficulties before inflation had become negative. Moreover,
the quantity and diversity of assets purchased by the Fed was much
bigger which made the Fed’s deflation-fighting more credible. It is also
possible, as mentioned before, that the agents saw in these unconven-
tional purchases some potential risk to the Fed’s independence.20
1.5 Risks of unconventional monetary policies
The central banks in the United States and in Japan employed un-
conventional monetary policies to diminish the amount of risk held by
private agents in several ways. They provided ample amounts of liq-
uidity in form of excess reserves (BOJ and Fed) or government bonds
(Fed, as a part of Term Securities Lending Facility) in exchange for
less liquid assets, taking over banks’ liquidity risk.
Furthermore, they enlarged the eligible collateral for their credit op-
erations and directly purchased unconventional risky assets. The Fed
exposed its balance sheet to credit risk to greater extent then the BOJ
did. First of all the BOJ increased less its balance sheet. Second, the
expansion was principally done with the long-term JGBs whereas the
Fed took on its balance sheet important amounts of MBS, ASB and
the assets of AIG and Bear Sterns. The central bank purchases of
risky assets and accepting them as a collateral reduced the private
cost of credit risk. In other words, the Fed, and to much smaller
extent the BOJ, took on their balance sheet the credit risk that the
private agents did not want to hold.
Furthermore, the purchases of longer-term government debt that con-
20The BOJ become independent in 1997 (the Bank of Japan Act was revised in June 1997) and put great effort
in communicating that the Japanese government cannot influence its monetary decisions. Mishkin (2006) even
says that “the governor and fellow board members took independence literally and refused to cooperate with the
government when the economic conditions called for such cooperation”.
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tributed significantly to the central bank balance sheet expansion in
Japan and in the US diminished the sovereign risk held by private
agents. Both the Fed and the BOJ purchased directly longer-term
government bonds which in fact allowed the government to increase
the borrowing without having to face the higher interest rates. In fact,
all along the QE period the long-term interest rates in Japan and in
the U.S. remained at a very low level even though the government
increased substantially its debt.
Finally, both central banks made a commitment concerning keeping
the interest rates at exceptionally low levels for an extended period of
time (Fed) or maintaining the conditions for the interest rates to stay
zero until inflationary concerns are dispelled (BOJ) which diminished
the interest risk borne by market participants.
Unconventional balance sheet management came with some possible
cost and risks. By providing almost unlimited amount of funds to
banks, the Fed practically replaced interbank market. The inter-
bank loans in the U.S diminished substantially and the money market
spreads stay at much higher levels then in the period preceding the
subprime crisis. The malfunctioning of the interbank market seems
permanent now which raises an important questions concerning the
future of that market and the impact on the overall heath of the
banking system. Indeed, an easy access to funding and little collateral
requirements can make dependent the weak banks with insufficient
capital on the central bank’s liquidity. The funding provided to such
insolvent banks is likely not to be transformed into lending to com-
panies and households. This argument was often made with respect
to BOJ accused to artificially maintain “zombie” banks and in this
way postponing the recovery. During the Japanese crisis the impor-
tant provision of liquidity had indeed no impact on aggregate lending.
Only once the disposal of bad loans and recapitalization of the banks
took place the banks started lending again. Therefore, the central
bank liquidity relive banks with funding difficulties but also lessen the
pressure on banks to reform.
Another important issue is linked to the credit risk that the Fed ac-
cepted on its balance sheet. As the Fed’s profits are transferred in
fine to the Treasury, the taxpayers are directly impacted by the cen-
tral bank decision. The Fed protected itself by imposing important
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haircuts on the accepted collateral and the purchased assets. However,
the Fed intends to keep important part of its assets for a long time.
As long as the economy recovers as planned, the Fed will make a profit
on these assets. If however another shock hits the economy the Fed
could bear losses and face the dilemma whether to ask the Treasury for
rescue (recapitalization, lending of Treasuries) or just monetizing the
loss. Both of these outcomes seem undesirable. Monetizing of losses
threatens credibility of the Fed. On the other hand, covering the losses
by the Treasury bring up the risk of overstepping into fiscal and distri-
bution policies. Traditionally, the central bank would buy securities at
the same prices as other financial market participant would buy them.
Since the recent crisis however, the Fed purchased the assets that were
unattractive to private agents and arbitrarily decided which market
participants would benefit from its lending operation. For instance,
in September 2008 the Fed agreed to transform Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs into bank holding companies which allowed them to
have access to cheap Fed’s liquidity. Also, the Fed participated in
the Bear Stearns and AIG rescue operations but refused to do so in
Lehman Brothers case. It seems preferable that such decisions are
taken directly by the Treasury.
The main risks of the Fed are therefore linked to the credit risk that it
bears on its balance sheet. The BOJ was much more cautious about
buying risky assets. However, the unconventional strategy chosen by
the BOJ proved insufficient to stimulate lending or increase inflation.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter emphasized the diversity of unconventional monetary
policies. Even though both Bank of Japan and Federal Reserve im-
plemented three types of unconventional monetary policies, namely
expectation management, monetary base increase and purchases of
risky assets, the objectives and results of these policies were not the
same. The country-specific problems and financial environment played
important role in the unconventional monetary policy design. Further-
more, the results of the non-standard measures depended on their in-
tensity and scale. We showed that the Fed increased its balance sheet
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as a result of large-scale interventions in specific financial markets
segments (“asset-driven balance sheet management”) while the BOJ
changed the composition of its balance sheet as a result of its raising
excess-reserves target. The comparison of the commercial banks’ bal-
ance sheets in the United States and in Japan underlines at the same
time country-specific characteristics of the U.S. and Japanese banking
sector and the possible impact of unconventional monetary policies
in each country. In Japan the aggregate lending diminished more
than in the U.S. which at the same time illustrates deeper problems
of Japanese companies and gives credit to aggressive U.S. credit eas-
ing monetary policy. On the other hand, the disruption of interbank
market in the U.S. has been much more pronounced than in Japan
and the Fed’s almost unlimited liquidity and interest-bearing exces-
sive reserves might have contributed to this phenomenon. Finally, the
Fed’s important interventions in chosen markets (credit easing) con-
tributed to lower interest rates of corresponding assets while in Japan
the smaller-scale JGBs purchases did not diminish their interest rates.
These interventions increased significantly the credit risk that the Fed
bears on its balance sheet and makes its exit strategy more challeng-
ing. The BOJ was much more cautious about buying risky assets but
this unconventional strategy proved insufficient to stimulate lending
or increase inflation.
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A1. Figures
Figure 1.1: Quantitative Easing and Credit Easing in practice: the case of the Fed
(a) Before crisis: “Normal times”. Fed’s Assets (left) and Liabilities (right), October 2006-July 2007
(b) First stage of the crisis: Pure Credit Easing. Fed’s Assets (left) and Liabilities (right), August 2007-
September 2008
(c) Second stage of the crisis: Mix of Credit and Quantitative Easing. Fed’s Assets (left) and Liabilities
(right), September 2008-November 2010
51
Chapter 1
Unconventional monetary policies in the United States (2007-2010) in the light of the Japanese
experience (1999-2006)
Figure 1.2: Spreads on financial markets and Fed’s liquidity facilities
(a) LIBOR-OIS Spread and Term Auction Facility (TAF)
(b) Commercial Paper (CP) Spreads and Commercial Paper Funding
Facility (CPFF)
(c) Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) - OIS spread and ABCP
Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF)
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Figure 1.3: Interest rates on excess reserves at the Fed and the Fed Funds spread
Fed announcements: 06/10/2008 Fed begins to pay interest on depository institutions’ required and excess reserve
balances; 22/10/2008 and 05/11/2008 Fed increases the interest rate paid to depository institutions on excess balances;
16/12/2008 Fed establishes interest rates on required and excess reserve balances of 0.25%.
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Figure 1.4: BOJ balance sheet
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Figure 1.5: Current Account Balances and the Money Market Rates
Figure 1.6: CAB (BOJ liabilities) and Bank Bills (BOJ assets)
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Figure 1.7: Monetary Aggregates in the United States and Japan
Figure 1.8: Aggregate U.S. commercial bank lending
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Figure 1.9: Securities holdings (U.S. commercial bank)
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Figure 1.10: Interbank Lending (U.S. Commercial Banks)
(a) Interbank Loans
(b) Interbank Loans and Cash Assets
(c) Fed Funds and Reverse Repos: Banks and non-banks
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Figure 1.11: Aggregate bank lending in Japan (Domestically Licensed Banks)
Figure 1.12: Investment Securities (Domestically Licensed Banks in Japan)
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Figure 1.13: Deposits in Banks and at the BOJ (Domestically Licensed Banks in Japan: Assets)
Figure 1.14: Outstanding amounts in Call money market
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Figure 1.15: Japan: Non Performing Loans and Aggragate Bank Lending
Figure 1.16: Negotiable Certificate of Deposit (NDC) and TIBOR spreads
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Figure 1.17: “Japan premium” in the Euroyen market
Figure 1.18: Long-term inflation expectations in the United States
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A1. Tables
Table 1.1: Unconventional monetary policies : BOJ and Fed
Bank of Japan (1999-2006) Federal Reserve (2007-2010)
Expectations
management
a) ZIRP until deflationary concerns are
dispelled (04/1999)
b) QMEP until the CPI inflation becomes
stably at or above 0% (03/2001)
Exceptionally low Fed Funds levels for: a)
some period of time (12/2008) b)
extended period of time (03/2009) c) at least
through mid-2013 (08/2011) d) at least
through late 2014 (01/2012) d) at least
through mid-2015 (09/2012)
Credit easing Purchases of ABCP, ABS, equities from
banks, long-term Japanese government
bonds; CP repos
Purchases of CP, ABS, MBS, longer-term
Agency and Treasury bonds
Quantitative
easing
Targeting the current account balances;
increase in monetary base of 50% via
long-term JGB and short-term lending to
banks
Increase in monetary base of 250% via
longer-term Treasury bonds and Agency
bonds and MBS
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Table 1.2: Central bank balance sheet management
(a) Simplified balance sheet of the central bank in normal times
Assets Liabilities
Conventional assets Excess reservesMoney in circulation
(b) Credit easing
Assets Liabilities
Conventional assets ↓ Excess reserves
Unconventional assets ↑ Money in circulation
(c) Quantitative easing
Assets Liabilities
Conventional assets ↑ Excess reserves ↑
Money in circulation
(d) Mix of Quantitative and Credit easing
Assets Liabilities
Conventional assets
Excess reserves ↑
Unconventional assets ↑
Money in circulation
Table 1.3: Fed’s liquidity facilities
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2 Were the Fed’s unconventional monetary
policies effective during the 2007-2010
crisis?1
2.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has made clear that the conventional mon-
etary policy through interest rates steering, was no longer sufficient
to bring back the financial stability and economic recovery. Faced
with severe tensions on financial and monetary markets the Federal
Reserve developed several unconventional monetary measures. First
of all, they introduced new liquidity facilities which were gradually
expanded to include wider range of collateral and bigger number of
counter-parties. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Fed low-
ered the federal funds target rate nearly to zero and implemented un-
conventional monetary policies even more intensively. In particular,
they started interventions in specific market segments and initiated
the asset purchase programs including commercial papers, longer-term
Treasury bonds and agency debt and MBS. Figure 2.1 illustrates the
way the unconventional policies affected the Fed’s balance sheet: since
the beginning of the crisis the composition of the Fed’s assets was sig-
nificantly altered and the size of the balance sheet more then doubled.
In this chapter we bring empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these
new policies: in particular, on the effectiveness in lowering long-term
interest rates and reducing the Libor-OIS spread. When short-term
interest rates are close to zero, the Fed can still stimulate aggregate de-
mand by reducing long-term rates. Furthermore, by reducing tension
on interbank market the Fed can improve transmission mechanism
1I would like to thank my supervisors Pierpaolo Benigno and Henri Sterdyniak for their guidance and valuable
advice. I am also grateful to Etsuro Shioji for helpful comments during my research stay in Hitotsubashi
University in spring 2010. This paper has also benefited from helpful discussions and suggestions from Nicola
Borri, Refet Gürkaynak, Yukinobu Kitamura, Philippe Martin, Giuseppe Ragusa and seminar participants at
Sciences-Po Economics Department, OFCE and LUISS Guido Carli. Any errors are mine. Financial support from
LUISS Guido Carli, Collège doctoral franco-japonais and Università Italo Francese is gratefully acknowledged.
An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title: “Are unconventional monetary policies effective?"
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through credit markets.
Beyond efficacy, the unconventional monetary measures raised the
question of the anchorage of long-term inflation expectations. Rais-
ing inflation expectations was not an explicit objective of the Fed
throughout the crisis and indeed in several occasions they reiterated
the importance of maintaining price stability. Moreover, as shown
in Figure 2.2, the monetary base expansion did not affect much the
broader money aggregates. Nevertheless, managing inflation expec-
tations along with implementing unconventional monetary policies is
a controversial issue. There are several reasons to think that non-
standard policies might affect the anchorage of long-run inflation ex-
pectations and threaten the Fed’s credibility and independence. First,
expansion of monetary base can encourage the doubts about the Fed’s
ability to absorb the excessive liquidity once the crisis is overcome.
Second, without explicit announcement of future taxes increase or ex-
penditure reduction, agents might expect the growing public debt to
be monetized. Finally, the Fed’s purchases of risky assets could poten-
tially lead to credit losses and smaller transfers to the Treasury which
in turn might trigger some political pressure on the conduct of mon-
etary policy. On the other hand, potential inflationary effect of un-
conventional monetary policies seems desirable in the context of pro-
longed recession. Increasing inflation expectations allows to counter
the deflationary spiral and reduce real interest rates. In that sense,
unconventional monetary policies might spur aggregate demand even
when the policy rates approached zero and the conventional monetary
policy lost its effectiveness.
To assess the impact of unconventional monetary policies on the Libor-
OIS spread, long-term interest rates and long-term inflation expecta-
tions we employ regression-based event study. First, we identify and
classify unconventional monetary announcements. We also list con-
ventional monetary policy surprises and fiscal policy news. Then,
we investigate the behavior of selected asset yields over short peri-
ods surrounding the policy statements. Under efficient markets, the
effect of the policy announcements should be immediately reflected
in asset prices. First, we measure the impact of all announcements
on the three-month Libor-OIS spread and ten-year nominal interest
rates so as to evaluate the effectiveness of the non-standard monetary
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measures. Second, we evaluate their impact on long-term inflation
expectations. We rely on dummy variables to discriminate between
days with or without announcement. In line with the previous liter-
ature Kuttner (2001) we assume that financial markets react only to
the announcements that were not fully anticipated. We define the sur-
prise component of dummy variables based on information included
in specialized articles in Wall Street Journal and Reuters before and
after the event.
Our contribution to the empirical literature on the effects of unconven-
tional monetary policies is three-fold. First, we create the database of
monetary and fiscal announcements, and their surprise components,
for the United States during 2007-2010. Second, we provide the first
empirical evidence on the impact of all unconventional monetary poli-
cies on long-term inflation expectations. Third, we bring new evidence
on their effectiveness using the regression-based event study. This ap-
proach allows us to estimate the effect of all policies simultaneously
which seems particularly important during the crisis as several types
of announcement arrived on the same day. We compare the monetary
policy responses to fiscal policy responses and take into consideration
the bad news about the health of important financial institutions.
We find that the liquidity facilities other than TAF and government
bailouts reduced the Libor-OIS spread. The outright purchases of
longer-term Treasury securities and agency debt and MBS within QE1
lowered long-term interest rates. Finally, we find evidence that the
Fed’s rescue operations, QE2 and fiscal stimulus announcements raised
long-term inflation expectations.
The chapter is organized as follows. The literature is reviewed in the
following section. The data and methodology are presented in section
2.3. In section 2.4 we estimate the impact of the announcements on
long-term interest rates, the Libor-OIS spread and long-term inflation
expectations and we present the main results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
There exists an extensive literature which evaluates the effects of un-
conventional monetary policies but the empirical evidence on this sub-
ject is yet not conclusive. Bernanke et al. (2004) analyze the effective-
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ness of different unconventional monetary tools in lowering the long-
term interest rates in the United States and in Japan based on policy
examples before the 2007-2010 crisis. They group the non-standard
policies into three categories: (1) Expectation management strategy
(commitment about the future path of interest rates); (2) Expansion of
monetary base (quantitative easing); (3) Changes in the composition
of the central bank balance (credit easing). Their empirical evidence
confirms to the large extent the effectiveness of shaping public expec-
tations and changing the relative supplies of securities in the United
States. However, the impact of unconventional policies implemented
by the Bank of Japan during the deflation period is more ambiguous.
According to the empirical studies surveyed by Ugai (2007), the com-
mitment effect lowers considerably long-term interest rates but the
expansion in monetary base and the change in the composition of the
central bank balance sheet were found to have little impact or none
at all.
During the recent economic crisis the unconventional monetary poli-
cies were extensively implemented by many central banks. Since then,
several descriptive (Borio and Disyatat (2010), Meier (2009)) and the-
oretical (Adrian and Song Shin (2010), Cùrdia and Woodford (2011),
Gertler and Karadi (2011)) studies contributed to the better compre-
hension of the non-standard monetary policies.
The empirical research focused on the impact of unconventional mon-
etary policies on the reduction of interbank risk premia. There is a
debate in the recent literature concerning the effects of new liquid-
ity facilities on the Libor-OIS spread. Several papers (Taylor and
Williams (2009a); Wu (2011); McAndrews et al. (2008)) evaluate the
effectiveness of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and report conflicting
results. Taylor and Williams (2009a) claim that TAF cannot have an
impact on the Libor-OIS spread because it is mostly due to credit risk
and not the liquidity risk. On the other hand, Wu (2011) maintains
that the spread was caused by the misallocation of liquidity and that
the financial strains in the interbank money market were alleviated
after TAF was implemented. McAndrews et al. (2008) evaluate the
impact of not only the TAF operations but also of the TAF announce-
ments and conclude that they diminished the spread. However, their
sample includes only the announcements made until April 24, 2008.
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We bring additional empirical evidence on the impact of new liquidity
facilities on money market distress. First, we take into consideration
all liquidity facilities implemented by the Fed during the 2007-2010
crisis. Second, we use the announcements during the whole period of
the crisis. Third, we compare the effectiveness of liquidity facilities in
reducing money market tensions to other monetary and fiscal policy
responses.
Aït-Sahalia et al. (2010) consider all macroeconomic and financial sec-
tor policy announcements in the United States, the United Kingdom,
the euro area and Japan and find that both macroeconomic and fi-
nancial sector policy announcements were associated with reductions
in the Libor-OIS spreads.
In this chapter we also consider all policy announcements but we take
different approach: regression-based event study. This approach al-
lows us to estimate the effect of all types of policy announcements
simultaneously. This is important during the crisis given that several
announcements arrived on the same day. In particular, it allows us to
take into consideration the bad news about the health of important fi-
nancial institutions which very often were driving the policy responses
on the same day and had opposite impact on the spread.
The impact of the Fed’s long-term debt purchases on long-term inter-
est rates is analyzed by Hamilton and Wu (2012) and Gagnon et al.
(2011). They find that QE1 lowered nominal long-term interest rates.
We contribute to the discussion on the effectiveness of long-term Trea-
sury and agency debt purchases through the regression-based event
study methodology. Moreover, we measure the impact of QE2 and
other unconventional monetary policies. As Hamilton and Wu (2012)
and Gagnon et al. (2011) we find that QE1 reduced long-term interest
rates. However, we show that QE2 did not have significant impact on
these rates. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) analyze via
event study the impact of QE1 and QE2 on long-term interest rates.
They find that both operations had reducing impact on long-term
nominal rates. Our results for QE2 are different as we consider in our
event study more announcements then Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011), and in particular the speech of Ben Bernanke on
August 27, 2010 in Jackson Hole (Bernanke, 2010a) that was under-
stood as a first indication of QE2 (see subsection 2.3.4 B for details).
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While the impact of alternative monetary policies on interest rates
and money market distress was largely discussed in the previous lit-
erature, their effect on long-run inflation expectations is still poorly
known. Recently, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) stud-
ied the impact of QE1 and QE2 on inflation expectations measured
as a difference between CDS-adjusted Abb rates and TIPS. In this
chapter we investigate the consequences of all unconventional mone-
tary policies on the anchoring of long-term inflation expectations. To
this purpose we focus exclusively on long-term inflation expectations
that we measure using far-ahead forward inflation compensation as in
Gürkaynak, Levin and Swanson (2010).
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Regression-based event study
We apply the regression-based event study methodology in order to
evaluate the impact of monetary and fiscal policy announcements on
the Libor-OIS spread, long-term interest rates and long-term inflation
expectations in the United States during the 2007-2010 financial crisis.
This approach is employed by Cook and Hahn (1989) and Kuttner
(2001) among others to measure the response of nominal interest rates
to the central banks’ official rates changes. Event study methodology
allows testing the impact of an economic event on financial market
data.2 In modern financial markets, an event that affect these future
payoffs should be reflected in asset prices over a short period of time.
Therefore, the impact of this event can be measured by examining
security prices surrounding the event.
In this chapter we examine one or two-day response of ten-year inter-
est rates, three-month OIS-Libor spread and far-ahead forward infla-
tion compensation to different policy announcements. In particular,
we take into account the FOMC interest rates decisions, unconven-
tional monetary policy announcements, fiscal policy announcements
and failures of big financial institutions. We rely on dummy variables
to discriminate between days when announcements were made or not.
In line with the previous literature (see for example Kuttner (2001))
we assume that financial markets react only to the announcements
2See MacKinlay (1997).
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that were not fully anticipated. Some previous studies use “surprise
dummy” variables to take into account unanticipated component of
announcements. Bernanke et al. (2004) construct surprise dummy
based on the set of commentaries written before and after each state-
ment. We define our surprise dummy variables based on specialized
articles in Wall Street Journal and Reuters before and after the event.
2.3.2 Data
In this study we use daily data sets from January 4, 1999 to Decem-
ber 31, 2010 with the exception of the OIS rates which were available
only from November 26, 2003 and CDS rates, available from January
1, 2001. We omit the observation for the 17/09/2001 FOMC inter-
meeting from our sample, as in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and
others, since this is the first day of trading following the September
11th attacks. The data on the one-year far ahead forward inflation
were taken from
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm.3 The
data on other interest rates were obtained from Datastream, Bloomberg
and Reuters.
2.3.3 Date and time of announcements
We put together a complete list of dates of monetary policy announce-
ments from January 4, 1999 until December 31, 2010. Until August
2007 the news concerning the monetary policy were released at 14:15
Eastern Time after regularly scheduled FOMC meetings. Since the
beginning of the subprime crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced sev-
eral new measures and intensified their communication. For instance,
12 monetary policy announcements were made in 2006 vs. 80 an-
nouncements in 2008. We also report fiscal announcements and fail-
ures of important financial institutions during the crisis. Table 2.1 and
Table 2.2 contain the list of all announcements as well as the dates of
release.
3Dataset from Gürkaynak, Sack and Wright (2010).
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2.3.4 Types of announcements
We classify unconventional monetary policy announcements into five
categories: interest rates commitment, long-term Treasury bonds pur-
chases, agency debt and MBS purchases, liquidity facilities and the
Federal Reserve’s rescue operations. We also include conventional
monetary policy and fiscal policy announcements into our analysis in
order to compare the effectiveness of unconventional monetary policies
to other types of policy responses.
In developed financial markets, asset prices should react only to the
unexpected component of the announcements. Therefore, for each
kind of policy, we define a measure of deviation of the actual state-
ments from what was expected by financial markets participants.
• Conventional monetary policy
FOMC interest rates decisions
The surprise component of the FOMC interest rates decisions is eval-
uated using federal funds futures (Kuttner (2001)). These contracts
are settled based on the average effective federal funds rate that is
realized for the calendar month specified in the contract. It is there-
fore possible to infer from these instruments the market expectations
of the FOMC decisions at future meetings. The daily changes in the
current-month futures contract rate reflect the changes in market’s
expectations of the fed funds rate during the reminder of the month.
The surprise component of the FOMC interest rates decision on day t
of month s is given by:
∆xs,t =
ms
ms − t(fff
0
s,t − fff 0s,t−1)
where:
fff 0s,t is the current month fed funds futures rate on day t of month s
ms denotes the number of days in month s with t = 1, ...,ms and s =
1, ..., 12. Since the contract settlement price is based on the average
of the effective fed funds rates, the scaling factor msms−t adjusts the
unexpected component proportionally to the number of days in the
month affected by the change.4
4For the interest rates decisions that occur in the last 7 days of the month, we use the next-month unscaled
contracts to avoid the effect of month-end noise and multiplying by a very large scale factor (30 or 31 on the
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In our regression we include the FOMC decisions about reducing, rais-
ing and maintaining the federal funds rate. The decisions to maintain
the target rate may also be surprising for financial markets.
• Unconventional monetary policies
A. Interest rates commitment
Under this class we consider statements through which the Federal
Reserve impact the expectation of the future federal funds rates. On
December 16, 2008 the FOMC cut the fed funds rate to a range of zero
to 0.25% and additionally stated that “the Committee anticipates that
weak economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels
of the federal funds rate for some time”. On March 18, 2009 they made
a stronger pledge announcing that the exceptionally low levels of fed
funds rate would be maintained “for an extended period” rather then
“for some time”. In this way, the Fed communicated to markets its
commitment to lower the path for future interest rates. Expectations
management has been proven effective in lowering long-term interest
rates during the deflation period in Japan (Ugai, 2007). In fact, ac-
cording to New Keynesian models this kind of policy should stimulate
the aggregate demand even in the zero-bound environment as the cur-
rent demand depends not only on the current interest rate but also on
the future expected short-term rates and expected inflation.
The interest rate commitment was reiterated seventeen times within
our sample and was always announced after the scheduled FOMC
meetings. The dates of the FOMC meetings were known in advance
to the market participants so as long as the economy was weak they
were expecting the FOMC to reiterate the commitment. However, as
the economic situation was gradually improving, market participants
were reading with attention the Fed’s statement to see whether there
would be a change in wording of the commitment, suggesting a future
tightening. Given that only surprise interest rate commitment should
have an impact on asset prices, we construct a surprise commitment
dummy. It takes the value of 1 when the announcement came as a
surprise, 0.5 when the financial markets were generally expecting the
Fed to reiterate its commitment but there was some uncertainty about
last day). The surprise on these days is given by: ∆xs,t = fff1s,t − fff1s,t−1. Also, if the surprise occurs on
the first day of the month, the relevant futures rate at time t − 1 is fff1 and the policy surprise is given by
∆xs,t = fff0s,t − fff1s,t−1. See Kuttner (2001) for details.
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it, and 0 on the days when the commitment was fully anticipated. The
measure of “surprise” part of the statement is based on articles from
the Wall Street Journal and Reuters before and after the FOMC meet-
ings. The details on the classification of each statement are included
in Table 2.3.
B. Long-term Treasury bonds purchases
Another tool at the disposal of the central bank when the interest rates
are close to zero is the outright purchase of long-term government se-
curities. The effectiveness of this policy is based on the “portfolio
balance effect”. By purchasing long-term securities, the central bank
changes the composition of the portfolio of securities left in hands of
private sector and therefore affects their yields. The theoretical basis
for the effectiveness of open-market purchases of non standard assets
were set by (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003). Their representative-
agent model predicts no effect for such operations on price level or
output.5 However, the model of (Vayanos and Vila, 2009) based on
preferred habitats of investors provides a theoretical basis for the port-
folio balance effect. In their model, the interest rates of all maturi-
ties are determined through the interaction between risk-averse arbi-
trageurs and investor clienteles with preferences for specific maturities.
In this framework the central bank purchases of long-term Treasuries
can lower the long-term yields because they shorten the average matu-
rity of government debt and therefore the duration risk held by market
participants.
The first round of Quantitative easing was announced in Ben Bernanke’s
speech in Austin on December 1, 2008 where he states that the Fed
“could purchase longer-term Treasury securities in substantial quan-
tities”. On December 16, 2008 the Federal Reserve announced that
they were “evaluating the potential benefits of purchasing longer-term
Treasury securities”. On January 28, 2009 they indicated that they
were “prepared to purchase longer-term Treasury securities if evolving
circumstances indicate that such transactions would be particularly ef-
fective in improving conditions in private credit markets”. On March
16, 2009 the FOMC decided to purchase up to 300 billion dollars of
longer-term Treasury securities over the following six months. This
5Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) model requires 2 additional assumption that are likely not to hold during the
crisis: (1) all investors can purchase and sell unlimited quantities of these assets, and (2) the assets being bought
and sold are valued only for their pecuniary returns.
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was the first time the Fed tried to change the relative supply of the
long-term Treasury bonds since the “Operation Twist” in 1961.
Purchases of long-term bonds ended in October 2009 but were re-
sumed the following year. On August 10, 2010 the Fed announced
that they would reinvest principal payments from agency debt and
agency mortgage-backed securities (which represented from $250 to
$300 billion) into longer-term Treasury securities. Furthermore, on
August 27, 2010 Ben Bernanke prepared markets for additional long-
term asset purchases in his speech in Jackson Hole (Bernanke, 2010a).6
The FOMC meeting on September 21, 2010 confirmed the Fed’s inten-
tion to purchase longer-term bonds and the effective decision to buy
$600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities was taken on November
3, 2010. This second round of Treasury bonds purchases was called
Quantitative Easing 2.
The Federal Reserve made most of the announcements concerning the
purchases of longer-term securities after the scheduled FOMC meet-
ings and the market participants could anticipate them. We construct
surprise dummy based on the information included in specialized press
articles (Wall Street Journal and Reuters). The dummy takes the
value 1 when the announcements surprised financial markets. The
surprise dummy is -1 on January 28, 2009 when the markets were ex-
pecting the Fed to take the stronger action.7 Table 2.4 presents the
details about the statements.
C. Agency debt and MBS purchases
In addition to longer-term Treasury bonds, the Fed also purchased as
a part of QE1 the debt and mortgage-backed securities of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac. These agencies operated since 1968 as government
sponsored enterprises (GSE). Their principal activity consisted in ex-
panding the secondary market in mortgages. They were both privately
owned but benefited from the “implicit” government guarantees which
insured them favorable interest rates. In July 2008 Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae faced serious problems in meeting their obligations as the
6“A first option for providing additional monetary accommodation, if necessary, is to expand the Federal Reserve’s
holdings of longer-term securities. (...) I believe that additional purchases of longer-term securities, should the
FOMC choose to undertake them, would be effective in further easing financial conditions.” (Bernanke, 2010a).
The speech in Jackson Hole was interpreted as a signal that renewed asset purchases are most likely. See “How
the Fed Could Employ QE Again”, The Wall Street Journal Online, 28 August 2010 or “Roundup of reactions
to Bernanke’s speech”, MarketWatch, 27 August 2010.
7See The Wall Street Journal, Long-term Treasurys fall ahead of big issue, Fed stance, 30 January 2009: “Longer-
term issues remained under pressure after Wednesday’s selloff, driven by investors’ disappointment that the
Federal Reserve didn’t signal a definite or imminent plan to buy long-term Treasuries.”
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U.S. housing crisis worsened. In response to that, on Sunday July 13,
2008 the Secretary of the Treasury announced that the U.S. govern-
ment would provide the backstop to GSE. On September 7, 2008 the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) put Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac under its conservatorship.
The surprise dummy, based on articles in Wall Street Journal and
Reuters, takes the following values: 1 when the announcement is unex-
pected, 0.5 when it is expected but accompanied by the commitment
to “expand the quantity of such purchases and the duration of the
purchase program as conditions warrant” and is equal to zero when
there was no announcement or when it was completely anticipated.
Table 2.5 presents the details about the statements.
D. Liquidity facilities
Since the beginning of the crisis, the Fed established several liquidity
facilities in order to restore the normal functioning of money mar-
kets. The additional funding sources were meant to encourage banks
and non-banking institutions to lend more funds to each other and
to bring down the borrowing costs. With the central bank liquidity
at their disposal, the financial institutions have smaller incentive to
hoard liquidity for precautionary reasons as they know they would be
able to meet the unanticipated liquidity needs. On the other hand, the
facilities should also bring down the default risk as the institutions’
counter-parties would also benefit from the access to Fed’s liquidity
backstop.
In December 2007, the Fed introduced the Term Auction Facility
(TAF) designed to auction term discount window loans to deposi-
tory institutions. After the collapse of Bear Stearns, in March 2008
two facilities for primary dealers were launched: the Term Securi-
ties Lending Facility (TSLF) providing term loans of Treasury se-
curities, and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) providing
discount window loans. The failure of Lehman Brothers was followed
by creation in September 2008 of the Asset-Backed Commercial Pa-
per Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) designed
to support money market funds and the market for ABCP. In Oc-
tober 2008, the Fed established the Money Market Investor Funding
Facility (MMIFF) designed to provide liquidity to U.S. money market
investors, and the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) provid-
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ing a liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial paper. Finally,
in March 2009 in cooperation with the Treasury the Fed launched
the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) intended to
revive the market for ABS.
Creation and expansion of liquidity facilities were announced on un-
scheduled meetings so we always consider them as surprises (see Table 2.6).
The only exceptions are the days on which the time extension of the
facilities was announced. Most of the facilities were announced to end
on specific dates but the economy was still in the recession and the
agents were expecting the Fed to extend the facilities that were about
to expire.
E. Federal Reserve’s rescue operations
During the crisis, the Fed rescued several financial institutions. Sec-
tion 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act allows the Fed to extend credit
through discounts in “unusual and exigent circumstances” when a bor-
rower is “unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other
banking institutions”. The main beneficiaries were Bear Stearns and
AIG but we include in this category also the loans granted to Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac and the conversion of Morgan Stanley and Gold-
man Sachs into traditional bank holding companies. The description
of each operation is presented in Table 2.7. As these events could not
be anticipated by market participants, we attribute the dummy equal
to 1 to each event.
• Fiscal policy
The severity of the crisis required numerous policy actions from both
monetary and fiscal authorities. Therefore, in parallel to the Federal
Reserve’s monetary and credit easing, the U.S. government introduced
several fiscal measures to offset the downturn. We take into account
these announcements as it seems important to compare the impact of
unconventional monetary policies to other policy actions. We divide
fiscal policy actions into two categories: fiscal stimulus (Table 2.8) and
government bailouts of individual troubled institutions (Table 2.9).
Implementation of fiscal stimulus was multi-stage processes which re-
quired approval of the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate.
We include the announcements corresponding to all validation stages
by the U.S. Congress and attribute them surprise dummy equal to 1
as these packages were controversial and there was uncertainty con-
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cerning their approval. The dummy is equal to zero on the days of
president’s signature as at this stage the stimulus packages were cer-
tain to become a law.
During crisis, the U.S government provided also financial support to
many troubled institutions to prevent them from failing. Market par-
ticipants could not anticipate whether the government would bail out
a particular financial institution so the dummy variable on the an-
nouncement day takes value equal to 1.
• Failures of important financial institutions
Government’s bailouts and Fed’s rescue operations were the response
to critical situation of important financial institutions. Therefore, very
often on a same day, an announcement about the Fed’s and/or gov-
ernment’s rescue operation was preceded by the bad news related to
insolvency of a given financial institution. We include these events in
our study (Table 2.10). The choice of bad news to be included is made
based on several timelines of the crisis.8
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Libor-OIS spread
Some of the unconventional monetary policies were designed to ease
the tensions on interbank market that appeared in August 2007 and
intensified after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Indeed, the gener-
alized uncertainty concerning the health of banks’ balance sheet made
the banks unwilling to lend to each other. As a consequence, the Libor-
OIS spread which is considered as a barometer of interbank market
distress widened significantly.9
We test the impact of all announcements (conventional and uncon-
ventional monetary statements, fiscal policy and failures of important
financial institutions) on the three-month Libor-OIS spread. We use
the changes of the Libor-OIS spread as a dependent variable rather
then the (potentially non stationary) level of the spread. As shown by
8See among others: 1.Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=
timeline 2.BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7521250.stm 3.University of Iowa: http://ebook.law.
uiowa.edu/ebook/sites/default/files/FinancialCrisisTimeline.pdf
9The London interbank offered rate (Libor), is an average interbank borrowing rate published daily by the British
Bankers’ Association (BBA). The overnight-indexed swap (OIS) rate represents market expectations of the funds
rate over the future months. There is no exchange of principal and only the net difference in interest rates is
paid at maturity, so there is very little default risk in the OIS market.
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McAndrews et al. (2008), the changes of the spread are more appro-
priate if there is a possibility that the effect of liquidity facilities lasts
several days after the event.
We estimate the following regression:
∆Spt = α + γ∆xt +
I∑
i−1
ϕiNCi,t +
J∑
j−1
βjFj,t + Lt + t (2.1)
where:
∆Spt is a 2-day change in 3-month Libor-OIS spread
∆xt is a surprise daily change in official rate
NCi,t is a surprise component of unconventional monetary policy an-
nouncement i
Fj,t is a surprise component of fiscal policy announcement j
Lt is a failure of important financial institution
t is a stochastic error term
There is a timing issue related to Libor-OIS spread. The Libor rate is
published at 11:00 a.m London time (06:00 ET) while the OIS rate is
taken from Datastream and the last update is from 19:15 GMT (14:15
EST / 15:15 EDT). Therefore, most of the announcements on a given
day were not taken into account by the Libor rate and some of them
were not incorporated in the OIS rate either as they were made in
the afternoon or in the evening. In particular, the FOMC statements
announcing important unconventional monetary measures were issued
at 14:15 ET (19:15 GMT or 20:15 GMT depending on the season of
the year). In order to ensure that the markets had the possibility
to react to all announcements we consider 2-day event window. The
changes in the Libor-OIS spread are defined in a following way:
∆Spt = ∆LIBORt −∆OISt
where:
∆LIBORt = LIBORt+1 − LIBORt−1
∆OISt = OISt+1 −OISt−1
Column (1) of Table 2.11 reports the estimation results. We find that
the spread rises after the failures of important financial institutions
by 29 basis points and is reduced following the government rescue
operations by 24 basis points. Announcements related to TAF10 do not
10We distinguish TAF from other liquidity facilities to make reference to the discussion in the literature about the
effectiveness of this facility.
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affect the spread but those related to other liquidity facilities (TSLF,
PDCF, AMLF, CPFF, MMIFF, AMLF) reduce the spread by 8 basis
points.11
Contrary to McAndrews et al. (2008) who also test the impact of the
TAF announcements we do not find significant impact of the TAF on
the Libor-OIS spread. Our results are different from those of McAn-
drews et al. (2008) as we study the whole period of crisis whereas their
sample ends in April 2008. Also, we do not include the dummy -1 on
2008/02/01 but this observation does not change the overall results.
Table 2.12 compares our results based on the whole sample (until De-
cember 31, 2010) with the results based only on the announcements
covering the early period of the crisis (until April 24, 2008). While the
TAF announcements had significant impact on the spread in the initial
phase of the crisis, they become insignificant as the crisis worsened.
These results suggest that in the later stage of the crisis the spread
was driven by the default and not the liquidity risk as the results of
Taylor and Williams (2009a) suggest.
2.4.2 Robustness checks
The positive and significant impact of failure of important financial in-
stitutions and the diminishing effect of government’s recapitalizations
and bailouts also suggest that the Libor-OIS spread is driven by the
credit risk as these two types of events affect directly the probability
of default. To control for the counterparty risk effect, we add as a
proxy the credit default swaps (CDS) for the US banking sector into
regression:
∆Spt = α+ γ∆xt +
I∑
i−1
ϕiNCi,t +
J∑
j−1
βjFj,t +Lt + ∆cdst + t (2.2)
where:
∆cdst is a 2-day change in 5-year US banks sector CDS index: ∆cdst =
cdst+1 − cdst−1
The results are presented in column (2) of Table 2.11. The coefficient
of the credit risk proxy is, as expected, positive and significant. The
coefficients of monetary and fiscal policies remain almost unchanged.
11We obtain similar results after including as a control variable the lag of the LIBOR-OIS spread as in McAndrews
et al. (2008).
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The variations in the general uncertainty in the macroeconomy and
financial markets may also drive the Libor-OIS spread. We add two
indicators of risk and risk aversion: VIX12 and Move13:
∆Spt = α+ γ∆xt +
I∑
i−1
ϕiNCi,t +
J∑
j−1
βjFj,t +Lt + ∆rskt + t (2.3)
where:
∆rskt is a 2-day change in VIX or MOVE index: ∆rskt = rskt+1 −
rskt−1
Again, the coefficients for the proxies are positive and significant while
other results do not change significantly (Table 2.11 column (3) and
(4)). Finally, we include both credit risk proxy and the MOVE in-
dex (column (5) Table 2.11). All coefficients have magnitudes and
significance level similar to those obtained earlier.
Libor-OIS spread is not the only appropriate indicator of the tensions
on the interbank market. In order to confirm the robustness of our
results we test the impact of unconventional measures on the alterna-
tive measures of money market distress: (1) spread between 3-month
certificate of deposit and 3-month OIS; (2) spread between 3-month
Libor and 3-month Treasury bond (TED spread); (3) 3-month Libor
and Repos (Repurchase Agreement backed by Treasury securities).
As in previous regressions, we use daily data. The dependent variable
are the previously described money market tension measures. The
independent variables are conventional monetary policy announce-
ments, unconventional monetary policy announcements, fiscal policy
announcements, bad news about the health of important financial in-
stitutions, represented by dummies:
∆Spaltt = α + γ∆xt +
I∑
i−1
ϕiNCi,t +
J∑
j−1
βjFj,t + Lt + t (2.4)
where:
∆Spaltt is a 2-day change in (1) spread between 3-month certificate
of deposit and 3-month OIS; (2) spread between 3-month Libor and
3-month Treasury bond (TED spread); (3) 3-month Libor and Repos
(Repurchase Agreement backed by Treasury securities).
The results are reported in Table 2.13. The failures of important fi-
12VIX is a measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options.
13MOVE is a measure of the implied volatility of Treasury market.
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nancial institutions widened the spreads and the government recapital-
izations and bailouts reduced them. These results are in line with the
effects of these events on the Libor-OIS spread. The liquidity facilities
on the other hand, have no significant impact on these spreads.
2.4.3 Long-term interest rates
In order to measure the impact of all policy announcements on long-
term interest rates we estimate the following regression:
∆it = α + γ∆xt +
I∑
i−1
ϕiNCi,t +
J∑
j−1
βjFj,t + Lt + t (2.5)
where:
∆it is a daily change in 10-year nominal rates (∆it = it − it−1)
∆xt is a surprise daily change in official rate
NCi,t is a surprise component of unconventional monetary policy an-
nouncement i
Fj,t is a surprise component of fiscal policy announcement j
Lt is a failure of important financial institution
t is a stochastic error term
In the first step we exclude the period of Quantitative Easing 2 and run
the regression from January 4, 1999 until July 31, 2010. Regression
results are reported in Table 2.14 column (1). The purchases of longer-
term Treasuries lower the ten-year interest rates by 22 basis points
and the purchases of long-term agency debt and MBS reduce it by
18 basis points. This result is not surprising given that Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac were nationalized in September 2008. In term of the
risk portfolio they are very similar to long-term Treasury bonds. This
evidence confirms the results of Hamilton and Wu (2012) and Gagnon
et al. (2011) who also find that altering the maturity structure of
publicly held Treasury debt lowered long-term interest rates in the
United States during the QE1 period.
In the second step we include the QE2 period. Column (2) of Table 2.14
shows the regression results from from January 4, 1999 until Decem-
ber 31, 2010. The purchases of long-term Treasury bonds still reduce
long-term interest rates but their impact is smaller (10 basis point
compared to 22 before the QE2) and the coefficient is less significant.
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Regression results from August 13, 200914 until December 31, 2010
show that the QE2 bond purchases did not lower long-term nominal
rates (Table 2.14 column (3)).
Some non-standard measures, interest rate commitment in particular,
were intended to reduce medium-term interest rates. In order to eval-
uate the impact of unconventional monetary policies on the different
parts of the yield curve, we orthogonalize the expectations of interest
rates for different maturities. We separate the expectations by con-
structing three independent factors: Factor 1: changes in expectations
of the current month interest rates; Factor 2: changes in expectations
of the next year interest rates that are not already explained by the
changes in current month expectations; Factor 3: changes in expecta-
tions of the interest rates over the next 10 years that are not explained
by the changes in the 1-year expectations.
The factors are given by the following relations:
∆y1 = F1
∆y12 = α1F1 + F2
∆y120 = α2F1 + β1F2 + F3
where:
∆y1 - changes in Fed Funds Futures (monetary policy surprises as
defined by Kuttner 2001)
∆y12 - changes in 1-year OIS
∆y120 - changes in 10-year nominal bond
We test the impact of all announcements on the second and the third
factor before QE2 was introduced (Table 2.15 and Table 2.16 (1)).15
The results presented in Table 2.16 column (1) confirm that the QE1
purchases of long-term Treasuries and agency debt and MBS con-
tribute to lowering medium and long-term interest rates (factor 3) by
respectively 16 and 22 basis points.
Table 2.16 column (2) reports the results for the whole period includ-
ing QE2. The purchases of agency bonds and MBS still reduce the
third factor by 16 basis points but the impact of Treasury bonds pur-
chases diminishes to 10 basis points and becomes less significant. In
14On August 12, 2009, the FOMC statement of that day announced that the full amount of bonds would be
purchased by the end of October 2009.
15The sample period is from November 26, 2003 until July 31, 2010 as the data on OIS rates necessary to calculate
factors were available from the end of 2003 only.
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the period including only QE2 (August 13, 2009 - December 31, 2010),
the impact of longer-term Treasury bonds purchases on the third fac-
tor is no longer significant (Table 2.16 column (3)).
Finally, we do not find evidence that interest rates commitment suc-
ceeded in lowering the expectations of interest rates from 1 month to
1 year (factor 2, Table 2.15).
2.4.4 Long-term inflation expectations
2.4.4.1 Some preliminary evidence on a change in inflation expectations
The expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet was viewed by
some observers as a threat to the Fed’s commitment to low and stable
inflation. At the same time, the worsening economic conditions, es-
pecially after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, raised concerns about
future deflation. In order to get a preliminary view of the evolution
of inflation expectations, we examine some market-based and survey-
based indicators.
A. Spread between 10-year Treasury bonds and average Fed
Funds
The term spread between 10-year Treasury bonds and average Fed
Funds increased significantly since the crisis started in August 2007
(Figure 2.3). However, the term spread is a very crude measure of
inflation expectations as it is also influenced by changes to expected
real interest rate and term premia (inflation risk premium and real
risk premium), which went up since the crisis started.
B. 10-year breakeven inflation compensation
In recent years, the market participants, analysts and policy makers
were using the inflation-indexed financial instruments to gauge infla-
tion expectations. One of them is the 10-year breakeven inflation
compensation which is measured by the difference in yields between
10-year nominal and inflation-indexed bonds (10-year TIPS rate16).
The 10-year breakeven inflation compensation rates declined strongly
after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Although this might reflect
deflationary expectations related to the worsening of economic situ-
ation, this preliminary evidence must be viewed with some caution.
16The U.S. Treasury issued Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS) for the first time in 1997. The coupon
and principal payments of these bonds are indexed to the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
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Inflation compensation is also affected by inflation risk premium and
the differential liquidity premia between TIPS and nominal securities.
It seems plausible that at the peak of the crisis the relative liquidity of
TIPS and nominal bonds played important role in the inflation com-
pensation evolution as the participants of the two markets are quite
different. The main contributors in the TIPS market are institutional
investors like pension funds or insurance companies with long-term lia-
bilities who treat TIPS as buy-and-hold assets. The emergency rescue
of AIG by the Fed led to some uncertainty concerning the financial
health of insurance companies. The fire sales of their assets might
explain the falling prices of TIPS. In contrast, the most important
holders of the Treasury nominal bonds are primary dealers for whom
nominal bonds play a role of hedging and trading vehicle. The sudden
increase in uncertainty concerning the value of many financial instru-
ments made the safe instruments like nominal bonds more attractive
to investors. A strong increase in TIPS yields and a fall in nomi-
nal yields in autumn 2008 shown in Figure 2.4 suggest that there was
indeed a disruption in relative liquidity in the two markets.
C. Forward inflation compensation
The 10-year breakeven inflation rate incorporates also short-term de-
velopments of inflation compensation. One way to measure specifically
long-term expectations is to focus on the evolution of the far-ahead
forward inflation compensation. Figure 2.5 shows 1-year forward in-
flation compensation from 9 to 10 years ahead. The far-ahead forward
inflation has been changing over time and became particularly volatile
in autumn 2008. In the beginning of 2009 it returns to its usual volatil-
ity. In January 2010 it starts declining but the trend reverses in August
2010 which coincides with the beginning of Quantitative Easing 2.
Figure 2.6 shows the 1-year nominal and real (TIPS) forward rates
ending in 10 years. Both TIPS and nominal forward rates are very
volatile in autumn 2008. The TIPS forward rate rises suddenly after
Lehman Brother collapse but to a much smaller extent then spot 10-
year TIPS rate. The nominal forward rate rises even more. This is in
contrast with the nominal spot 10-year rate that declined significantly
at the same time. This provides some tentative evidence that the
disruption in TIPS liquidity relative to nominal bonds affected mostly
short and medium term inflation compensation.
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D. Survey-based inflation expectations
One way to measure the informative content of market-based inflation
expectations is to compare them to survey-based inflation expecta-
tions. Figure 2.7 shows the University of Michigan survey of forward
inflation expectations from 5 to 10 years. Figure 2.8 compares the
market-based and the survey-based inflation expectations at the same
horizon and shows that the survey-based forward inflation expecta-
tions were also unusually volatile during the peek of the current crisis.
2.4.4.2 Extracting the inflation expectations
In this study we use the market-based measure of long-run inflation
expectations provided by Gürkaynak, Levin and Swanson (2010).17
It is based on the comparison between nominal and inflation-indexed
Treasury securities (break-even inflation rates). More specifically, it
is constructed as a difference between 1-year forward nominal rate
ending in 10 years and 1-year forward TIPS rate ending in 10 years:
piet = fn1,t+9y − f i1,t+9y
where:
piet denotes the nine-year-ahead one-year forward inflation compensa-
tion.
fn1,t+9y denotes the nine-year-ahead one-year forward nominal yield.
f i1,t+9y denotes the nine-year-ahead one-year forward yield of inflation-
indexed bond.
As we mentioned previously, the daily changes in forward inflation
compensation rates may be driven not only by long-term inflation
expectations (IE1,t+9y) but also by forward inflation risk premium
(IP1,t+9y) or forward TIPS/nominal bonds liquidity premium (LP1,t+9y):
∆piet = ∆IE1,t+9y + ∆IP1,t+9y + LP1,t+9y
Nevertheless, there are still two reasons for which breakeven inflation
rates should be informative about expected inflation during the crisis.
First, we use the forward inflation compensation rate (from 9 to 10
years ahead) and not the spot rate (from now to 10 years ahead).
As discussed earlier, the relative TIPS liquidity worsened in autumn
17These data are updated periodically and available on Federal Reserve website: http://www.federalreserve.gov/
econresdata/researchdata.htm
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2008 but impacted mostly short and medium maturities. One-year far-
ahead forward rates provide cleaner indication of long-horizon inflation
expectations as they filter out the effects of short-term expectations.
Second, the survey-based inflation expectations are also volatile during
crisis which suggests that fluctuations in forward compensation can be
also viewed as changes in expected inflation.
We test the impact of liquidity premium and inflation risk premium
on far-ahead inflation compensation by estimating a regression model.
Following Söderlind (2011), we use VIX to approximate the TIPS liq-
uidity premium and bond options to account for inflation uncertainty.
Moreover, we construct additional proxy for the differential liquidity
premium between TIPS and nominal securities given that the nominal
bonds’ liquidity might also have changed during crisis (see Figure 2.4).
The liquidity of each type of bond is approximated by its bid-ask
spread. Therefore, the relative liquidity proxy is a difference between
the bid-ask spread for TIPS and nominal bonds:
Bidaskt = BidaskTIPSt −BidaskNomt
where:
Bidaskt is a relative TIPS / nominal bonds liquidity proxy
BidaskTIPSt is a bid-ask spread for TIPS
BidaskNomt is a bid-ask spread for nominal bonds
We estimate the following regressions:
∆piet = α1 + φ1∆V IXt + γ1∆BOt + t
∆piet = α2 + β1∆Bidaskt + γ2∆BOt + t
∆piet = α3 + φ2∆V IXt + β2∆Bidaskt + γ3∆BOt + t
where:
∆piet is a daily change in one-year forward inflation from 9 to 10 years
ahead (∆piet = piet − piet−1)
∆V IXt is a daily change in the VIX index (∆V IXt = V IXt−V IXt−1)
∆BOt is a daily change in options on 30-year bond futures (∆BOt =
BOt −BOt−1)
∆Bidaskt is a daily change in relative TIPS / nominal bonds liquidity
proxy (∆Bidaskt = Bidaskt −Bidaskt−1)
If these models are able to explain much in the movement of the far-
ahead forward inflation compensation, we would expect the sign of
φ1 and φ2 to be negative. In fact, systemic risk approximated by the
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VIX index should increase the TIPS illiquidity and diminish inflation
compensation. We would also expect the relative liquidity proxy to
have negative sign as the bigger bid-ask spread for nominal bonds
increases the inflation compensation and that the bigger TIPS bid-ask
spread on the contrary diminishes it. On the other hand the inflation
risk premium increases inflation compensation so the coefficient of this
proxy should be positive.
Table 2.17 shows that both proxies for TIPS liquidity and relative
liquidity are significant and have the expected sign. The proxy for
inflation uncertainty, the implied bonds volatility, has a positive im-
pact but is not significant. Therefore, we add only liquidity proxies
into our regression model intended to measure the impact of uncon-
ventional monetary policies on long-term inflation expectations. Even
though inflation expectations and inflation risk premium cannot be
easily decomposed, they can be both associated with the capacity of
the central bank to control inflation and it is not necessary to separate
out these effects.
2.4.4.3 Unconventional monetary policy and fiscal policy announcements
As mentioned earlier, some of the unconventional monetary policies
implemented by the Fed during crisis were perceived as inflationary.
We evaluate the impact of these policies on long-term inflation ex-
pectations by measuring the response of far-ahead forward inflation
compensation over the one-day period surrounding monetary policy
actions and statements. We also measure its response to fiscal policy
announcements in order to compare monetary and fiscal policy effect.
As in the case of long-term nominal rates we run the regression for
two periods: including and excluding Quantitative Easing 2.
∆piet = α+φ1∆V IXt+φ2∆Bidaskt+γ∆xt+
I∑
i−1
ϕiNCi,t+
J∑
j−1
βjFj,t+Lt+t
(2.6)
where:
∆piet is a daily change in one-year forward inflation from 9 to 10 years
ahead (∆piet = piet − piet−1)
∆V IXt is a daily change in the VIX index
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∆Bidaskt is a daily change in a relative liquidity proxy
∆xt is a surprise daily change in official rate
NCi,t is a surprise component of unconventional monetary policy an-
nouncement i
Fj,t is a surprise component of fiscal policy announcement j
Lt is a failure of important financial institution
t is a stochastic error term
Table 2.18 column (1) reports the regression results for the period
from January 4, 1999 to July 31, 2010, before QE2 was implemented.
First of all, the failures of big financial institutions diminish long-term
inflation expectations by 4 basis points. On the other hand, news re-
lated to Fed’s rescue operations increases far-ahead forward inflation
compensation by 5 basis points. Announcements related to other un-
conventional monetary policies and news about fiscal measures do not
have significant impact on long-term inflation compensation. Fiscal
stimulus announcements are only significant at 10% level at this stage.
In the second step we include in our regression the period of QE2
and estimate the sample from January 4, 1999 to December 31, 2010.
Table 2.18 column (2) shows that the effect of the Fed’s rescue op-
eration is still positive and significant. However, this time the fiscal
stimulus and purchases of longer-term Treasury bonds raise long-term
inflation expectations by 6 basis points. The results for the period of
QE2 (Table 2.18 column (3)) shows that QE2 longer-term Treasury
purchases increase long-term inflation expectations by 7 basis points.
This result provides evidence that the second round of QE2 had quite
different effect on long-term nominal interest rates and long-term in-
flation expectations then QE1. QE1 reduced long-term interest rates
without raising inflation, whereas QE2 raised inflation expectations
without diminishing long-term interest rates.
2.5 Conclusion
The implementation of unconventional monetary policies required the
huge expansion of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and the change
of its composition. The non-standard monetary measures were imple-
mented along with government fiscal stimulus and proved effective in
many ways. The Fed’s liquidity facilities other than TAF reduced to
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some extent strains on the interbank markets (8 basis points) while
the government’s bailouts and recapitalizations diminished them by 24
basis points. The QE1 purchases of long-term Treasury and agency
securities lowered long-term interest rates respectively by 18 and 22
basis points. On the other hand, long-term inflation expectations
remained relatively stable before QE2 was introduced: the Fed’s res-
cue operations were the only type of intervention that raised infla-
tion expectations. The situation changed when QE2 was introduced.
When the period of the second round of quantitative easing is included,
the long-term Treasury bonds purchases and fiscal stimulus announce-
ments raise long-term inflation expectations by 6 basis points.
The different effects of QE1 and QE2 on long-term interest rates and
long-term inflation expectations are puzzling. The first round of quan-
titative easing lowered the long end of the yield curve and preserved
the anchoring of long-run inflation expectations. The response of mar-
ket participants to the second round of quantitative easing was differ-
ent: long-term inflation expectations rose and long-term interest rates
were not reduced. The different market reaction could be related to
the perceived “permanent” character of QE2. Indeed, according to
Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) permanent monetary base expansion
can have positive impact on prices. Moreover, the independence of
the Fed with respect to Treasury might be more of an issue as the
government bond purchases continued along with fiscal stimulus. The
inflationary impact of rescue operations, often conducted with Trea-
sury, seems to confirm the agents’ sensibility to that question.
Even though QE1 and QE2 did not have the same impact on nominal
long-term rates they both seem to lower real long-term rates as QE2
raised long-term inflation expectations. It appears that the overall
effects of longer-term Treasury securities purchases is still an open
question that would be pursued in further research.
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A1. Figures
Figure 2.1: Federal Reserve Assets
Figure 2.2: Monetary base and broader money aggregates
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Figure 2.3: Term Spread: 10-year Treasury yield - average Fed Funds rate
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Figure 2.4: 10-year interest rates
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Figure 2.5: 1-year Forward Inflation Compensation ending in 10 years
1
2
3
4
5
Jan 99 Jan 01 Jan 03 Jan 05 Jan 07 Jan 09 Dec 10
Source: www.federalreserve.gov
92
2.6 Annexes
Figure 2.6: 1-year Forward Nominal and TIPS rates ending in 10 years
0
2
4
6
Jan 99 Jan 01 Jan 03 Jan 05 Jan 07 Jan 09 Dec 10
1y forward real (TIPS) rate ending in 10y
1y nominal forward rate ending in 10y
Source: www.federalreserve.gov
Figure 2.7: Survey: 5-10 Year Ahead Inflation Expectations
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Figure 2.8: Forward Inflation Compensation and the Univ. of Michigan Survey
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A2. Tables
Table 2.1: Dates of announcements - part 1
Date 1* 2* 3* 4* 5* 6* 7* 8* 9* 10* Comment
20070809 1 BNP Paribas suspends 3 investment funds that invested in subprime mort-
gage market
20070918 1 FOMC statement
20071031 1 FOMC statement
20071206 1 U.S. President unveils the plan to ease pressure on the mortgage market
20071211 1 FOMC statement
20071212 1 TALF created
20080122 1 FOMC statement
20080129 1 Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 approved by the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives
20080130 1 FOMC statement
20080207 1 Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 approved by the Senate
20080213 1 U.S. President signs the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008
20080307 1 TAF increased to $100 billion
20080311 1 TSLF created
20080314 1 1 Bear Stearns shares decline by 47%. Board authorizes the New York Fed
to extend credit to JPMC to provide nonrecourse loan to Bear Stearns.
20080317 1 1 1 Bear Stearns bailed out. PDCF creation. Fed grants a loan to JPMC for
acquiring Bear Stearns. (News on Sunday, September 16).
20080318 1 FOMC statement
20080430 1 FOMC statement
20080502 1 Expansion of the collateral in Schedule 2 TSLF auctions.
20080625 1 FOMC statement
20080711 1 Bad news about Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE)/ talks about
GSE nationalization
20080714 1 1 1 Indymac Bank’s failure on July 11 in the evening (Friday). Treasury in-
creases the credit line for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. Board grants
Federal Reserve Bank of New York the authority to lend to Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac should such lending prove necessary. (News on Sunday,
July 13).
20080723 1 The Housing and Economic Recovery Act passed by Congress
20080730 1 1 TAF maturity extended. U.S. President signs into law the Housing and
Economic Recovery Act of 2008.
20080805 1 FOMC statement
20080908 1 1 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac nationalized
20080915 1 1 Lehman Brothers collapsed. Important expansion of TSLF and PDCF:
collateral, frequency, amount. (News on Sunday, September 14).
20080916 1 1 FOMC statement. Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s downgrades ratings
on AIG credit.
20080917 1 1 Failure of AIG. Fed bailouts AIG (News on September 16, late in the
evening).
20080919 1 1 1 AMLF created. Fed plans to buy short-term agency debt. Paulson fi-
nancial rescue plan is unveiled (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008)
20080922 1 The Fed agrees to convert Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs Group into
traditional bank holding companies and extends credit to their subsidiaries
(News on Sunday, September 21)
20080925 1 Washington Mutual seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
20080929 1 1 1 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act defeated 228-205 in the United
States House of Representatives. Wachovia’s failure. TAF expansion.
Acquisition of Wachovia by Citigroup is facilitated by the FDIC and con-
curred with by the Fed and the Treasury.
20081001 1 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 passed in Senate
20081003 1 U.S. President signs the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
1* FOMC statements; 2* Interest rates commitment; 3* Failures of important institutions; 4* Liquidity facility
creation; 5* Liquidity facility extension; 6* Fed’s rescue operations; 7* Government’s bailouts; 8* Purchases
of agency debt/MBS; 9* Purchases of long-term Treasury securities; 10* Fiscal stimulus
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Table 2.2: Dates of announcements - part 2
Date 1* 2* 3* 4* 5* 6* 7* 8* 9* 10* Comment
20081006 1 TAF expansion.
20081007 1 1 CPFF creation. TAF expansion.
20081008 1 FOMC statement.
20081009 1 1 AIG’s critical financial situation. FED lends to AIG late on October 8.
20081014 1 Secretary of the Treasury Paulson and President Bush separately announce
revisions in the TARP
20081021 1 MMIFF creation
20081029 1 FOMC statement
20081110 1 1 1 AIG’s critical financial situation. FED and Treasury lend to AIG
20081124 1 1 The US government agrees to rescue Citigroup after an attack by investors
causes the stock price to plummet 60% over the last week.
20081125 1 1 TALF created. Fed announced purchases of agency debt and MBS.
20081202 1 Extension of PDCF, AMLF, TSLF up to April 30,2009
20081216 1 1 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment. Fed repeats its intention to
buy agency debt and MBS and stands ready to expand the purchase. Fed
evaluates the benefits from purchasing longer-term Treasury securities.
20081230 1 Date of purchase of agency debt and agency MBS announced, the pur-
chase plan will be realized in 6 months not several quarters as previously
announced
20090116 1 1 Bailout of the Bank of America.
20090128 1 1 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment. Fed repeats its intention to
buy agency debt and MBS and stands ready to expand the purchase. Fed
is prepared to buy longer-term Treasury securities.
20090203 1 Extension of facilities until October 30, 2009 instead of April 2009
20090210 1 1 Increase of the size of the TALF and expansion of the eligible asset classes.
Fed repeats its intention to buy agency debt and MBS and stands ready
to expand the purchase.
20090213 1 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 passed in the House
and in the Senate
20090217 1 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 signed by President
Obama
20090302 1 1 1 AIG reports the largest quarterly loss in US corporate history in the final
three months of 2008. AIG receives rescue package from the US govern-
ment. The Fed and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York plan to take
up to a $26 billion preferred interest in two AIG life insurance subsidiaries
20090303 1 TALF launched
20090318 1 1 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment. Additional purchases of
agency debt and MBS. Fed will buy longer-term Treasury securities.
20090429 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment.
20090624 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment.
20090812 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment.
20090923 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment.
20091104 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment.
20091216 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment.
20100127 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment.
20100316 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment.
20100428 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment.
20100623 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment.
20100810 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment. The fed announces its plan
to reinvest principal payments from agency debts and MBS in longer-term
Treasury securities
20100827 1 1 Ben Bernanke’s speech in which he said that the Fed could increase its
purchases of Treasury securities.
20100921 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment. The Fed stated that it “was
prepared to provide additional accommodation if needed to support the
economic recovery", displaying a bias towards easing that was absent from
its last policy statement.
20101103 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment. The pledge to buy an ad-
ditional $600 billion in long-term Treasury bonds by the middle of next
year was slightly larger than the median expectation of‘$500 billion in a
Reuters poll.
20101214 1 1 FOMC statement. Interest rate commitment. The Fed reiterates its in-
tension to purchase its $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities.
1* FOMC statements; 2* Interest rates commitment; 3* Failures of important institutions; 4* Liquidity facility
creation; 5* Liquidity facility extension; 6* Fed’s rescue operations; 7* Government’s bailouts; 8* Purchases
of agency debt/MBS; 9* Purchases of long-term Treasury securities; 10* Fiscal stimulus
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Table 2.3: Interest rate commitment
Date Dummy Comments
20081216 1 The phrase “the Committee anticipates that weak economic conditions are likely to
warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for some time” was
introduced for the first time.
20090128 0 Economy had weakened and markets expected the Fed to reiterate the commitment.
20090318 1 Commitment expected but the Fed introduced of the term “for an extended period”
perceived as stronger than the phrase “for some time”.
20090429 0 Economy had weakened, markets expected the Fed to reiterate the commitment
20090624 0 Economy had weakened, markets expected the Fed to reiterate the commitment
20090812 0 Economy had weakened, markets expected the Fed to reiterate the commitment
20090923 0.5 Some economist expected the sign of “exit strategy”
20091104 0.5 Economy improved
20091216 0.5 Deceleration in the pace of jobs losses but experts do not think Fed will try to
destabilize expectations
20100127 0 Hoenig dissent confirmed some experts expectations about the implementation of
exit strategy
20100316 0.5 No one joint Hoenig as some feared, statement was reiterated
20100428 0,5 Some experts speculated the Fed would indicate a rate increase in the coming
months in the statement
20100623 0 Economy had weakened, markets expected the Fed to reiterate the commitment
20100810 0 Economy had weakened, markets expected the Fed to reiterate the commitment
20100921 0 Economy had weakened, markets expected the Fed to reiterate the commitment
20101103 0 Economy had weakened, markets expected the Fed to reiterate the commitment
20101214 0 Economy had weakened, markets expected the Fed to reiterate the commitment
Table 2.4: Longer-term Treasury bonds purchases
Date Dummy Comments
20081201 1 Ben Bernanke’s speech in which he announces that the Fed “could purchase
longer-term Treasury securities in substantial quantities”.
20081216 1 Fed evaluates the benefits from purchasing longer-term Treasury securities
20090128 -1 Fed is prepared to buy longer-term Treasury securities (market participants
disappointed as they expected the decision about the purchases : -1)
20090318 1 Fed will buy $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities.
20100810 1 Fed will reinvest principal payments from agency debts and MBS in longer-term
Treasury securities.
20100827 1 Ben Bernanke’s speech in which he said that the Fed could increase its purchases of
Treasury securities.
20100921 1 Fed stated that it “was prepared to provide additional accommodation if needed to
support the economic recovery”, displaying a bias towards easing that was absent
from its last policy statement.
20101103 1 The pledge to buy an additional $600 billion in long-term Treasury bonds by the
middle of next year was slightly larger than the median expectation of‘$500 billion
in a Reuters poll.
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Table 2.5: Agency debt and MBS purchases
Date Dummy Comments
20081125 1 Fed announces purchases of GSE debt up to $100 billion and MBS backed by GSE
up to $500 billion
20081216 0,5 Fed repeats it’s intention to buy agency debt and MBS and stands ready to expand
the purchase.
20081230 1 Date of purchase announced, the purchase plan will be realized in 6 months not
several quarters as previously announced
20090128 0,5 Fed repeats it’s intention to buy agency debt and MBS and stands ready to expand
the purchase.
20090210 0,5 Fed repeats it’s intention to buy agency debt and MBS and stands ready to expand
the purchase
20090318 1 Additional 750 billion of agency MBS and additional purchase 100 $billion of
agency debt.
Table 2.6: Liquidity facilities
Date Creation Extension Dummy Comment
20071212 1 0 1 TAF created
20071221 1 0 1 Announce continuation of TAF
20080104 0 1 1 TAF’s auction amount increased
20080307 0 1 1 TAF’s auction amount increased
20080311 1 0 1 TSLF created
20080317 1 0 1 PDCF created
20080502 0 1 1 Expansion of the collateral in Schedule 2 TSLF auctions
20080730 0 1 1 TAF’s maturity extended
20080915 0 1 1 Important expansion of TSLF and PDCF
20080919 1 0 1 AMLF created
20080929 0 1 1 TAF’s expansion
20081006 0 1 1 TAF’s expansion
20081007 1 1 1 CPFF created. TAF’s expansion
20081021 1 0 1 MMIFF created
20081125 1 0 1 TALF’s creation
20081202 0 1 0 Extension of PDCF, AMLF, TSLF up to April 30, 2009
20090107 0 1 1 Expansion of MMIFF
20090203 0 1 0 Extension of most facilities until October 30, 2009
20090210 0 1 1 Increase of the size of the TALF.
20090303 0 1 1 TALF launched
20090319 0 1 1 Expansion of TALF
20090501 0 1 1 Expansion of TALF
20090519 0 1 1 Expansion of TALF
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Table 2.7: Federal Reserve’s rescue operations
Date Dummy Comment
20080314 1 Federal Reserve Bank of NY extends credit to JPMC to provide nonrecourse loan to
Bear Stearns.
20080317 1 Fed grants a loan to JPMC for acquiring Bear Stearns. (Announced on Sunday
September 16).
20080714 1 Board grants Federal Reserve Bank of New York the authority to lend to Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac should such lending be necessary
20080917 1 Fed bailouts AIG (announced on September 16 late in the evening).
20080922 1 The U.S. Fed agreed to convert Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs Group into
traditional bank holding companies and extended credit to their subsidiaries
(announced on Sunday, September 21)
20081009 1 FED lends to AIG late on October 8.
20081110 1 FED and Treasury lend to AIG
20090302 1 The Fed and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York plan to take up to a $26 billion
preferred interest in two AIG life insurance subsidiaries.
Table 2.8: Fiscal stimulus announcements
Date Dummy Comment
20071206 1 President Bush unveils the plan to ease pressure on the mortgage market
20080129 1 Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives
20080207 1 Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 approved by the Senate
20080213 0 President Bush signs the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008
20080723 1 The Housing and Economic Recovery Act was passed by Congress
20080728 1 The Housing and Economic Recovery Act was passed by Congress on Saturday July
26, 2008
20080730 0 President Bush signs into law the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008.
20080919 1 Paulson financial rescue plan is unveiled (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008)
20081002 1 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 passes in Senate late on October 1,
2008
20081003 1 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act was passed by the House of Representatives
and President George W. Bush signed it into law.
20081014 1 Secretary of the Treasury Paulson and President Bush separately announced
revisions in the TARP program
20090210 1 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 passed in the Senate
20090213 1 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 passed in the House and in the
Senate late on Friday February 13, 2009
20090217 0 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 signed by President Obama
20101215 1 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010. The Senate passed the legislation on $858 billion tax-cut plan
20101217 1 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010. House voted 277-148 for final passage on the tax-cut agreement vote late on
December 16, 2010 and President Obama signs it into law on December 17, 2010.
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Table 2.9: Government’s recapitalization
Date Dummy Comment
20080714 1 Treasury increases the credit line for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.
20080908 1 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac placed into conservatorship of the FHFA
20080929 1 Acquisition of Wachovia by Citigroup is facilitated by the FDIC
20081110 1 FED and Treasury lend to AIG
20081124 1 The US government agrees to rescue Citigroup
20090116 1 Bailout of Bank of America.
20090302 1 AIG is to receive an extra $30bn from the US government
Table 2.10: Failures of important financial institutions
Date Dummy Comment
20070809 1 BNP Paribas suspends three investment funds
20080314 1 Bear Stearns Shares decline by 47%.
20080317 1 Bear Stearn’s failure. (news on September 16 SUNDAY).
20080711 1 Bed news about GSE/ talks about GSE’ nationalization
20080714 1 Indymac Bank’s failure on July 11 in the evening (Friday).
20080908 1 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac nationalized
20080915 1 Lehman Brothers collapsed. Announcement made on September 14, SUNDAY.
20080916 1 Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s downgrade ratings on AIG’s credit.
20080917 1 Failure of AIG (September 16 late in the evening).
20080925 1 Washington Mutual’s failure
20080929 1 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act is defeated 228-205 in the House of
Representatives + Wachovia’s failure.
20081009 1 AIG’s critical financial situation. FED lends to AIG late on October 8.
20081110 1 AIG”s critical financial situation. FED and Treasury lend to AIG.
20081124 1 Citigroup stock price declined by 60% over the week
20090116 1 Bailout Bank of America.
20090302 1 AIG reports the largest quarterly loss in US corporate history of $61.7bn in the
final three months of 2008.
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Table 2.11: Impact of monetary and fiscal announcements on 3-month Libor-OIS spread
3-month Libor-OIS spread (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FOMC rate decisions -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
[0.13] [0.13] [0.12] [0.13] [0.12]
Failures of financial institutions 0.29** 0.29** 0.27** 0.28** 0.27**
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
Fed’s rescue operations -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.06]
Agency debt and MBS 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.04]
Long-term Treasury bonds -0.02 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01
[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01]
Government’s recapitalizations -0.24** -0.23** -0.23** -0.24** -0.22**
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Fiscal stimulus 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Interest rate commitment -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
TAF creation and extensions 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
[0.05] [0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05]
Other liquidity facilities -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08* -0.08*
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
CDS 0.08** 0.06*
[0.03] [0.03]
MOVE 0.24** 0.21**
[0.07] [0.07]
VIX 0.07**
[0.02]
Constant -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 1,823 1,823 1,823 1,823 1,823
Newey West standard errors in brackets ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 2.12: Impact of monetary and fiscal announcements on Libor-OIS spread in different phases
of the crisis
3-month Libor-OIS spread until Apr 24, 2008 until Dec 31, 2010
FOMC rate decisions -0.03 -0.04
[0.13] [0.13]
Failures of important financial institutions 0.29** 0.29**
[0.06] [0.06]
Fed’s rescue operations -0.02 -0.02
[0.07] [0.07]
Agency debt and MBS 0.02 0.03
[0.05] [0.05]
Long-term Treasury bonds purchases -0.02 -0.02
[0.01] [0.01]
Government’s recapitalizations/ bailouts -0.23** -0.24**
[0.07] [0.07]
Fiscal stimulus 0.02 0.02
[0.04] [0.04]
Interest rate commitment -0.07 -0.07
[0.04] [0.04]
TAF until 24 April 2008 -0.05**
[0.02]
TAF whole sample 0.05
[0.05]
Other liquidity facilities -0.07 -0.08*
[0.04] [0.04]
Constant -0.00 -0.00
[0.00] [0.00]
Observations 1823 1823
Newey West standard errors in brackets ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 2.13: Impact of monetary and fiscal announcements on alternative measures of money
market tensions
CD-OIS Libor-Treasury Libor-Repo
FOMC rate decisions -0.18 -0.10 0.07
[0.25] [0.23] [0.21]
Failures of important financial institutions 0.62** 0.50* 0.26**
[0.24] [0.21] [0.07]
Fed’s rescue operations 0.09 -0.03 -0.03
[0.23] [0.14] [0.05]
Agency debt and MBS 0.09 0.02 0.07
[0.13] [0.08] [0.05]
Long-term Treasury bonds purchases -0.02 -0.01 -0.03
[0.02] [0.03] [0.02]
Government’s recapitalizations/ bailouts -0.68* -0.43* -0.21**
[0.32] [0.21] [0.08]
Fiscal stimulus -0.03 -0.04 0.04
[0.12] [0.08] [0.05]
Interest rate commitment -0.13 -0.10 -0.10
[0.08] [0.08] [0.06]
TAF creation and extensions 0.06 -0.06 0.08
[0.08] [0.06] [0.07]
Other liquidity facilities -0.24 -0.09 -0.06
[0.13] [0.07] [0.06]
Constant -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 1,823 1,823 1,823
Newey West standard errors in brackets ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 2.14: Impact of monetary and fiscal announcements on 10-year nominal interest rates
10-year nominal rate Before QE2 Including QE2 Only QE2
FOMC rate decisions 0.18** 0.18** 0.72
[0.05] [0.05] [0.77]
Failures of important financial institutions -0.01 -0.01
[0.06] [0.06]
Fed’s rescue operations -0.01 -0.01
[0.05] [0.05]
Agency debt and MBS purchases -0.18** -0.18**
[0.05] [0.06]
Long-term Treasury bonds purchases -0.22** -0.10* -0.01
[0.02] [0.05] [0.06]
Government’s recapitalizations/ bailouts -0.03 -0.03
[0.07] [0.07]
Fiscal stimulus 0.04 0.03 -0.02
[0.03] [0.03] [0.05]
Interest rate commitment 0.01 -0.06 0.04
[0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
Liquidity facilities -0.01 -0.01
[0.02] [0.02]
Constant 0.00 0.00 -0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 3013 3122 361
R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.00
Robust standard errors in brackets ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 2.15: Impact of monetary and fiscal announcements on 2nd factor
Factor 2 Before QE2 Including QE2 Only QE2
Failures of important financial institutions -0.07 -0.07
[0.04] [0.04]
Fed’s rescue operations 0.01 0.01
[0.04] [0.04]
Agency debt and MBS purchases -0.02 -0.02
[0.02] [0.02]
Long-term Treasury bonds purchases 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.03] [0.01] [0.00]
Government’s recapitalizations/ bailouts 0.05 0.05
[0.04] [0.04]
Fiscal stimulus 0.05 0.04 0.01
[0.03] [0.02] [0.01]
Interest rate commitment 0.02 0.02 -0.02
[0.03] [0.03] [0.01]
Liquidity facilities -0.03 -0.03
[0.02] [0.02]
Constant 0.00 0.00 -0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 1723 1832 361
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.01
Robust standard errors in brackets ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 2.16: Impact of monetary and fiscal announcements on 3rd factor
Factor 3 Before QE2 Including QE2 Only QE2
Failures of important financial institutions 0.03 0.03
[0.03] [0.03]
Fed’s rescue operations -0.01 -0.01
[0.03] [0.03]
Agency debt and MBS purchases -0.16** -0.16**
[0.05] [0.06]
Long-term Treasury bonds purchases -0.22** -0.10* -0.01
[0.03] [0.05] [0.05]
Government’s recapitalizations/ bailouts -0.07 -0.07
[0.05] [0.05]
Fiscal stimulus 0.02 0.01 -0.02
[0.02] [0.02] [0.05]
Interest rate commitment 0.00 -0.07 0.05
[0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
Liquidity facilities 0.01 0.01
[0.02] [0.02]
Constant 0.00 0.00 -0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 1722 1831 361
R-squared 0.07 0.05 0.00
Robust standard errors in brackets ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 2.17: Impact of liquidity and inflation risk premium proxies on far-ahead forward inflation
compensation
(1) (2) (3)
Far-ahead forward inflation compensation
VIX -0.09*** -0.09***
[0.00] [0.00]
Bond options 0.13 0.04 0.12
[0.58] [0.86] [0.60]
Relative liquidity proxy -0.30*** -0.30***
[0.00] [0.00]
Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.82] [0.93] [0.81]
Observations 2,760 2,760 2,760
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.02
Robust pval in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.18: Impact of monetary and fiscal announcements on inflation expectations
Far-ahead forward inflation compensation Before QE2 Including QE2 Only QE2
VIX -0.06** -0.07** -0.28**
[0.02] [0.02] [0.04]
Relative liquidity proxy -0.29** -0.29** -0.26
[0.07] [0.07] [0.56]
FOMC rate decisions -0.06 -0.06 0.36
[0.04] [0.04] [0.49]
Failures of important financial institutions -0.04* -0.04*
[0.02] [0.02]
Fed’s rescue operations 0.05* 0.05*
[0.03] [0.03]
Agency debt and MBS 0.04 0.04
[0.06] [0.06]
Long-term Treasury bonds purchases 0.03 0.06** 0.07**
[0.03] [0.02] [0.02]
Government’s recapitalizations/ bailouts -0.03 -0.03
[0.04] [0.04]
Fiscal stimulus 0.06 0.06* 0.05
[0.03] [0.03] [0.05]
Interest rate commitment 0.00 -0.02 0.02
[0.04] [0.05] [0.03]
Liquidity facilities -0.00 -0.00
[0.02] [0.02]
Constant 0.00 0.00 -0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Observations 2897 3001 346
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.16
Robust standard errors in brackets ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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3 Have the ECB unconventional monetary
policies lowered market borrowing costs
for banks and governments?1
3.1 Introduction
Since August 2007 severe financial market disruptions impaired tra-
ditional monetary transmission channels in the euro area. First, the
2007-2009 crisis increased uncertainty concerning the banks’ balance-
sheet health and paralyzed interbank lending. Second, the euro-area
sovereign debt crisis led to the fragmentation of the single finan-
cial market and resulted in important differences in credit conditions
across the member countries. The European Central Bank (ECB)
faced a difficult task of restoring monetary transmission and main-
taining price stability in these exceptional circumstances. However,
the traditional monetary tool - the ECB main refinancing rate - did
not affect other interest rates to the extent it used to before the crisis
and the euro-area monetary authority had to design and implement
unconventional monetary policies to attain its objectives.
The ECB operational framework was, on the one hand, modern and
flexible enough to adjust promptly to new circumstances, especially
with regard to liquidity provision to banks. On the other hand, the
euro area construction limited the ECB’s field of action. More partic-
ularly, sovereign debt purchases were strongly opposed by some mem-
ber countries and the Federal Reserve-style quantitative easing was
difficult to implement. Despite sometimes strong criticism, the ECB
gradually introduced important unconventional measures: unlimited
liquidity provision in euro and important foreign currencies, lengthen-
ing of the maturities of the loans, wider range of collateral accepted
and outright purchases of private and government assets. This new
1I would like to thank my supervisors Pierpaolo Benigno and Henri Sterdyniak for their guidance and valuable
advice. This paper has also benefited from helpful discussions and suggestions from participants at CEPII/PSE
Macro Finance Workshop and OFCE seminar. Any errors are mine.
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policy toolkit was designed to “enhance the flow of credit above and
beyond what could be achieved through policy interest rate reductions
alone”.2
The objective of this chapter is to provide an empirical evidence on
the impact of the ECB non-standard measures on the market borrow-
ing costs for banks and governments. This question is motivated by
the importance of banks in financing the euro-area economy and by
the crucial role that long-term government refinancing plays in the
ongoing euro-area crisis. There is a rapidly growing literature about
the effectiveness of alternative monetary policies in the U.S. and the
U.K. but the empirical evidence about the effects of non-orthodox
measures in the euro area is still relatively scarce. The impact on
macroeconomic variables was studied by Peersman (2011) and Gam-
bacorta et al. (2012) who showed that the ECB unconventional mon-
etary policies increased output and inflation. Beirne et al. (2011)
evaluated via an event study the impact of the first covered bond
purchasing program and found that it was effective in lowering cov-
ered bond spreads. The impact of the ECB unconventional policies
on money market spreads is much less clear and the existing studies
are skeptical about the effectiveness of exceptional liquidity measures
in increasing interbank lending (Brunetti et al. 2011, Angelini et al.
2011).
To our best knowledge this study is the first one to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of all ECB unconventional monetary policies implemented
between 2007 and 2012 on bank and government borrowing costs.
Specifically, we employ event-based regression to measure the impact
of the ECB announcements on money market spreads, covered bond
spreads and sovereign bond spreads in the euro-area. Our method-
ology allows for the simultaneous evaluation and comparison of the
effects of the non-orthodox measures. First, we make a timeline of un-
conventional monetary policy announcements and classify them into
six main categories: 1) fixed-rate full-allotment procedure (FRFA),
2) three-year refinancing operations (3y LTRO), 3) collateral easing
and 4) covered bond purchase programmes (CBPP1 and CBPP2), 5)
long-term sovereign bond purchases (Securities Markets Programme,
SMP) and 6) short-term sovereign bond purchases (Outright Mone-
2Trichet (2009).
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tary Transactions, OMT). We also consider conventional interest rate
policy and less important liquidity measures to ensure that the effect
of main unconventional policies is not due to other announcements,
sometimes made on the same day. Given the exceptional circum-
stances during the sovereign debt crisis we also take into account the
European Financial Stability Facility / European Stability Mechanism
announcements and add a sovereign crisis dummy for the peaks of the
crisis. In order to put the ECB measures into perspective, we also
include quantitative easing announcements in the U.S. and the U.K.
The results show that among the ECB unconventional measures, long-
term sovereign bond purchases (SMP) proved to be the most effective
in lowering longer-term borrowing costs for both banks and govern-
ments. The effects are the most important for the euro-area sovereign
spreads and range from 35 basis points (Italy) to 476 basis points
(Greece). As a comparison, we show that the U.S. and U.K. sovereign
spreads also fell following the sovereign bond purchases announced
by the Fed and the Bank of England but the magnitude of the ef-
fect was much smaller: respectively 5 and 9 basis points. The strong
impact in the euro area suggests that the central bank intervention
in sovereign market is particularly effective when the sovereign risk is
important. The SMP also reduced longer-term bank refinancing costs,
namely covered bond spreads, as the smaller country default risk im-
proves the financial standing of the country financial institutions. The
second bond purchasing program, OMT, had a similar impact on bor-
rowing conditions as SMP: it diminished, albeit to smaller extent,
sovereign spreads and covered bond spreads, especially in periphery
euro area countries. As far as covered bond purchase programs are
concerned, they reduced the spreads in all markets studied: covered
bond spreads, sovereign bond spreads and to some extent the money
market spreads. Finally, among the exceptional liquidity provisions,
the 3-year refinancing operations (3y LTRO) were the only measure
that succeeded in reducing bank refinancing costs and its impact was
particularly strong in money market.
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. The ECB un-
conventional monetary policy announcements, their objectives and
theoretical basis for their effectiveness are described in section 3.2.
Methodology and data are presented in section 3.3. In section 3.4 we
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estimate the impact of the announcements on money market, covered
bonds and sovereigns bonds spreads. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Unconventional monetary policies implemented by the ECB
The ECB unconventional monetary policies implemented by the ECB
can be regrouped into three categories: 3.2.1) exceptional liquidity
measures, 3.2.2) purchases of assets and 3.2.3) collateral easing. In
this section we present these measures, their theoretical foundations
and the objectives they were meant to attain.
3.2.1 Liquidity provisions
Since the beginning of the subprime crisis the ECB reacted very promptly
to the tensions on the interbank market. The operational framework
of the ECB was already quite flexible compared to other central banks:
the ECB accepted a wide range of collateral and provided liquidity to
large number of counterparties. However, the regular liquidity tools
failed to calm down unprecedented interbank tensions due to global
economic crisis and the euro-area sovereign debt crisis (Figure 3.1).
Therefore, the ECB implemented several additional liquidity measures
that we define here as unconventional since they go beyond the regular
framework of the open market operations.3
The main objective of exceptional liquidity provisions was to restore
the smooth functioning of interbank markets as this aspect was crucial
for extending credit to firms and households.4 The ECB made clear
all along the crisis that monetary policy stance and liquidity programs
were two different things, and the latter were merely supposed to nor-
malize euro money markets and improve the monetary transmission.
The exceptional liquidity measures may be effective in stabilizing inter-
bank market for several reasons. The liquidity shortage has a negative
impact on financial institution lending capabilities and may result in
3The regular open market operations at the ECB include: 1) Main refinancing operations (MRO) with a frequency
and maturity of one week. 2) Longer-term refinancing operations (LTRO) with a monthly frequency and a
maturity of three months. 3) Fine-tuning operations designed to smooth the effects on interest rates caused
by unexpected liquidity fluctuations. 4) Structural operations carried out by the Eurosystem through reverse
transactions, outright transactions and issuance of debt certificates.
4Draghi (2008): “Restoring the smooth functioning of the interbank markets globally and within the euro area is a
precondition to ensure the stability of credit flows to households and firms, thereby minimizing the real impact
of the financial turmoil”.
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credit crunch. Liquidity-constrained banks excessively hoard liquidity
for precautionary reasons and proceed to fire sales of assets affecting
negatively their prices. The ECB unconventional measures by ensur-
ing funding liquidity diminish these adverse effects. They also reduce
the banks’ uncertainty with respect to funding liquidity of other mar-
ket participants and therefore diminish counterparty risk premiums.
Furthermore, the excess liquidity provisions can affect the economy via
portfolio rebalancing effect (Meltzer, 1995; Tobin, 1982) when money
and other financial assets are not perfect substitutes. Market par-
ticipants faced with increased money supply want to trade money
for non-money assets which increases prices of non-monetary assets
and reduces their yields. The ECB excess liquidity might have en-
couraged banks to purchase sovereign and corporate bonds as they
would realize interest-rate gains with these transactions. The imper-
fect substitutability of assets, in general equilibrium framework, can
in particular be linked to a difference in liquidity between money and
other assets. Increase in money supply could reduce the liquidity
premium and stimulate investment (Kiyotaki and Moore, 2012) and
reduce long-term interest rates (Andres et al., 2004).
However, the ECB unlimited liquidity provision can also have per-
verse effects on the money market. It might contribute to “crowding
out” of private liquidity and the effective substitution of the ECB
for the interbank market trades. The central bank interventions can
therefore create greater uncertainty in the interbank market rather
than enhancing liquidity as intended (see empirical study of Brunetti
et al., 2011). The important functions of interbank transactions such
as information aggregation, price discovery and peer monitoring are
reduced if unlimited liquidity is available from the central bank. In-
deed, Heider et al. (2009) theoretical model shows that in case of high
counterparty risk and informational asymmetry, the central bank liq-
uidity injections result in liquidity hoarding and finally contribute to
the greater distress of the money markets.
In this chapter, we measure the impact of the strongest ECB liquidity
innovations: announcements of the fixed-rate full-allotment procedure
(FRFA) and the 3-year refinancing operations (3y LTRO). However,
since 2007 the ECB has implemented other exceptional liquidity mea-
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sures: gradual lengthening of LTRO maturity up to 1 year and refi-
nancing operations in foreign currencies. We take into account these
innovations even though they are closer to conventional liquidity pro-
visions. In fact, some of these liquidity announcements were made on
the same day as the important measures that we focus on and we want
to separate their effects.
3.2.1.1 Fixed-rate full-allotment (FRFA)
The fixed-rate procedure with full allotment (FRFA) was an impor-
tant part of the ECB’s non-standard toolbox. Traditionally, the open
market operations were conducted through variable-rate tenders. Un-
der the new procedure, the banks could satisfy all their liquidity needs
at the interest rate specified in advance (the interest rate on the main
refinancing operation). By ensuring banks’ continued access to liq-
uidity the ECB intended to offset liquidity risk in the market. The
fixed tenders for the main refinancing operations (MROs), without
full allotment, existed in the beginning of the Eurosystem (01/1999 -
06/2000) but were quickly abandoned as the banks were overbidding.
When the subprime crisis started, the ECB conducted two fine tuning
operations (FTOs) as a fixed-rate tenders with full allotment but it is
only after the Lehman Brothers collapsed that it introduced the fixed-
rate full-allotment procedure for all their open market operations and
for the foreign liquidity swaps (Table 3.1). First, late on October 8,
2008, the ECB announced that all weekly MROs would be carried
out through a fixed-rate tender procedure with full allotment rather
than through a variable rate tender format used before. On October
13, 2008 it decided to provide unlimited dollar funding in coordinated
action with the Fed. Two days later, on October 15, 2008 the ECB
decided to conduct its longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) on
a FRFA basis as well. The ECB decided to return to variable-rate
tender procedure in the regular 3-month LTROs in March 2010. How-
ever, the Greek debt crisis forced it to resume a FRFA procedure in
the regular LTROs in May 2010.
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3.2.1.2 Three-year refinancing operations (3-year LTRO)
On December 8, 2011, the ECB took an unprecedented measure to
conduct two three-year refinancing operations (3y LTRO) with full
allotment, with the interest rate fixed at the average rate of the MROs
over the life of the operation. The first 3y LTRO was offered on
December 21, 2011 and the second on February 29, 2012. The banks
borrowed more than €1 trillion which covered their immediate funding
needs and prevent them from selling assets and cutting some types of
lending (Aglietta et al. 2012). The announcement of the 3y LTRO is
incomparable to other liquidity measures and created a real surprise on
the markets. The three-year loans are quite exceptional in the history
of central banking as they extend the central bank intermediation
from money markets to capital markets. Taking into consideration
the special character of this measure and the surprise it created we
separate this announcement from the other liquidity measures.
3.2.1.3 Longer maturities of the refinancing operations in euros
Soon after the beginning of the subprime crisis, the ECB increased
the liquidity provisions through the longer-term refinancing opera-
tions (LTROs). The LTROs are liquidity-providing reverse transac-
tions that are regularly conducted with a monthly frequency and a
maturity of three months. The ECB does not usually fix the rate of
these operations but let the banks participating in auction define it in
a variable-rate tender. The LTROs dates are known in advance as the
ECB announces them in an indicative calendar. However, during the
crisis the ECB announced supplementary LTROs and some of them
of maturity exceeding three months. In this chapter, we consider the
announcements of liquidity provisions at maturities longer than three
months as unconventional in line with Trichet (2009)’s classification
(for the dates and description of the announcements see Table 3.2).5
The ECB first lengthened the maturity of the supplementary LTROs
to six months after the Bear Sterns collapsed in March 2008, to encour-
age banks in the euro area to lend to one another for longer periods.
The 6-month operations were seen as significant because it was the
5As a robustness check, we add to this category all supplementary liquidity measures which are even closer to regular
liquidity operations: supplementary 3-month LTROs announcements and special-term refinancing operations (1
month) but it does not change significantly the results.
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first time the central bank has departed from its standard three-month
funding operations. The maturity of loans was further extended to one
year in May 2009. As the economy was recovering, the supplementary
liquidity measures were to be wound up. However, the outburst of the
Greek debt crisis in spring 2010 forced the ECB to resume the supple-
mentary LTROs and to increase again their maturity to ensure that
commercial banks get the crucial funding. Indeed, the money markets
started to freeze again as the exposure to risky sovereign debt made
banks wary of lending to one another.
3.2.1.4 Liquidity in foreign currencies
Along with the liquidity provisions in euro, the ECB furnished to
banks liquidity in foreign currencies thanks to the currency swaps
established with other central banks. Within these agreements, re-
versible in a later date, the ECB exchanged euros against dollars, the
Swiss franc and the British pounds and used the foreign currency to
lend to euro-area financial institutions. The foreign currency swaps,
just as supplementary euro liquidity provisions, were implemented in
both subprime and sovereign debt crisis (See Table 3.3).
When the subprime crisis started and a chain of defaults occurred on
the U.S. subprime mortgage markets, the euro-area banks had dif-
ficulties to renew their funding in U.S. dollars. In December 2007
the ECB announced the foreign currency swaps with the Fed to help
money markets function more smoothly. The terms and amounts of
the swaps were regularly expanded and since October 2008 the liquid-
ity in dollars was distributed to banks at FRFA basis. Progressively,
the ECB concluded swap arrangements also with the Swiss National
Bank (SNB) to provide the Swiss franc to euro-area financial institu-
tions.
The ECB closed the swap lines with the Fed on February 1, 2010
but was obliged to resume them in May 2010. At the onset of the
European crisis, foreign lenders retreated out as they feared that the
euro-area financial institutions were holding too much bad sovereign
debt and may be insolvent. As the crisis worsened, the arrangements
were subsequently extended. In addition to Fed and SNB swap lines,
the arrangements were also made with the Bank of England (BOE) in
December 2010 in order to provide liquidity in sterling to Irish banks
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and limit the problems faced by the Irish banking system.
3.2.2 Purchases of assets
IIn a period of financial distress, the central bank can modify the
composition of its assets by purchasing the securities that suffer from
temporary liquidity problems or are undervalued by financial mar-
kets. This policy is sometimes called “credit easing”. The purchases
can be sterilized by disposal of the other central bank assets (“pure
credit easing”) or be a part of the central bank balance-sheet expan-
sion (“quantitative easing”).
The effectiveness of credit easing is based on the “portfolio rebalanc-
ing effect”: when the assets are not perfect substitutes, reducing the
quantity of selected assets available for private investors increases their
prices and diminishes yields by suppressing the risk premia (Bernanke,
2010a). The portfolio rebalancing effect is controversial from a theo-
retical point of view. A representative-agent model of Eggertsson and
Woodford (2003) predicts no effect for such operations on price level or
output. However, this result holds only under following assumptions:
(1) all investors can purchase and sell unlimited quantities of these
assets, and (2) the assets being bought and sold are valued only for
their pecuniary returns. The first assumption is likely not to hold dur-
ing crisis as there exist binding constraints on participation in some
markets. One example of general equilibrium analysis in which these
constraints exist and credit easing affects asset prices is Cùrdia and
Woodford (2011). As for the second assumption, Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) show that US government debt for example
possesses non-pecuniary qualities that are valued by the financial sec-
tor above their pure pecuniary returns given that Treasuries are often
required as collateral in repo transactions.6
Furthermore, replacing a representative agent with no preference be-
tween markets and assets by heterogeneous agents can also provide
rationale for central bank asset purchasing. In the preferred-habitats
model of Vayanos and Vila (2009) the interest rates of all maturi-
ties are determined through the interaction between risk-averse arbi-
trageurs and investor clienteles with preferences for specific maturities.
6It should be noted however, that government bond purchases by central banks diminish the availability of these
desirable assets and can be welfare reducing.
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In this framework, the central bank purchases of long-term Treasuries
can lower the long-term yields because they create a “scarcity effect”
that arbitrageurs cannot eliminate. Moreover, the purchases can be
effective as they shorten the average maturity of government debt and
therefore the duration risk held by arbitrageurs.
In this chapter we investigate the effects of the ECB purchases of
covered bonds and euro-area sovereign debt. These assets are more
risky that government bonds considered in Vayanos and Vila (2009)
and the duration risk is not the only one that the central bank takes
on its balance sheet. By purchasing above mentioned assets the ECB
also accepts the liquidity and default risk that private investors do not
want to hold and it replaces it with riskfree reserves. Private investors
would ask for smaller liquidity compensation when buying covered or
sovereign bonds knowing that they would be able to sell the asset
easily to the ECB.
Moreover, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe increased the default risk
in the sovereign bond markets. Market participants started to price in
a high probability of sovereign default and even the high probability
that some member state would exit the euro area. Such projections cut
off these countries’ access to market refinancing or made it extremely
costly leading to “self-fulfilling” prophecy and to the outcome that in-
vestors were concerned about. By purchasing government bonds, and
indirectly securing the sovereign debt, the ECB intended to prevent
this “bad equilibrium” outcome.
There exists another channel of central bank asset purchases which
instead of reducing risk premia has an impact on private sector’s ex-
pectations of the future monetary policy (“signaling effect”). Accu-
mulation of risky asset on central bank balance sheet associated with
important balance sheet expansion can be understood by financial
markets as a signal that the monetary easing will continue longer
than previously expected. Indeed, raising interest rates in these cir-
cumstances would expose the central bank to capital losses on the
assets it holds. In this chapter however, we focus on the ECB impact
on risk premia rather than on agents expectations of future mone-
tary policy given that the ECB objective was to restore homogeneous
credit conditions throughout the euro area, but not necessarily to ease
credit conditions in aggregate (Coeuré, 2012). Increased risk premia
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(spreads) on certain markets in the euro area were the reflection of
these divergent credit conditions.
3.2.2.1 Sovereign bond purchases (SMP and OMT)
The Greek sovereign debt in Spring 2010 triggered a fire selling of some
euro-area government bonds. The ECB launched on May 9, 2010 the
Securities Market Programme (SMP) as a part of European Union
efforts to stabilize the euro.7 The program was designed to purchase
sovereign bonds and therefore “ensure depth and liquidity in those
market segments which are dysfunctional”.8 This was the first time
the ECB and its constituent central banks bought public debt and the
SMP was from the start a source of division within the ECB. The crit-
ics said that the ECB was overstepping its mandate by buying public
debt in secondary markets and that the bond purchases would increase
the inflationary pressures as well as undermine the ECB credibility.
However, the ECB insisted that the SMP was temporary and merely
aimed at improving the transmission of the monetary policy. In order
to distinguish the SMP from the U.S.-style quantitative easing and
to ensure that the monetary policy stance is not affected, the ECB
decided to sterilize these purchases via specific operations designed
to re-absorb the injected liquidity.9 Another notable difference with
the Fed sovereign bond purchases, is that the ECB gave no details
on how much it could spend or how long it intended the program to
last. It did not deliver precise quantities of bonds bought from spe-
cific countries neither. The purchases stopped unofficially in January
2011 but the intensity of euro crisis and the risk of contagion to Italy
and Spain made the ECB resume the program. After an emergency
meeting on Sunday August 7, 2011 the ECB announced they would
actively purchase euro-area debt. Since the start of the program, the
ECB bought a total 219.5 billion euros of euro area government bonds
(see Figure 3.2).
The euro-area debt crisis continued in the beginning of 2012 as the
critical financial standing of Spanish banks was revealed. The concerns
about their solvency and in fine solvency of the Spanish government
7On the same day the EFSF was established.
8“ECB decides on measures to address severe tensions in financial markets”, ECB Press Release, 10 May 2010.
9The sterilization of SMP operation is questionable however, given that the banks had unlimited access to the
central bank liquidity and the ECB had no longer control over the monetary base.
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made the sovereign yields in the euro area periphery increase rapidly
as market participants were pricing in the possibility of some coun-
tries leaving the monetary union. As a response, the ECB President
Mario Draghi announced in July 2012 that the central bank would do
“whatever it takes to save euro”.10 On September 6, 2012, the ECB an-
nounced the sovereign bond purchasing program: Outright Monetary
Transactions (OMT) and at the same time officially terminated SMP.
The objective of the new program, just as the objective of SMP, was to
repair monetary policy transmission mechanism and restore homoge-
neous credit conditions throughout the euro area. More precisely, the
purchases of the euro-area periphery sovereign debt was intended to
reduce the risk premia related to fears of the reversibility of the euro.
Despite the shared objective, OMT was different to SMP in several
aspects. First, the maximum maturity was set to 3 years whereas the
SMP concerned the longer-term bonds. Second, there was a condition-
ality attached to participating in OMT: the ECB would only purchase
sovereign debt of a given country if its government complies with a full
or precautionary macroeconomic adjustment program set by the Eu-
ropean Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) or the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM). Third, the ECB decided to forgo its seniority sta-
tus with respect to private creditors. Finally, once the country meets
the access conditions, the ECB would intervene without limits whereas
SMP was always presented as “temporary” and “limited” which was
hardly reassuring for investors.11 OMT was intended as pure “credit
easing” meaning that the purchases of bonds would just change the
assets composition of the central banks but not increase the overall
monetary base.12
3.2.2.2 Covered bond purchases (CBPP1 and CBPP2)
Covered bonds are securities issued by credit institutions to assure
their medium and long-term refinancing. They are collateralized by
a dedicated pool of loans, typically mortgage loans and public-sector
loans, which comply with a minimum legal standard and remain on the
10Draghi (2012).
11Introductory statement to the ECB press conference, November 3, 2011 available at:
http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2011/html/is111103.en.html
12As in the case of SMP, the sterilization operations seem mostly symbolic as the fixed-rate full-allotment procedure
in all main refinancing operations leaves the control of monetary base in hands of banks participating in these
operations.
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lender’s balance sheet. This high quality collateral allows the credit
institution issuing bonds that have higher credit rating than its own
rating. They are seen as safer than other bank bonds, because they
give investors a claim on the the issuing credit institution itself and on
the the cover pool of collateral as well. This “dual recourse” feature of
covered bonds make them also more attractive and more liquid than
the ABS market. Unlike in the standard securitization process, the
issuer of covered bonds keeps the ownership of the pooled mortgages
and loans and ensures that they are at all times sufficient to satisfy
the claims of bondholders.
These specific features of covered bonds contributed to the develop-
ment of their market. A relatively low risk and the return higher than
government bonds makes them highly attractive in the eyes of in-
vestors. At the end of 2007 it was the most important privately issued
bond segment in Europe’s capital markets (ECB, 2008). The relative
safety of covered bonds contributed to its resilience to the financial tur-
moil that started in August 2007. However, after the Lehman Brothers
collapsed in September 2008, the market dried up as investors turned
to government bonds and other less risky assets. To prevent the credit
crunch the ECB decided in May 2009 to purchase covered bonds. The
importance of covered bond market as a source of funding for finan-
cial institutions and their relative soundness in terms of credit risk
made them the perfect target for the ECB intervention. The ECB
announced on May 7, 2009 that it would purchase euro-denominated
covered bonds of the amount of around €60 billion issued in the euro
area. This decision was surprising for the markets which were ex-
pecting the rate cut and the lengthening of the lending program but
not direct purchases of the private debt, which was perceived as a
change in strategy.13 The objective of the Covered Bond Purchase
Programme (CBPP) as stated in the decision of the ECB of July 2,
2009 (ECB/2009/16) were the following: (a) promoting the ongoing
decline in money market term rates; (b) easing funding conditions for
credit institutions and enterprises; (c) encouraging credit institutions
to maintain and expand their lending to clients; and (d) improving
market liquidity in important segments of the private debt securities
market. All along the implementation of the CBPP, the ECB officials
13 “Trichet Drags ECB Into New Era Over Weber’s Bond Objections”, May 7, 2009, Bloomberg.
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claimed that the covered bond purchases were not quantitative easing
but a part of “enhanced credit support operations”. In other words,
the ECB did not intend to create money to buy covered bonds but
revive an illiquid market. The ECB intended these operations to be
naturally sterilized as the euro area banks would demand less liquidity
from the ECB’s refinancing operations.
In the end of June 2010 the ECB stopped the covered bond purchas-
ing but as the sovereign crisis deepened in autumn 2011 it proceeded
to further measures supporting the covered bond markets. On Octo-
ber 6, 2011 it announced the new covered bond purchase programme
(CBPP2) and decided to allocate €40bn to this twelve-month program
and to purchase euro-denominated covered bonds in both primary and
secondary markets (see Figure 3.3 for the amounts purchased in CBPP
1 and 2).
3.2.3 Collateral easing
Since the creation of the euro area the ECB had a collateral framework
that was much less restrictive than the Fed and the Bank of England.
Therefore, the loosening of the collateral rules was not as significant
as it was in the U.S in the beginning of the crisis. For instance, the
commercial paper was eligible as collateral at the ECB while the Fed
had to implement a specific lending facility in order to purchase it
(Commercial Paper Funding Facility). However, after the Lehman
Brothers collapse, the ECB significantly loosened its collateral rules
(see Table 3.4). On October 15, 2008 it decided to accept as an eli-
gible collateral debt instruments issued by credit institutions, which
are traded on the accepted non-regulated markets (bank certificate
of deposit among others). While widening the collateral accepted in
its lending operations, the ECB sought to limit its exposure to risky
assets by applying haircuts on the accepted securities. Also, since the
end of 2008 it started preparing the ground to unwind emergency col-
lateral measures and raised the requirement especially concerning the
asset-backed securities (ABS). However, in Spring 2010 the sovereign
debt crisis began and the ECB was obliged to further relax its collat-
eral requirements. In particular, it took several measures to ensure
that the Greek banks would still be able to use Greek government
bonds as a guarantee to obtain central bank funds. As the sovereign
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debt crisis spread to other euro area countries, in 2011 the ECB took
the same decisions in favor of Irish and Portuguese government bonds.
Moreover, in December 2011 the ECB decided to further reduce some
ABS ratings thresholds and to accept loans to small and medium-sized
enterprises for the first time. In February 2012, another important in-
novation was announced: each national central bank would accept
divergent types of collateral to accommodate the peculiarities of their
country banking industries.
Loosening the collateral requirements could affect the money markets
via two channels. First of all, it increased the volume of collateral
that could be used as a guarantee in refinancing operations and there-
fore lowered the liquidity constraint for the banks. It was particularly
important when the sovereign debt crisis started as the banks were
holding important amounts of their country debt instruments. Fur-
thermore, accepting lower-graded assets might have contributed to
lowering the interest rates on accepted instruments via portfolio re-
balancing effect.
3.3 Methodology
The objective of this chapter is to assess the effectiveness of all ECB
unconventional monetary policies in reducing the market borrowing
costs for banks and governments between 2007 and 2012. We apply
event-based regression methodology in order to measure the impact of
each non-standard measure on the euro-area money market, covered
bond markets and sovereign bond markets. Event-based regression
allows testing the impact of an economic event on financial market
data.14 In modern financial markets, as these of the euro area, the
effect of the event should be reflected in asset prices over a short
period of time.
We rely on dummy variables to discriminate between days when an-
nouncements were made or not. Based on the ECB press releases we
create a database of monetary policy news. The announcements are
classified into following categories (as described in Section 3.2):
• Exceptional liquidity provisions
– Fixed-rate full-allotment procedure (FRFA)
14See MacKinlay (1997).
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– Three-year refinancing operations (3y LTRO)
– Longer-term refinancing operations of maturity greater than 3
months
– Liquidity in foreign currencies
• Collateral easing
• Covered bond purchases (CBPP1 and CBPP2)
• Longer-term sovereign bond purchases (Securities Markets Pro-
gramme, SMP)
• Short-term sovereign bond purchases (Outright Monetary Trans-
actions, OMT)
The advantage of the event-based regression with respect to standard
event study methodology is that there is no need to make an assump-
tion as for which announcement (event) was the most important on
a specific day. It seems particularly important during the crisis when
there were several policy actions announced on the same day. On May
7, 2009 for instance, the ECB introduced the covered bond purchase
program and one-year longer-term refinancing operations. On De-
cember 8, 2011, the three-year refinancing operations were announced
along with significant collateral rules easing. Moreover, other then
monetary news could also affect the market borrowing costs. When
these events coincide with monetary policy announcements it is nec-
essary to include them into regression in order to distinguish the ef-
fects. We use Factiva press database to check if there were other
major events that might have influenced the variable of interest, i.e.
interest rates spreads.15 The most striking example of simultaneous
announcements is the weekend of 8-9 May 2010 when several mone-
tary measures were decided and in particular the SMP was created.
In parallel, the euro-area politicians founded the European Financial
Stability Fund (EFSF). Even though both SMP and EFSF were in-
tended to purchase sovereign debt it is useful to separate the effects of
the two measures as they are conducted by different institutions. To
assure a correct specification of our event-based regression model we
include announcement concerning the EFSF and the European Stabil-
ity Mechanism developments as well as the dummy for sovereign debt
crisis. The crisis dummy is equal to 1 during the periods when the
15Factiva is an information and research tool owned by Dow Jones & Company. It offers online articles from both
licensed and free sources (Wall Street Journal, Reuters, Financial Times among others).
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concerns about solvency of the periphery euro-area were the highest.16
The ECB conventional monetary policy is also taken into account as
the updates about the future ECB interest rates decisions are im-
mediately priced into market interest rates. These surprises may be
important if they are announced on the same day as unconventional
monetary measures. First, we account for the unanticipated ECB in-
terest rates decisions identified based on Reuters poll and Bloomberg
surveys.17 Second, we include the surprises about the “path” of the
ECB interest rates that are defined as the surprise information of the
interest rates hikes (cuts) in the following month. We rely on arti-
cles in Factiva to determine the surprises in the ECB interest rates
“path”.18 Given that we investigate the responses of interest rates
longer than three month, both current interest rates surprise as well
as the surprises about the future interest rates changes matter for this
study.
We use daily data from July 2, 2007 until September 27, 2012 with
the exception of Italian and Portuguese covered bond series available
respectively from January 2, 2009 and October 31, 2008.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Money market
Since August 2007 the uncertainty concerning the health of banks’
balance sheet was unusually high and financial institutions were reluc-
tant to lend to each other. They were hoarding liquidity for their own
unexpected liquidity needs but also out of concern about the counter-
party financial soundness. As a result, the spreads between unsecured
and secured rates increased to previously unseen levels (Figure 3.1).
The spread decreased significantly in 2009 but it never attained the
pre-crisis level and increased again with the onset of the euro-area
16We define the crisis dummy according to Google Trends which show how often a particular search-term (“euro-
area sovereign debt crisis” in our case) is entered relative to the total search-volume across various regions of
the world. The results were cross-checked with main sovereign debt crisis events reported by Reuters, The Wall
Street Journal and The Daily Telegraph in their crisis timelines .
17We thank Tomasz Orpiszewski and Antoine Bouveret for their help with obtaining the data.
18For instance: 1) “No change in interest rates now, hike possible in September”, Agence Europe, August 3,
2007: “On Thursday 2 August, the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to keep the euroarea interest rates
unchanged. (. . . ) The ECB made a surprise move, however, by holding a press conference after the meeting
to explain its short-term plans. (. . . ) it organized a press conference to prepare the financial markets for an
expected tightening of the monetary belt in September.” 2) “Bunds lower as markets digest ECB rate shock”,
Reuters News, March 3, 2011: “Yields pushed sharply higher and the curve flattened on Thursday after the
European Central Bank stunned markets by indicating it could raise interest rates as soon as next month.”
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sovereign debt crisis. The interbank lending is a key element of the
successful monetary transmission and the ECB was determined to
support money market activity. The exceptional liquidity measures,
relaxed collateral rules and covered bond purchasing programs were
particularly aimed at restoring the interbank lending.
To test the impact of all announcements on the money market spreads
we estimate the following regression:
∆SMt = α+
I∑
i=1
βiNCi,t+ϕ1Ft+ϕ2Ct+γxt+
N∑
n=1
ψn∆SMt−n+
7∑
l=1
ψlDl,t+t
where NCi,t are dummies for unconventional monetary policy an-
nouncements discussed in section 3.2; Ft is a dummy for EFSF/ESM
announcements; Ct is a dummy for sovereign debt crisis; xt is a dummy
for the ECB policy rate/policy path surprise; ∆SMt−n are lagged values
of dependent variable included to correct for the auto-correlations of
the residuals (number of lags n = 3); Dl,t are dummies for the day of
the week (Monday, Tuesday...) and t is a stochastic error term.
The dependent variable∆SMt is a 2-day change in 3-month money
market spreads. We use four alternative measures of money market
distress reflecting the difference between unsecured and secured (or
riskfree) three-month lending rates: i) Euribor - OIS19, ii) Euribor
- Repo20, iii) Euribor - Germany Treasury bill and iv) certificate of
deposit (CD) - OIS21. Among these measures, the Euribor-OIS is the
most commonly cited barometer of the situation on the interbank
market.
There is a timing issue related to the Euribor-OIS spread. Euribor rate
is published at 11:00 a.m Brussels (10:00 GMT) time while the OIS
rate is taken from the Datastream and the last update is from 19:15
GMT. Therefore, many announcements on a given day are not taken
into account by Euribor rate. In order to ensure that the markets had
the possibility to react to all announcements we consider 2-day event
19The Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor) is an average interbank borrowing rate published daily at 11:00 a.m.
(Brussels time) by the European Banking Federation (EBF). The overnight-indexed swap (OIS) rate represents
market expectations of the monetary policy rate over the future months. There is no exchange of principal and
only the net difference in interest rates is paid at maturity, so there is very little default risk in the OIS market.
20Repo is the rate at which, at 11.00 a.m. Brussels time, one bank offers, in the euro-area and worldwide, funds
in euro to another bank if in exchange the former receives from the latter the best collateral within the most
actively traded European repo market.
21Certificate of deposit is a debt instrument issued by banks and other financial institutions.
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window for all measures.
Another issue is related to the recent revelations about Libor and
Euribor manipulation by one of the contributing banks. However,
there are two particular features of Euribor rate that make it less
sensitive to manipulation than Libor. First, 43 banks contribute to
Euribor as opposed to 15 in the Euro Libor panel, which reduces the
weight of the eventual misreporting contributor. Second, Euribor is an
average lending rate while Libor is an average borrowing rate. During
crisis, the contributing banks are more inclined to diminish the latter
as high borrowing rates send the negative signal about their financial
standing.
Table 3.5 reports the estimation results. The money market spreads
react relatively little to monetary policy announcements. However,
following the 3-year LTRO announcement all spreads diminish signif-
icantly. The Euribor-OIS spread is reduced by 24 basis points while
Euribor-Repo and Euribor-German Treasury bill by respectively 20
and 6 basis points. The coefficient is not reported for the CD-OIS
spread as there was no quotation for 3-month certificate of deposit on
the day of the announcement. Similarly, the spreads go down on the
days of the two 3-year LTRO operations. The effect is smaller than
the announcement effect for the Euribor spreads (3-6 basis points) but
reaches 13 basis points for the CD-OIS spread. Surprisingly, lengthen-
ing the LTRO to six and one year did not have the same effect which
confirms that 3-year operations were indeed exceptional measure and
incomparable by its scope to other liquidity facilities.22 The fact that
other longer-maturity LTROs did not diminish spreads can be due to
several reasons. First, by furnishing unlimited liquidity provisions to
banks the ECB substituted itself for the interbank market and might
have caused a “crowding out” effect as also shown in Brunetti et al.
(2011). As there is unlimited liquidity available at the central bank
there is no need to borrow it from the interbank market. Second, the
liquidity risk was not the most important determinant of the spreads
(Angelini et al. (2011)) and therefore liquidity measures were not able
to affect them. In that case, only more risk-taking by the ECB (pur-
chasing of assets, 3y LTRO for instance) would lower the spreads.
22In order to verify the robustness of this result we included intro regression other supplementary liquidity an-
nouncement: supplementary LTROs and Special-Term LTROs. We also included different types of open market
operation (regular LTROs, MROs, fine tuning) and none of these reduced the money markets spreads.
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Covered bond purchases indeed diminished the spreads but the signif-
icance of the results is smaller. The effects range from 15 to 37 basis
points but only the impact for the CD-OIS spread is significant at
5%.23 On the other hand, sovereign bond purchases (SMP and OMT)
did not have significant impact on money market spreads.
3.4.2 Covered bond market
Another important source of bank refinancing is covered bond markets.
The ECB unconventional measures, and the covered bond purchasing
programs in particular, were designed to reduce the cost of longer-term
bank borrowing. In order to measure the impact of these measures we
estimate the following regression:
∆SCt = α+
I∑
i=1
βiNCi,t+ϕ1Ft+ϕ2Ct+γxt+
N∑
n=1
ψn∆SCt−n+
7∑
l=1
ψlDl,t+t
where NCi,t are dummies for unconventional monetary policy an-
nouncements; Ft is a dummy for EFSF/ESM announcements; Ct is
a dummy for sovereign debt crisis; xt is a dummy for the ECB policy
rate/policy path surprise; ∆SCt−n are lagged values of dependent vari-
able included to eliminate the auto-correlations of the residuals for all
series with the exception of the UK data where the residual were not
autocorrelated (number of lags n = 1); Dl,t are dummies for the day
of the week (Monday, Tuesday...) and t is a stochastic error term.
∆SCt is a 1-day change in covered bond spread in the euro area and in
the member countries, in particular Germany, France, Italy, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain.24 The UK covered bond rates are also employed
in order to compare a response of non euro-area rates to the ECB
policies. All covered bond rates are synthetic benchmark provided by
Iboxx and available from Datastream. These benchmark rates cover all
bonds maturities exceeding one year and are comparable among coun-
tries. The composed-maturity bonds indexes seem appropriate as the
ECB bought covered bonds of different maturities.25 The spread is cal-
culated with respect to corresponding all-maturities German sovereign
23Result are significant at 10% for Euribor-Repo and Euribor-German bill spreads.
24Datastream does not provide the Iboxx covered bond rates for Greece.
25CBPP 1: 3-10 years, with strong focus on maturities up to 7 years; CBPP 2: Up to 10.5 years residual maturity,
according to ECB website.
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bond, also provided by Iboxx (Datastream). The UK covered bond
spread takes as a reference all-maturities UK sovereign bond yield.
Table 3.6 presents the estimation results for the euro-area, France,
Germany and the UK while Table 3.7 the results for Southern Eu-
ropean countries: Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. At the euro-
area level, the policies that diminished the covered bond spread the
most were long-term sovereign bond purchases, SMP (20 bp), followed
by covered bond purchases26 (6 bp), short-term sovereign bond pur-
chases, OMT (5 bp) and 3y LTRO announcement (3 bp). The positive
news concerning the EFSF/ESM also diminished spreads (4 bp) while
sovereign crisis dummy increased it (1 bp).
Breaking up the results by country allows seeing the differentiated
impact of the ECB measures on the spreads. The SMP had by far
the strongest effect on all euro-area countries studied but the spread
reduction was the most significant for Portugal (164 bp) and Ireland
(49 bp) and the least for Germany and France (respectively 12 and
8 bp). The biggest impact for the periphery euro area countries sug-
gests that the covered bonds from these countries benefited from the
“spill-over effect” from the sovereign bond yields reduction (see next
sub-section) which are often used as a benchmark for other longer-
term rates.27 More importantly however, longer-term sovereign bond
purchases diminished sovereign default risk in these countries which
had positively impact on business climate and the credit standing of
its financial institutions who held important amount of sovereign debt.
The announcement of short-term government bonds purchases (OMT)
also diminished covered bond spreads in all euro-area countries stud-
ied but the magnitude of the effects was smaller ranging from 46 bp
for Portugal to 3 bp for France.
As far as covered bond purchases are concerned (CBPP 1 and 2), they
were significant only for Italy (16 bp), Germany (10 bp), Spain (10
bp) and France (4 bp). These results are not surprising given that
according to ECBC (2010) the biggest amounts of the CBPP 1 were
allocated to the central banks of Germany, France, Italy, Spain and
Netherlands. Furthermore, Italy and Finland were the main beneficia-
ries when the ratio of purchased amounts to the size of the outstanding
26We tested CBPP 1 and CBPP 2 separately and they both have similar impact on covered bond spreads.
27Covered bonds are highly correlated with government bonds (correlation of 91% between July 2006 and March
2010 as reported by ECBC (2010)).
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covered bonds eligible under the CBPP 1 is taken into account.
The impact of 3-year LTRO also differs for each country and was
significant for Ireland (6bp) and France (4bp). The overall impact for
the euro area is significant (3 bp). 3y LTRO reduced longer-term bank
funding constraints and therefore diminished their credit risk pulling
the yield on their debt down.
As expected, the reaction of the UK covered bonds are quite different
to euro-area covered bonds. The sovereign crisis dummy enters in the
UK covered bond spread with negative sign which means that the
sovereign-debt crisis in euro area redirected investors to UK covered
bonds (flight to quality). Furthermore, the UK covered spreads did
not react to ECB measures that were significant for the euro-area
spreads: sovereign and covered bond purchases, and 3y LTRO.28
3.4.3 Sovereign bond market
Since the beginning of the euro-area debt crisis the spreads between
the euro-area periphery sovereign yields and German sovereign yields
increased dramatically. We measure the impact of the ECB uncon-
ventional measures and in particular of government bonds purchas-
ing programs (SMP and OMT) on the euro-area long-term sovereign
spreads. We compare these effects to the impact of sovereign bond
purchases by the Fed and the Bank of England on the US and the UK
sovereign spreads. To this end, we estimate the following equation:
∆SSt = α +
I∑
i=1
βiNCi,t +
2∑
j=1
δjQj,t + ϕ1Ft + ϕ2Ct + γxt+
N∑
n=1
ψn∆SSt−n +
7∑
l=1
ψlDl,t + t
where NCi,t are dummies for unconventional monetary policy an-
nouncements; Qj,t are dummies for the sovereign bond purchase an-
nouncements by the Fed (δ1) and the Bank of England (δ2); Ft is a
dummy for EFSF/ESM announcements; Ct is a dummy for sovereign
debt crisis; x is a dummy for the ECB policy rate/policy path surprise;
28The response of the UK spread is only indicative and is reported to show the contrast in U.K. rates responses
compared to the euro area. For more formal analysis of the UK spread we would need to make sure that the
important UK announcements (for example Bank of England monetary surprises) do not coincide with the ECB
announcements but this analysis is beyond the scope of our study.
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∆SSt−n are lagged values of dependent variable included to eliminate
the auto-correlations of the residuals for all series with the exception
of the UK data where the residuals were not auto-correlated (number
of lags for the euro-area series n = 1, U.S. series n = 2,); Dl,t are
dummies for the day of the week (Monday, Tuesday...) and t is a
stochastic error term.
Dependent variable ∆SSt is a 1-day change in 10-year sovereign bond
spread. The spread is calculated as a difference between the 10-year
sovereign bond yield of the euro-area member country (France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the 10-year German sovereign
bond yield. The spreads for the Germany, the UK and the US are
defined as 10-year sovereign bond yield and the 10-year interest rate
swap.
Table 3.8 presents the results for the euro area, Greece, Italy, Ire-
land, Portugal and Spain, while the Table 3.9 the results for Germany,
France, the UK and the US. The most striking result in the euro area
is the impact of the ECB sovereign bond purchasing program (SMP)
which reduced the spreads by 17 bp. This confirms the economic in-
tuition that increasing the demand for these assets would reduce their
risk premium as predicted by Vayanos and Vila (2009). The effect is
particularly strong for the countries where the risk attained the high-
est levels: Greece (476 bp), Ireland (117 bp) and Portugal (205 bp).
Italy and Spain acknowledge the reduction of respectively 35 and 44
basis points while French and German spreads do not react. The SMP
program was announced without any precision about the amounts nor
about the regularity of the purchases. The market participant discov-
ered every Monday the quantities of bonds that the ECB purchased.
The analysts say that the ECB purchased mostly Greek, Irish and
Portuguese bonds which is reflected in regression results.29
The SMP was never officially stopped but there was however one more
important date, August 7, 2011, as the crisis was about to spread to
Italy and Spain. On that day the ECB confirmed its willingness to
purchase actively the euro-area sovereign bonds. This announcement
was preceded by a positive appreciation of the Italian and Spanish
austerity program execution and was unambiguously understood as a
promise to buy Italian and Spanish government bonds. We take this
29Reuters, August 1, 2011, “ECB keeps bond-buying programme dormant”, article available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/01/ecb-bonds-idUSEAP50O13520110801
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announcement into account and report the results in Table 3.10. The
overall SMP effect for the euro-area increased: 23 bp reduction in the
benchmark euro spread but the effect is significant only for Italy and
Spain (respectively 65 and 84 basis points).
The second sovereign bond purchasing program, OMT, had similar
but smaller impact on benchmark euro area sovereign spreads (13
bp). The program was announced in a view of helping Spain and
the Spanish spreads reacted the most to that measure (56 bp). The
impact for Italian and Portuguese spreads was also significant at 5%
(respectively 28 and 43 bp) but for Irish spreads only at 10% (27 bp)
and not significant for Greek spreads. Again, the French and Ger-
man spreads did not react to the announcement. The conditionality
attached to the program might have contributed to smaller response
of Greek and Irish bonds. Indeed, when we take into account the
speech of Mario Draghi on July 26, 2012, in which he promised to
“do whatever it takes to save euro”, the response of Greek rates was
significant and high: 38 bp (Table 3.11). 26-July announcement trig-
gered expectations of unlimited euro-area bonds buying and targeting
a specific level of spreads that were further dismissed in the final ver-
sion of the program. The smaller OMT impact could be also linked to
the maturity of purchased bonds, smaller than three years, whereas
SMP concerned longer-term bonds. Finally, the smaller impact of
subsequent asset purchasing programs seem to be a general response
of financial markets, also valid for asset purchases in the U.S. and in
the U.K where the first programs had far greater impact on sovereign
bonds and on corporate bond yields than the later programs Meaning
and Zhu (2011).
As a comparison, we show that the U.S. and U.K. sovereign spreads
also fell following the sovereign bond purchases announced by the Fed
and the Bank of England but the magnitude of the effect was much
smaller: respectively 5 and 9 basis points. The strong impact in the
euro area suggests that the central bank intervention in sovereign mar-
ket is particularly effective when the sovereign risk is important. The
fall of the sovereign bond markets following the EFSF/ESM-linked
announcements (13 bp) confirms that measures that aimed at default
risk reduction were effective in reducing government borrowing costs
in the euro area.
130
3.5 Conclusion
Covered bond purchase programs were another measure that reduced
the sovereign spreads (7bp). The puzzling result however, is the re-
action of the sovereign spreads following the important 3y LTRO an-
nouncement. The spreads rise especially in the Southern European
countries. The reaction of sovereign spreads is particular as the im-
pact of the 3y LTRO on interbank market and covered bonds was very
significant and in line with expectations. This result shows that 3y
LTRO improved significantly market borrowing costs for banks but
not for the governments. Given that 3y loans were granted to banks
this comes as no surprise. However, the 3y LTRO announcement sig-
nificantly increased the government borrowing costs. This reaction
suggests that market participants were disappointed with the ECB
not reactivating its bond purchasing program and did not believe the
3y LTRO would be enough to solve the euro-area debt crisis. The
press on that day confirms this disappointment.30 The reaction of the
sovereign spreads to 3y LTRO seems to confirm that sovereign bond
markets in euro area were mostly driven by the market perception
of the sovereign default risk and hence the measures that diminished
that risk were the most successful in reducing the spreads.
3.5 Conclusion
The empirical evidence from the event-based regressions shows that
only the most spectacular ECB unconventional monetary policies,
namely sovereign bond purchases (SMP and OMT), covered bond pur-
chases (CBPP 1 and 2) and 3-year refinancing operations (3y LTRO),
diminished significantly borrowing costs for banks and government.
Money market spreads were most relieved after the 3-year loans were
distributed to banks (3y LTRO) and after the ECB started buying
longer-term bank debt (CBPP 1 and 2) but remained unaffected by
smaller liquidity measures which suggests that credit risk was the
banks’ principal concern.
The covered bond markets reacted the most to long-term sovereign
bond purchasing program (SMP) but also to short-term sovereign
bond purchasing program (OMT), covered bond purchases (CBPP
1 and 2) and the 3-year LTRO. Covered bonds, as a source of banks
301) "US Stocks Fall As ECB Disappoints On Bond Buying", December 8, 2011, Wall Street Journal; 2) "ECB
dampens bond-buying hopes", December 8, 2011, Reuters.
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long-term refinancing, were reactive to measures addressed to banks
(CBPP, 3y LTRO). However, the strong reaction to sovereign bond
purchases suggests that this measure had an impact on broader class
of long-term assets as it diminished the risk of sovereign default.
Finally, both OMT and SMP had important impact on the cost of gov-
ernment borrowing in countries directly threatened by loosing access
to financial markets: the effects range from 35 basis points (Italy) to
476 basis points (Greece). As a comparison, we show that the U.S. and
U.K. sovereign spreads also fell following the sovereign bond purchases
announced by the Fed and the Bank of England but the magnitude
of the effect was much smaller: respectively 5 and 9 basis points. The
strong impact in the euro area suggests that the central bank interven-
tion in sovereign market is particularly effective when the sovereign
risk is important.
132
3.6 Annexes
3.6 Annexes
A1. Figures
Figure 3.1: Money market spread and ECB LTROs
Figure 3.2: Sovereign Spreads and ECB Sovereign Bond Purchases
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Figure 3.3: Covered Bond Spreads and ECB Covered Bond Purchases 1 and 2
A2. Tables
Table 3.1: Fixed-Rate Full-Allotment (FRFA)
.
Date Description of the ECB announcement
08/10/2008 FRFA procedure in the main refinancing operations (MROs) (announced late in the
evening and taken into account by markets on 09/10/2008).
13/10/2008 Liquidity in U.S. dollars (currency swaps with the Fed) provided at FRFA procedure.
15/10/2008 FRFA procedure in all longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs).
10/05/2010 Reactivation of FRFA procedure in regular longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs)
(the ECB decided to return to variable-rate tender procedures in the regular LTROs on
04/03/2012).
Table 3.2: Longer-term refinancing operations of maturity above 3 months
.
Date Description of the ECB announcement
28/03/2008 2 supplementary 6-month LTROs (€50 bn)
04/09/2008 Supplementary 6-month LTRO (€25 bn)
07/10/2008 Increase in allotment amount of 6-month LTRO (from €25 to €50bn)
15/10/2008 5 supplementary 6-month LTROs (FRFA procedure)
05/03/2009 ECB will continue with the current frequency and maturity profile of supplementary
LTROs for as long as needed, and in any case beyond the end of 2009.
07/05/2009 3 supplementary 1-year LTROs (FRFA)
10/05/2010 Supplementary 6-month LTRO (FRFA)
04/08/2011 Supplementary 6-month LTRO (FRFA)
06/10/2011 Supplementary 12-month and 13-month LTRO (FRFA)
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Table 3.3: Foreign currency arrangements
Date Currency Description of the ECB announcement
12/12/2007 USD Swaps with the Federal Reserve. US dollar liquidity-providing operations up to
$20 billion, for a maturity of: 28 and 35 days.
11/03/2008 USD Swaps with the Federal Reserve increased by $10 billion (up to $30 billion). The
ECB commits to provide the USD liquidity for as long as needed.
02/05/2008 USD Swaps with the Federal Reserve increased by $20 billion (up to $50 billion) and
extended to Jan 30, 2009.
30/07/2008 USD Swaps with the Federal Reserve increased by $5 billion (up to $55 billion).
84-day auction introduced.
18/09/2008 USD Swaps with Fed expanded to $110 billion.
26/09/2008 USD Swaps with Fed expanded to $120 billion. 1-week auction introduced.
29/09/2008 USD Swaps with Fed expanded to $240 billion and extended through April 30, 2009.
13/10/2008 USD US dollar liquidity-providing at fixed-rate full-allotment basis.
15/10/2008 USD
CHF
USD liquidity also through EUR/USD foreign exchange swaps (in parallel with
existing tenders against ECB-eligible collateral). Swaps lines with SNB to
provide Swiss Francs in euro area.
03/02/2009 USD Swap lines between the Federal Reserve and ECB extended to October 30, 2009.
25/06/2009 USD
CHF
Swap lines between the Fed and ECB extended until February 1, 2010. 1-week
Swiss franc liquidity-providing swap operations extended until at least 31
October 2009.
10/05/2010 USD Reactivation of the swap lines with the Federal Reserve (USD liquidity-providing
operations at terms of 7 and 84 days as fixed rate tenders with full allotment).
17/12/2010 GBP ECB and BOE announce liquidity swap facility: GBP liquidity-providing
operations up to £10 billion.
21/12/2010 USD Swap line between the Federal Reserve and ECB extended to August 1, 2011.
29/06/2011 USD Swap line between the Federal Reserve and ECB extended to August 1, 2012.
25/08/2011 GBP Swap line between the BOE and ECB extended to September 28, 2012.
15/09/2011 USD Fed and ECB decide to conduct 3 USD liquidity-providing operations with a
maturity of approx. 3 months covering the end of the year.
30/11/2011 JPY
GBP
CHF
CAD
USD
Establishment of a temporary network of reciprocal swap lines with other central
banks to provide liquidity operations, should they be needed, in Japanese yen,
sterling, Swiss francs and Canadian dollars. ECB reduced the charge for the
USD liquidity (-50bp) and extended the size and timing of the swap lines.
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Table 3.4: Collateral
Date Description of the ECB announcement
15/10/2008 ECB expands accepted collateral (until the end of 2009): debt in non-euro currencies;
euro-denominated syndicated credit governed by UK law; some debt instruments of credit
instruments traded on non-regulated markets (for ex. CDs); some subordinated debt
instruments.
07/05/2009 Prolongation until the end of 2010 of the temporary expansion of the list of eligible assets,
announced on 15 October 2008.
22/03/2010 Jean Claude Trichet signals the possibility to ease collateral rules if Greek bonds not
eligible.
08/04/2010 The ECB reveals its revamped collateral scheme that allows banks to pledge as collateral
lower-rated investment-grade debt (also sovereign Greek bonds); certain exceptional
collateral no longer accepted from Jan. 1, 2011.
03/05/2010 ECB announces the suspension of the rating threshold for debt instruments of the Greek
government
31/03/2011 ECB announces the suspension of the rating threshold for debt instruments of the Irish
government
07/07/2011 ECB announces change in eligibility of debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the
Portuguese government
21/09/2011 ECB increases the pool of assets it accepts as collateral against loans from Jan1, 2012,
accept for ex instruments issued by credit institutions and traded on non-regulated markets
but tighten its rules on banks using their own unsecured bonds as collateral
08/12/2011 ECB reduces the rating threshold for some ABS and allowing national central banks to
accept credit claims (for ex. bank loans) as collateral.
09/02/2012 ECB relaxes collateral rules; Collateral regulations for ECB loans vary by country
(following 8/12/11 that allows additional performing credit claims as collateral)
08/03/2012 ECB reactivates eligibility of Greek bonds as collateral
22/06/2012 ECB reduces the rating threshold and amends the eligibility requirements for certain ABSs
06/09/2012 ECB announces the suspension of the rating threshold for debt instruments of countries
that are eligible for OMT or are under an EU-IMF program and comply with the attached
conditionality as assessed by the ECB
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Table 3.5: Money Market Spreads
MONEY MARKET SPREADS = 3M unsecured - 3M "safe" rate
3-month Euribor- Euribor- Euribor- CD-
-OIS Repo German OIS
Sovereign crisis dummy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.39] [0.30] [0.55] [0.32]
EFSF 0.02 0.02* 0.02 -0.01
[0.27] [0.09] [0.64] [0.86]
ECB policy rates surprises 0.13* 0.04 -0.08 0.13
[0.08] [0.80] [0.38] [0.34]
Covered Bonds P.P. 1 and 2 -0.21 -0.37* -0.17* -0.15**
[0.11] [0.10] [0.07] [0.03]
Securities Markets Prog.(SMP) 0.19 -0.02 -0.36* 0.01
[0.45] [0.93] [0.05] [0.96]
Outright Monetary Trans.(OMT) -0.04 -0.06* -0.01
[0.15] [0.08] [0.63]
Collateral easing 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.03
[0.42] [0.24] [0.97] [0.35]
3Y LTRO annoucement -0.24*** -0.20*** -0.06**
[0.00] [0.00] [0.03]
3Y LTRO operations -0.06** -0.06** -0.03*** -0.13***
[0.02] [0.05] [0.01] [0.00]
Fixed-rate full-allotment -0.38 -0.19 0.15 -0.10
[0.19] [0.51] [0.42] [0.54]
Longer maturity LTRO 0.13 0.21 0.12 0.10
[0.31] [0.12] [0.22] [0.12]
Swaps agreements 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04
[0.79] [0.89] [0.32] [0.28]
Observations 1,365 1,365 1,278 1,187
R-squared 0.49 0.61 0.33 0.23
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust pval in brackets; Long-run coefficients;
Lags of dependent variables, constant and day dummies not reported.
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Table 3.6: Covered bonds: Euro area, Germany, France, UK
COVERED BOND SPREAD = Covered bond rate - German (UK) sovereign bond rate
Euro area France Germany (UK)
Sovereign crisis dummy 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** -0.01***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.01]
EFSF -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.00
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.99]
ECB policy rates surprises -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02
[0.48] [0.40] [0.58] [0.25]
Covered Bonds P.P. 1 and 2 -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.08*** 0.04
[0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.30]
Securities Markets Prog.(SMP) -0.20*** -0.08*** -0.12*** 0.08
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.22]
Outright Monetary Trans.(OMT) -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.04*** 0.09*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.09]
Collateral easing -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
[0.18] [0.36] [0.22] [0.92]
3Y LTRO annoucement -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.01* 0.10*
[0.00] [0.00] [0.07] [0.06]
3Y LTRO operations -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03
[0.34] [0.20] [0.76] [0.33]
Fixed-rate full-allotment -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.12***
[0.13] [0.23] [0.41] [0.00]
Longer maturity LTRO 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.06***
[0.14] [0.41] [0.15] [0.01]
Swaps agreements -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
[0.83] [0.60] [0.12] [0.15]
Observations 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,369
R-squared 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.04
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust pval in brackets; Long-run coefficients;
Lags of dependent variables, constant and day dummies not reported.
138
3.6 Annexes
Table 3.7: Covered bonds: Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
COVERED BOND SPREAD = Covered bond rate - German sovereign bond rate
Euro area Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Sovereign crisis dummy 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.02***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
EFSF -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.12* -0.08***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.07] [0.00]
ECB policy rates surprises -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.04
[0.48] [0.57] [0.19] [0.91] [0.18]
Covered Bonds P.P. 1 and 2 -0.06*** -0.02 -0.16** -0.08 -0.07***
[0.00] [0.82] [0.02] [0.48] [0.00]
Securities Markets Prog.(SMP) -0.20*** -0.49*** -0.38*** -1.64*** -0.35***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Outright Monetary Trans.(OMT) -0.05*** -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.46*** -0.10***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Collateral easing -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02*
[0.18] [0.50] [0.10] [0.35] [0.06]
3Y LTRO annoucement -0.03*** -0.06** -0.01 0.07 -0.01
[0.00] [0.02] [0.60] [0.58] [0.20]
3Y LTRO operations -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.01
[0.34] [0.69] [0.16] [0.98] [0.31]
Fixed-rate full-allotment -0.04 -0.07 -0.06**
[0.13] [0.15] [0.05]
Longer maturity LTRO 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.01
[0.14] [0.23] [0.26] [0.92] [0.22]
Swaps agreements -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
[0.83] [0.26] [0.45] [0.88] [0.81]
Observations 1,368 1,368 973 1,018 1,368
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.17 0.27 0.20
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust pval in brackets; Long-run coefficients;
Lags of dependent variables, constant and day dummies not reported.
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Table 3.8: Sovereign bond spreads: Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain
SOVEREIGN SPREAD = 10Y Country government bond - 10Y German gov. bond
Euro area Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Sovereign crisis dummy 0.01** 0.13*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02 0.02**
[0.04] [0.00] [0.01] [0.05] [0.20] [0.02]
ECB policy rates surprises -0.01 -0.36 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06
[0.15] [0.30] [0.74] [0.19] [0.83] [0.20]
EFSF -0.13*** -0.24* -0.52*** -0.28** -0.46*** -0.43***
[0.00] [0.09] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
Covered Bonds P.P. 1 and 2 -0.07*** -0.36** -0.07 -0.21*** -0.07 -0.11
[0.01] [0.03] [0.59] [0.00] [0.72] [0.27]
SMP -0.17*** -4.76*** -1.17*** -0.35*** -2.05*** -0.44***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
OMT -0.13*** -0.17 -0.27* -0.28*** -0.43** -0.56***
[0.00] [0.40] [0.07] [0.00] [0.05] [0.00]
Collateral easing -0.02* 0.22 0.03 -0.03 -0.11* -0.04
[0.08] [0.24] [0.56] [0.23] [0.10] [0.29]
3Y LTRO annoucement 0.20*** 1.00*** 0.02 0.51*** 0.19 0.37***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.87] [0.00] [0.38] [0.00]
3Y LTRO operations -0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.38** 0.05
[0.95] [0.84] [0.82] [0.94] [0.01] [0.52]
Fixed-rate full-allotment -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02
[0.16] [0.91] [0.96] [0.10] [0.93] [0.78]
Longer maturity LTRO 0.01 0.05 -0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.00
[0.30] [0.51] [0.28] [0.23] [0.95] [0.95]
Swaps agreements -0.01 -0.11 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01
[0.52] [0.42] [0.60] [0.70] [0.43] [0.74]
Treasuries purchases (US) 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.00 0.03
[0.34] [0.71] [0.56] [0.67] [0.95] [0.44]
Gilt purchases (UK) 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.00
[0.49] [0.42] [0.60] [0.57] [0.66] [0.97]
Observations 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,368
R-squared 0.13 0.04 0.19 0.10 0.19 0.17
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust pval in brackets; Long-run coefficients;
Lags of dependent variables, constant and day dummies not reported.
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Table 3.9: Sovereign bond spreads: Germany, France, the UK and the US
SOVEREIGN SPREAD = 10Y Government bond - 10Y Riskfree rate
Euro area Germany France UK US
Sovereign crisis dummy 0.01** -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
[0.04] [0.51] [0.13] [0.34] [0.33]
ECB policy rates surprises -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.01
[0.15] [0.26] [0.60] [0.39] [0.19]
EFSF -0.13*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.00 -0.00
[0.00] [0.11] [0.00] [0.61] [0.93]
Covered Bonds P.P. 1 and 2 -0.07*** -0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.02
[0.01] [0.93] [0.54] [0.13] [0.45]
SMP -0.17*** -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.04
[0.00] [0.78] [0.39] [0.69] [0.28]
OMT -0.13*** 0.01 -0.05 -0.00 -0.00
[0.00] [0.72] [0.17] [0.89] [0.93]
Collateral easing -0.02* -0.01 -0.02 -0.01** -0.01
[0.08] [0.25] [0.14] [0.04] [0.50]
3Y LTRO annoucement 0.20*** 0.07*** 0.20*** -0.00 0.01
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.96] [0.80]
3Y LTRO operations -0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.01* 0.01
[0.95] [0.95] [0.24] [0.05] [0.76]
Fixed-rate full-allotment -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.02
[0.16] [0.27] [0.70] [0.43] [0.15]
Longer maturity LTRO 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00
[0.30] [0.11] [0.62] [0.20] [0.72]
Swaps agreements -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.00
[0.52] [0.64] [0.42] [0.14] [0.91]
Treasuries purchases (US) 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.05***
[0.34] [0.67] [0.42] [0.84] [0.00]
Gilt purchases (UK) 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.09** -0.02
[0.49] [0.76] [0.49] [0.01] [0.16]
Observations 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,369 1,367
R-squared 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.25
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust pval in brackets; Long-run coefficients;
Lags of dependent variables, constant and day dummies not reported.
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Have the ECB unconventional monetary policies lowered market borrowing costs for banks and
governments?
Table 3.10: Sovereign bond spreads: Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain (SMP 2nd announcement)
SOVEREIGN BOND SPREAD = 10Y Country gov. bond - 10Y German gov. bond
Euro area Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Sovereign crisis dummy 0.01** 0.12*** 0.02* 0.02** 0.01 0.02**
[0.05] [0.00] [0.09] [0.05] [0.40] [0.01]
ECB policy rates surprises -0.01 -0.36 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06
[0.15] [0.30] [0.62] [0.19] [0.66] [0.19]
EFSF -0.12*** -0.83* -0.68*** -0.23** -0.69*** -0.35***
[0.00] [0.07] [0.01] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00]
Covered Bonds P.P. 1 and 2 -0.07*** -0.22 -0.04 -0.22*** -0.02 -0.13
[0.01] [0.33] [0.75] [0.00] [0.84] [0.19]
SMP -0.23*** -1.65 -0.31 -0.65*** -0.77 -0.84***
[0.00] [0.21] [0.41] [0.00] [0.15] [0.00]
OMT -0.13*** -0.25 -0.29*** -0.27*** -0.46*** -0.55***
[0.00] [0.22] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Collateral easing -0.02* 0.29 0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.05
[0.06] [0.12] [0.35] [0.15] [0.37] [0.17]
3Y LTRO annoucement 0.20*** 0.93*** 0.00 0.52*** 0.16* 0.38***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.95] [0.00] [0.08] [0.00]
3Y LTRO operations -0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.38 0.05
[0.95] [0.84] [0.85] [0.93] [0.12] [0.51]
Fixed-rate full-allotment -0.00 -0.53 -0.15 0.01 -0.22 0.05
[0.78] [0.22] [0.22] [0.87] [0.18] [0.48]
Longer maturity LTRO 0.02 -0.18 -0.13* 0.07* -0.10 0.03
[0.16] [0.34] [0.08] [0.10] [0.18] [0.49]
Swaps agreements -0.01 -0.15 0.01 -0.00 -0.06 -0.01
[0.55] [0.30] [0.82] [0.82] [0.23] [0.84]
Treasuries purchases (US) 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.03
[0.34] [0.66] [0.59] [0.68] [0.88] [0.42]
Gilt purchases (UK) 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.07 -0.01
[0.55] [0.21] [0.18] [0.68] [0.20] [0.87]
Observations 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,368
R-squared 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.22
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust pval in brackets; Long-run coefficients;
Lags of dependent variables, constant and day dummies not reported.
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Table 3.11: Sovereign bond spreads: Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain (OMT 2nd announcement)
SOVEREIGN SPREAD = 10Y Country Government bond - 10Y German gov. bond
Euro area Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Sovereign crisis dummy 0.01* 0.13*** 0.02** 0.01* 0.02 0.02**
[0.05] [0.00] [0.01] [0.06] [0.20] [0.02]
ECB policy rates surprises -0.01 -0.36 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06
[0.15] [0.30] [0.74] [0.18] [0.83] [0.20]
EFSF -0.13*** -0.24* -0.52*** -0.28** -0.46*** -0.42***
[0.00] [0.09] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00]
Covered Bonds P.P. 1 and 2 -0.07*** -0.37** -0.07 -0.21*** -0.07 -0.11
[0.00] [0.03] [0.61] [0.00] [0.73] [0.27]
SMP -0.16*** -4.75*** -1.17*** -0.34*** -2.06*** -0.44***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
OMT -0.17*** -0.38** -0.18* -0.39*** -0.37** -0.57***
[0.00] [0.02] [0.08] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00]
Collateral easing -0.01 0.23 0.02 -0.02 -0.12* -0.04
[0.16] [0.18] [0.68] [0.42] [0.07] [0.27]
3Y LTRO annoucement 0.20*** 0.98*** 0.03 0.50*** 0.20 0.37***
[0.00] [0.00] [0.83] [0.00] [0.36] [0.00]
3Y LTRO operations -0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.38** 0.05
[0.95] [0.85] [0.82] [0.93] [0.01] [0.52]
Fixed-rate full-allotment -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.04* -0.01 -0.02
[0.12] [0.88] [0.98] [0.08] [0.94] [0.78]
Longer maturity LTRO 0.01 0.04 -0.07 0.04 -0.00 0.00
[0.33] [0.54] [0.29] [0.25] [0.96] [0.97]
Swaps agreements -0.01 -0.12 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01
[0.50] [0.41] [0.60] [0.67] [0.43] [0.72]
Treasuries purchases (US) 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.00 0.03
[0.34] [0.71] [0.56] [0.67] [0.95] [0.43]
Gilt purchases (UK) 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 -0.00
[0.52] [0.43] [0.61] [0.60] [0.67] [0.95]
Observations 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,368 1,368
R-squared 0.14 0.04 0.19 0.12 0.19 0.19
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust pval in brackets; Long-run coefficients;
Lags of dependent variables, constant and day dummies not reported.
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4 Disaster Risk in a New Keynesian Model1
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we build a model that is particularly suitable for ana-
lyzing unconventional monetary policies and in particular risky asset
purchases. The sudden increase in risk premia driven in by investors’
perception of risk contributed to decrease in asset prices and contrac-
tion of lending and finally led to recession. The central banks reacted
to these developments by taking the risk on their balance sheet.
We incorporate a small and time-varying “disaster risk” à la Gourio
(2012) in a New Keynesian model. A small change in the probabil-
ity of disaster may affect macroeconomic quantities and asset prices.
In particular, a higher disaster probability is sufficient to generate a
recession without effective occurrence of the disaster. By accounting
for monopolistic competition, price stickiness, and a Taylor-type rule,
this chapter provides a baseline framework of the dynamic interac-
tions between the macroeconomic effects of rare events and nominal
rigidity, particularly suitable for further analysis of monetary policy.
A recent but growing literature studies how the risk of rare events
— sometimes called economic “disasters” — affects the dynamic in-
teractions between macroeconomic quantities and asset prices — risk
premia in particular. However, disaster risk is still rarely accounted
for in general equilibrium models, especially in the models used to
conduct monetary policy where variations in the expected returns are
generally entirely driven by variations in the risk-free interest rate.
Yet understanding the efficiency and the desirability of monetary pol-
icy facing — realized or potential — rare events is of main interest.
In order to design an appropriate intervention, studying the effects of
a time-varying disaster risk in this class of models is a prerequisite.
1This chapter was co-authored with Marlène Isoré. We thank Pierpaolo Benigno, Julio Carrillo, Benjamin Carton,
Richard Clarida, Marco Del Negro, François Gourio, Salvatore Nisticò, Henri Sterdyniak, and Philippe Weil for
many discussions from the early stages of this work. All remaining errors are ours.
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Early papers on disaster risk were restricted to endowment economies
(Rietz, 1988, Barro, 2006, Gabaix (2012)) such that policy implica-
tions could have hardly been derived. Gourio (2012) has gone a step
further by introducing a small and stochastically time-varying risk pre-
mium into a real business cycle model. His model has thus provided a
tractable way to analyze the feedback effects between changes in ag-
gregate risk and the macroeconomic variables, as well as to reproduce
some important empirical facts in terms of asset pricing including the
countercyclicality of the risk premia. In particular, an increase in the
probability of disaster leads investment and output to fall as capital
becomes riskier. Meanwhile precautionary savings lower the yield on
risk-free assets, such that the spread rises in distressed times.
This paper builds on Gourio’s approach and introduces a time-varying
risk of disaster in an otherwise standard New Keynesian DSGE model,
providing a baseline framework that will allow to evaluate the role of
monetary policy facing changes in the probability of rare events. The
occurrence of a disaster is associated with the destruction of a share of
capital, but the appealing feature of the model is that business cycles
are significantly affected by the disaster risk even when disasters do
not effectively arrive. We especially focus on the responses of macroe-
conomic quantities to a sudden small rise in the probability of disaster,
and get some interesting preliminary results.
First, we are able to relax one essential assumption in Gourio’s work
which consists in imposing a reduction in total factor productivity by
exactly the same amount than the capital stock to replicate the data.
We show that the equally important output fall may occur when in-
vestment adjustment costs and monopolistic competition in interme-
diate goods are introduced. The response of output is much more
important under time-dependent price stickiness. However, firms may
be more inclined to adjust their prices when the aggregate risk rises
(Caplin and Leahy, 1991), so we also allow for some state-dependent
price adjustment.
Second, we find that consumption falls on impact in case of a rise in
disaster risk while Gourio found the opposite response with a more
stylized model. Similarly, we get a drop in wages which is not ob-
served in the pure flexible-price but otherwise similar version of the
model under both time-dependent and state-dependent price sticki-
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ness. This response of wages seems more reminiscent of distressed
economic times. Finally, we compare the responses of the model with
and without the presence of a disaster risk to standard monetary, fis-
cal, and productivity shocks.
So far our model is solved under certainty-equivalence since at this
stage we only study the responses of macroeconomic quantities to a
(small) change in the probability of disaster instead of the responses to
a (large) disaster shock. Indeed, there is a consensus that higher order
approximation terms are irrelevant for macroeconomic quantities even
when time-varying risk is introduced2. Asset pricing on the other hand
are affected by a time-varying disaster risk and require the combina-
tion of nonlinear methods and aggregate uncertainty.3 This version
of the model does not study the feedback effects between macroeco-
nomic quantities and the impact of disaster risk on asset pricing yet.
However, the set-up is such that we will be able to do so in the next
step by incorporating a stochastic discount factor from which the yield
curve and the term premium will be derived.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 develops the
model, Section 4.3 discusses how the steady state is affected by the
presence of a disaster risk and presents the calibration, Section 4.4 de-
scribes the response functions to a shock to the probability of disaster
as well as to standard shocks. Section 4.5 gives our further research
agenda, and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Households
Households consume goods, supply labor, and save through risk-free
bonds and capital accumulation so as to maximize the expected dis-
counted sum of utility flows given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(Ct − hCt−1)1−γ1− γ − χ
L1+φt
1 + φ
 (4.1)
where β is the subjective discount factor, E0 the expectation operator,
2We solved the model using first and second order approximations and obtained almost identical results
3See Bloom (2009) for a model with uncertainty shocks for instance.
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C and L consumption and labor flows respectively, h a habit formation
parameter, γ the coefficient of relative risk aversion or the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and φ the inverse of the
elasticity of work effort with respect to the real wage. Households own
the capital stock Kt and lease a fraction ut of it to the firms. Thus
their budget constraint is
Ct + It +
Bt+1
pt
≤ WtLt + (1 + it−1)Bt
pt
+Rkt utKt + Πt − Tt (4.2)
where It is investment, Bt are one-period bonds, wt is the real wage,
Πt are profits from firms, and Rkt is the real rental rate of capital, at
time t.
Capital is considered as a risky asset here in the sense that it may be
hit by a “disaster”. In (Barro, 2006) and (Gourio, 2012)’s spirit, a dis-
aster occurrence may be either a war which physically destroys a part
of the capital stock, the expropriation of capital holders, a technolog-
ical revolution that make it worthless, or the loss of intangible capital
due to a prolonged recession. We assume that the disaster destroys a
share bk of the capital stock if realized.4 Therefore the law of capital
accumulation is given by
Kt+1 =
{
(1− δt)Kt +
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]
It
}
(1− xt+1bk) (4.3)
where δt = δuηt is the depreciation rate increasing with capital uti-
lization (Burnside and Eichenbaum, 1996), and S = τ2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
is
a capital adjustment cost function which verifies the usual properties
(S(0) = 0, S ′(0) = 0, and S ′′(.) > 0). The disaster is captured by the
indicator xt+1 which is equal to 1 with probability θt and equal to 0
otherwise. This means that at time t agents know that in the next
period disaster will happen (xt+1 = 1) with probability θt and with
probability 1− θt there will be no disaster (xt+1 = 0). So far we have
an indicator variable which stands for the occurrence of a disaster. In
order to solve with linear approximations and the usual perturbation
methods we need to introduce certainty equivalence. Therefore we re-
place the effective occurrence of a disaster by its expectation so that
4As a disaster lowers the return on capital because investing in capital is riskier one can equally consider ex ante
that this is the price or the quantity of capital which is affected by the disaster.
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the law of accumulation of capital is rewritten as
Kt+1 = θt {(1− δt)Kt + [1− S (It/It−1)] It} (1− bk) +
+ (1− θt) {(1− δt)Kt + [1− S (It/It−1)] It} =
= (1− θtbk){(1− δt)Kt + [1− S(It/It−1)]It}
Hence the disaster risk is formally treated as a small but certain pe-
riodic depreciation shock here instead of a large uncertain shock. We
plan to use projection methods in the following versions of this paper
so as to solve the model while keeping the indicator variable.
In this model we analyze the response of the macroeconomic quanti-
ties when there is small increase in the probability that the disaster
arrives in the next period. (Gourio, 2012) argues that the probability
of disaster can be considered as strict rational expectations or more
generally account for time-varying beliefs which may differ from the
objective probability.5 We consider that the log of the probability of
disaster follows a first-order autoregressive process as
log θt = (1− ρθ) log θ¯ + ρθ log θt−1 + σθεθt (4.4)
and assume that the shocks θt+1 and xt+1 are independent, conditional
on θt, in line with the evidence that a disaster occurrence tomorrow is
not likely if there is a disaster today (Gourio, 2008).
We relax (Gourio, 2012)’s assumption that total factor productivity
is reduced by exactly the same amount than the capital (bk) in case
of a disaster here. This assumption has been made for two reasons.
First, detrending the capital by the (stochastic) technology level gives
a stationary variable and reduces the dimension of the state space,
so as to obtain analytical results and simplify the numerical analysis.
Second, it delivers an empirically relevant magnitude for the recession.
However, the combination of adjustment costs and monopolistic com-
petition allows us to replicate a large enough fall in output following a
rise in disaster risk without having to maintain this assumption here.
5Building on the behavioral macroeconomics literature would help to disentangle whether this probability is objec-
tive or stemming from agents’ sentiments or “animal spirits” (waves of optimism or pessimism) but this is out
of the scope of our paper for now (see Section 4.5).
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Moreover, while Gourio argues that some disasters were associated
with a fall in TFP (South America since 1945, Russia in 1917), some
papers find, on the contrary, that TFP may rise in recessions as the
least productive firms are shut down (for instance Petrosky-Nadeau,
2010).
Maximizing (1) subject to (2), (3), and (4) gives standard first-order
conditions for consumption, labor, and the riskfree bonds, respectively
as
λt = (Ct − hCt−1)−γ − βhEt(Ct+1 − hCt)−γ (4.5)
χLφt = wtλt (4.6)
λt = βEtλt+1(1 + it)(1 + pit+1)−1 (4.7)
in which λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint (the
marginal utility of consumption) and pi is the inflation rate (1+pit+1 ≡
pt+1
pt
). The first-order conditions for capital and capital utilization are
both affected by the disaster probability and the disaster size effect,
θtbk, as follows6
µt = βEt
[
λt+1R
k
t+1ut+1 + µt+1 (1− δuηt+1) (1− θt+1bk)
]
(4.8)
λtR
k
t = µtδηu
η−1
t (1− θtbk) (4.9)
where µt is the Lagrange multiplier on the capital accumulation con-
straint (the shadow value of having an extra unit of capital).
Finally the first-order condition on investment, also affected by the
6These expressions hold under certainty-equivalence, such that disaster risk is not an uncertainty shock in this
version of the paper. See Section 4.5 and Appendix.
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disaster risk, is
λt = µt (1− θtbk)
1− τ2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− τ
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
It
It−1
 (4.10)
+βEtµt+1 (1− θt+1bk) τ
(
It+1
It
− 1
) (
It+1
It
)2
Without investment adjustment cost (τ = 0), the Euler equation
would be
βEt
λt+1
λt
= Et
{[
Rkt+1ut+1 + (1− δt+1)
]
(1− θtbk)
}−1
and would further reduce to the standard Euler equation if the proba-
bility of disaster was equal to zero.7 This states that the marginal util-
ity from consumption tomorrow λt+1 will be greater than the marginal
utility from consumption today λt if the probability θt drawn today
that a disaster arrives tomorrow increases given that the disaster would
destroy a share of capital tomorrow. Consumption may fall or rise on
impact following a shock to the disaster risk depending on the value of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4).
Moreover, complete markets imply that there is a unique stochastic
discount factor, denoted Qt,t+1 such that
1 + it = (EtQt,t+1)−1 (4.11)
If τ = 0, we can easily derive, from the first-order condition on bonds
and the Euler equation above, that
EtQt,t+1 = Et
{
(1 + pit+1)
[
Rkt+1ut+1 + (1− δt+1)
]
(1− θtbk)
}−1
such that the stochastic discount factor also accounts for the disaster
risk, while remains standard if θt = 0.8
The existence of a risk of disaster on capital also affects the level of
the Tobin’s q. Defined as the ratio of the market value of one addi-
tional unit of investment to the marginal replacement cost of installed
capital,9 it is given by the ratio of the Lagrange multipliers on (3) and
7For the purpose of the quantitative exercise, we keep adjustment costs positive (τ > 0) though, in order to get
a more gradual response of investment to changes in the probability of disaster, without qualitative impact on
the Euler equation.
8Our time-varying stochastic discount factor however differs from (Gourio, 2012)’s because we do not assume that
total factor productivity is reduced by the same amount than the capital stock in case of a disaster.
9In microeconomic terms, the ratio of the marginal benefit in terms of utility of an extra unit of investment over
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(4), that is,
qt =
µt
λt
(4.12)
Without disaster risk, the first-order condition on investment would
imply that, in steady-state, λ¯ = µ¯, and thus q¯ = 1. Therefore when-
ever qt+s > 1 in any period t + s more investment would then add to
the value of the firm, whereas with qt+s < 1 it would be optimal for
firms to disinvest. Here the disaster risk implies that λ¯ = µ¯(1− θ¯bk),
and thus
q¯ = 1
1− θ¯bk
> 1 if θ¯ > 0
The higher the probability of disaster in steady-state, the higher the
Tobin’s q: the threshold value for (dis-)investment incentives is higher
in the presence of a disaster risk. This is because a rise in disaster risk
today leads to a higher marginal replacement cost of capital tomor-
row, associated with a rise in the threshold level of investment that is
required to increase firms’ net market value.
4.2.2 Firms
The production block is roughly similar to the New Keynesian litera-
ture,10 except that we will allow the price adjustment to depend on the
disaster risk. Production is split into a monopolistic competition mar-
ket producing intermediate goods and a competitive sector producing
the final consumption good as a CES composite of the intermediate
goods.
4.2.2.1 Final goods producers
With intermediate goods indexed by j over a continuum of unit inter-
val, the aggregate is given by
the marginal benefit in terms of utility of sacrificing a unit of current consumption in order to have an extra unit
of investment.
10See for instance Fernández-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramírez (2006)
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Yt =
ˆ 1
0
Y
ν−1
ν
j,t dj

ν
ν−1
which corresponds to a downward sloping demand curve for each good
j as
Yj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)−ν
yt
and to an aggregate price index given by
pt =
ˆ 1
0
p1−νj,t dj

1
1−ν
4.2.2.2 Intermediate goods producers
Intermediate goods are produced with capital and labor, according to
a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
Yj,t = AtK˜αj,tL1−αj,t
in which the capital leased to the firms is
K˜t = utKt (4.13)
where ut is the variable utilization rate of capital, and in which total
factor productivity, denoted At, is driven by
logAt = (1− ρA) log A¯+ ρA logAt−1 + σAεAt (4.14)
where the shocks are small and normally distributed (εt is i.i.d. N(0, 1)).
There is a two-step problem for firms producing the intermediate
goods. First, each firm j minimizes capital and labor costs at each
date, independently of price adjustment, subject to the restriction of
producing at least as much as the intermediate good is demanded at
the selling price, that is,
min
Lj,t,K˜j,t
pt(wtLj,t +Rkt K˜j,t)
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s.t. AtK˜αj,tL1−αj,t ≥
(
pj,t
pt
)−ν
Yt
The first-order conditions for this problem give a capital-labor ratio
which holds at the aggregate level since it is the same across all firms
K˜j,t
Lj,t
∗ = wt
Rkt
α
(1− α)
and allows to write the optimal marginal input costs as
mc∗t = w1−αt
( 1
1− α
)1−α ( 1
α
)α Rαt
At
from which the aggregate first-order conditions are expressed as
wt = mc∗ (1− α)At
K˜t
Lt
α (4.15)
Rkt = mc∗αAt
K˜t
Lt
α−1 (4.16)
Then, given the optimal input mix, some firms maximize their profits
by choosing their selling price pj,t. We consider two alternative ways to
introduce nominal stickiness. One is standard Calvo time-dependent
pricing so that firms in the intermediate sector face a constant prob-
ability ζ0 of being unable to change their price at each time t despite
the disaster risk. The other one is to assume that firms’ price adjust-
ment increases in the aggregate risk, i.e. the gap between the current
value of the probability ζt of being unable to change one’s price and
the Calvo probability ζ0 is given by
ζt − ζ0 = −θιt
where ι is the elasticity of the gap to the probability of disaster.11 12
11Note that this function requires to impose a parameter restriction so that ζ remains positive. With θ¯ = 0.01 in
particular, ι cannot be lower than 0.05.
12This price setting reminds the ‘SS pricing’ literature Caplin and Leahy (1991) although the firms do not react to
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Writing ζ as standing either for ζ0 in the first case or for ζt in the
second, the profit-maximizing problem in both cases is
max
pj,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζ)sQt+s
( pj,t
pt+s
)1−ν
yt+s −mc∗t+s
(
pj,t
pt+s
)−ν
yt+s

The solution to this problem holds for all optimizing firms, indepen-
dently of j (p∗t = p∗j,t). The gap between the optimal (reset) price p∗t
and the consumer price index pt is
p∗t
pt
= ν
ν − 1Et
∑∞
s=0 (ζ)
sQt+s
(
pt+s
pt
)ν
Yt+smc
∗
t+s∑∞
s=0 (ζ)
sQt+s
(
pt+s
pt
)ν−1
Yt+s
This expression can finally be rewritten recursively in terms of an
inflation gap to allow for a non-zero inflation steady-state, such that
1 + pi∗t
1 + pit
= ν
ν − 1Et
Ξ1t/pνt
Ξ2t/pν−1t
(4.17)
with pit = ptpt−1 − 1 the inflation rate, pi∗t the reset inflation rate, and
Ξ1t
pνt
= Qt+s
β
Ytmc
∗
t + ζβEt
Ξ1t+1
pνt+1
(1 + pit+1)ν, and (4.18)
Ξ2t
pν−1t
= Qt+s
β
Yt + ζβEt
Ξ2t+1
pν−1t+1
(1 + pit+1)ν−1 (4.19)
All the computational details are given in Appendix.
4.2.3 Public authority
The public authority consumes some output Gt, charges lump sum
taxes Tt to households, and issues debt Dt which pays interest it set up
according to a standard Taylor-type rule that depends on the deviation
the effective realization of aggregate shocks but to the expected risk. This is because the probability of disaster is
incorporated in the forward-looking agents’ optimization problem and the size of an effective disaster is constant
here.
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of inflation from steady-state and on an output growth gap as
it = ρiit−1 + (1− ρi)
[
ψpi(pit − p¯i) + ψY (yt − y¯) + i¯
]
+ σiεit (4.20)
in which y is the growth rate of output and where an overbar indicates
the steady-state value of a variable. The public authority’s budget
constraint equates spending plus payment on existing debt to collected
taxes plus new debt issuance13, that is,
Gt + (1 + it)
Dt
pt
= Tt +
Dt+1
pt
in which Gt follows a first-order autoregressive process in the logs
logGt = (1− ρG) log(ωY¯ ) + ρG logGt−1 + σGεGt (4.21)
where ω is the steady-state share of output devoted to public expen-
ditures.
4.3 Equilibrium
4.3.1 Market clearing
Market-clearing in the bond market implies that the total amount of
debt is equal to the total amount of bonds in period t
Dt = Bt
and market-clearing in output implies that
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (4.22)
Moreover, knowing the demand for individual intermediate goods firms,
we are able to derive the aggregate production function as a func-
tion of the individual firms’ production function and a measure of
13We assume that there is no money, hence no seignorage revenue in the model.
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the inefficiency introduced by the dispersion in relative prices, Ωt =´ 1
0
(
pj,t
pt
)−ν
dj, such that
Yt =
AtK˜
α
t L
1−α
t
Ωt
(4.23)
in which the aggregate price dispersion is given by the recursive equa-
tion
Ωt = (1− ζ)
( 1 + pit
1 + pi∗t
)ν
+ ζ(1 + pit)νΩt−1 (4.24)
Finally, given that a fraction ζ of firms do not readjust their prices,
the aggregate price index, p1−νt =
´ 1
0 p
1−ν
j,t dj, is given by p1−νt = (1 −
ζ)p∗1−νt + ζp1−νt−1 , further rewritten in inflation terms as
(1 + pit)1−ν = (1− ζ)(1 + pi∗t )1−ν + ζ (4.25)
Equilibrium is characterized by equations (3) to (25) in 23 unknowns:
{Y,C, I,G,A, L,K, K˜, u, w,Rk,Ω, pi, pi∗, Ξ˜1, Ξ˜2,mc∗, λ, µ, i, q, Q, θ}.
4.3.2 Calibration and steady-state analysis
Our calibration, summarized in Table 1, is mostly based on the stan-
dard New Keynesian literature (Smets and Wouters, 2003, Rudebusch
and Swanson, 2008). In particular the value of the inverse of the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) ranges from 0.5 to 6 under
CRRA preferences with a baseline value of 2. In addition, Barro (2006)
found on historical data that the average share of capital that is de-
stroyed in case of disaster is 43%, while (Gourio, 2012) estimates that
the average probability of a such a disaster is 1.7% annually, backing
it out from evidence on asset prices under the assumption that the fall
in total factor productivity is also exactly equal to 43%. Since we use
the quarterly calibration of standard New Keynesian models and are
not able to replicate the estimation so far, we test for several values
of θ¯ around a 1% benchmark, as well as for several values of bk and of
the persistence in the shock to θ, without significant changes in our
results.
157
Chapter 4 Disaster Risk in a New Keynesian Model
In the steady-state, the capital stock, output, and consumption are
lower in the presence of a disaster risk as compared to the same econ-
omy without disaster for all values of risk aversion/EIS. Steady-state
investment and labor may be larger in the presence of disasters if
the EIS is very high (γ = 0.5), but are generally weaker, such that
wages are generally lower. The firms can substitute labor to capi-
tal such that their steady-state marginal costs are unchanged even
though the cost of capital is higher in case of disaster. Therefore the
non-zero steady-state inflation rate is unaffected by disaster risk and
equal to the public authority’s target that we set at 2% annually. The
main ratios, C/Y , I/Y , G/Y are in all cases slightly above or below
their standard values, 60%, 20% and 20%, respectively. Finally, the
steady-state risk premium in case of disaster corresponds to the wedge
between the higher steady-state return on capital and the unchanged
risk-free rate.
(Gourio, 2012)found that the model quantities shift to a lower steady-
state in the economy with disaster risk (as compared to an economy
where the disaster risk does not exist) if and only if the EIS is larger
than unity. Therefore, it is noteworthy to clarify at this point why
we do get a lower steady-state for all values of the EIS here, on the
one hand, and its further implications for the model dynamics, on
the other hand. First, with Epstein-Zin preferences, i.e. dissociating
the risk aversion coefficient from the inverse of the EIS, it would be
possible to show that, when investment in capital becomes riskier, the
risk-adjusted return on capital goes down for risk averse agents, while
the effect of this change on the consumption-savings decisions depends
on the value of the EIS (Weil, 1990, Angeletos, 2007). In particular,
when the EIS is larger than unity (γ < 1), the substitution effect
of a higher risk-adjusted return is larger than the income effect and
savings fall. Therefore the steady-state capital stock and output are
lower. However, when the EIS is equal to 1, both effects cancel each
other out and savings are unaffected by changes in the risk-adjusted
return, that is, are unaffected by changes in the return on capital even
if agents are risk-averse.14 Our specification, where risk aversion is only
the inverse of the EIS, does not allow to disentangle the two effects,
yet remains preferable in order to solve the equity premium puzzle
14The EIS determines the sign of the effect of increased uncertainty on savings while the risk aversion only affects
its magnitude (Weil, 1990).
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by incorporating habit formation (Weil, 1989, Uhlig, 2007, Angeletos,
2007).
More importantly, the reason why we get lower steady-state macro
quantities even when the EIS is unity is because we solve the model
such that the disaster risk is treated as a small but certain probabil-
ity of disaster instead of being a large uncertain shock. This allows
to solve the model quite easily without having to maintain Gourio’s
assumption that the disaster is a strict combination of a depreciation
shock to capital and a negative shock to the total factor productivity
by the same amount. Meanwhile, this does not substantially restrict
our business cycle analysis for two reasons. First, we capture the
main first-moment effect of disaster risk by the fact that depreciation
of capital will be higher in the future, even though we do not have the
second-moment effect associated with higher uncertainty about future
depreciation.15 Second, Gourio shows that Tallarini (2000)’s observa-
tional equivalence in the dynamics of the macroeconomic variables in
case there is an aggregate risk or not does not hold when the probabil-
ity of disaster is not constant. When the disaster risk is time-varying,
Gourio finds that risk aversion matters for the macroeconomic dynam-
ics, and this is captured here.
4.4 Impulse responses of the macroeconomic variables
Analyzing the effects of a time-varying risk on asset pricing would
require to treat the disaster risk as an uncertainty shock and to use
nonlinear methods to solve the model. However, since there is a con-
sensus about the irrelevance of approximation beyond the first-order
for the macroeconomic quantities, on the one hand, and given that
we do not consider the case of a large shock, on the other hand, we
maintain certainty-equivalence and first-order methods in this version
of the paper, although we keep track of some second-order correc-
tions in the Appendix.1617 For each (small) shock below, we compare
the responses obtained in our model (solid line) to their counterpart
15Gourio admits that the two effects are present but cannot be disentangled in his article. In every case, both effects
push the variables in the same direction, and the first-moment effect is far more important for macroeconomic
quantities.
16Since certainty-equivalence holds, these correction terms are naturally very small.
17The effective occurrence of a disaster would be a large shock, whereas the rise in the probability of disaster
considered here is a small one.
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in a flexible-price but otherwise similar model18 (dashed line) and in
a standard sticky-price New Keynesian model without disaster risk
(dotted line).
4.4.1 A rise in the probability of disaster
Figure 1 depicts the responses of the main variables to a rise in the
probability of disaster, θ. Investment and capital fall on impact as
households foresee the upcoming depreciation of capital when the
probability of disaster, θ, rises. These effects are much more impor-
tant under Calvo price stickiness (ζ = 0.8) than under flexible prices
(ζ = 0) as all firms do not adjust their prices downwards as much as
they would optimally do to match the fall in aggregate demand. The
capital stock still goes down next periods because of the depressed
investment even though the probability of disaster gradually returns
to its initial level (from the autoregressive process).
Labor supply decreases when prices are flexible because it is less at-
tractive for workers to work today when the return on savings is low
(intertemporal effect), despite a negative wealth effect that tends to
push employment up.19 Wages thus slightly rise. However, when prices
are sticky, the firms that cannot readjust their prices downwards as
much as they want face an even lower demand for their own inter-
mediate goods, and thus in turn lower their demand of labor, leading
wages to fall. Because capital and labor decrease more under sticky
prices, combined with the fact that decrease in aggregate demand is
more severe, the slump in output is far larger with nominal rigidity.
In the flexible case, consumption increases on impact as households
substitute consumption for investment in the first period, while lower
output leads consumption to fall in the next periods, for standard
values of the EIS and/or risk aversion.20 With sticky prices however,
consumption falls on impact for the baseline calibration (γ = 2), or
lower values of the EIS (higher risk aversion). For very low risk aver-
sion, consumption moves up on impact similarly to the flexible-price
18The flexible-price model is different from Gourio’s RBC with disaster risk since we have CRRA preferences with
habit formation, a public authority, and variable utilization rate of capital, on the one hand, and because we do
not assume a fall to TFP by the same amount as simultaneous to the rise in the probability of disaster, on the
other hand.
19The relative importance of the two effects would depend on the EIS with Epstein-Zin preferences. However this
result is familiar with standard calibration of CRRA preferences.
20Gourio (2012)found a similar effect with a slightly different flexible-price model and a simultaneous shock to the
TFP.
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case but a quantitative difference due to price stickiness remains, as
shown in Figure 5.
As investment in capital is riskier, households’ demand for safer gov-
ernment bonds rises, so that the short-term nominal interest rate falls
(“flight to quality” effect). However, because of the inertia in the
Taylor-type reaction, the interest rate — and therefore inflation —
falls less under price stickiness Finally, actual inflation decreases less
than reset inflation, so that the price dispersion falls, but still falls
more than the nominal interest rate, so that the real rate rises.
Figures 6 to 10 present some robustness checks and alternative speci-
fications. Figure 6 considers different values of the steady-state prob-
ability of disaster (θ¯). While the magnitude of the effects increases in
the steady-state disaster risk, the qualitative responses are all identi-
cal. Figure 7 gives some alternative values for the persistence of the
shock (ρθ). Figure 8 tests for different values for the share of capital
which is destroyed in case of disaster (bk), including a possible negative
value.21
More importantly, Figure 9 gives the responses under state-dependent
price stickiness for different values of the parameter ι < 1.22 The
responses still differ significantly from the pure flexible-price version
of the model (ζ = 0) and our main results hold, notably the drop in
wages, including for an extreme ι = 0.1.
We finally consider a fall in the probability of disaster in Figure 10.
Table 2 gives the second-order correction terms associated with this
shock, naturally found to be very small under the certainty-equivalence
assumption.
To sum up, a rise in the probability of disaster creates a recession, a
fall in inflation, a flight to quality in terms of asset demand, depressed
investment and labor, as well as lower consumption for standard risk
aversion. The fact that the probability of a disaster is higher suffices
to generate this recession, without effective occurrence of the disaster.
21A negative value of bk verifies that the model works symmetrically such that the rare event could be a “miracle”
instead of a “disaster”.
22When ι ≥ 1, the responses are almost identical to the time-dependent pricing case.
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4.4.2 Standard shocks
The responses to standard shocks in the model with disaster risk are
very close to the responses in a standard New Keynesian model.
For a TFP shock (Figure 2), output and investment rise because the
marginal returns on labor and capital rise. However this is slightly
less important in the presence of a disaster risk which depreciates
capital. Consumption rise more however from the substitution effect
between investment and consumption for households. The response
of labor is discussed extensively in the literature: in opposition to
a RBC where labor increases because the marginal return on labor
is higher, sticky prices prevent some firms from lowering their prices
leading them to lower their labor demand because of the contraction
in demand for their own intermediate goods (Gali, 1999). In addition,
higher incomes for households make leisure more desirable so that the
supply of labor does not substantially rise neither. As reset inflation is
higher than actual inflation, price dispersion falls and the real interest
rate goes up despite the fall in the nominal rate.
A positive shock to public expenditures (Figure 3) also replicates the
very well-known reactions. In all cases, there is a temporary rise in
output from the rise in aggregate demand, an eviction effect on private
consumption and investment, hence a fall in capital. Thus firms rely
more on labor and wages go up. High reset inflation creates more price
dispersion, and the nominal rate is increased.
Finally, a monetary contraction (Figure 4) generates the standard de-
crease in all macro quantities, as well as in inflation and price disper-
sion.
4.5 Further research
This paper provides a baseline framework that could be used to de-
velop a number of innovative research ideas, including the role of mone-
tary policy to prevent self-fulfilling recessions in case of misperceptions
about the disaster risk. This Section presents our research agenda,
which broadly consists in three steps.
First, we would like to account for a perceived risk of disaster along
with the real disaster risk. (Gourio, 2012) considers that the prob-
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ability of disaster introduced in his model (and in ours) may result
from the economic agents’ perception, probably because considering
that the probability taken as given by the agents is the real risk would
be associated with perfect individual rationality and knowledge about
disasters while one could be more agnostic by considering it as merely
perceived, especially for rare events. We think that it would be help-
ful to build on the behavioral macroeconomics literature (Gabaix and
Laibson, 2002, De Grauwe, 2010, Fuster et al., 2010, Angeletos and
La’O, 2012, Barsky and Sims, 2012) in order to disentangle a per-
ceived from a real disaster risk. Another mean would be the use of
computational methods in order to keep the disaster variable (xt+1)
as an indicator in the Euler equation instead of substituting the time-
varying probability θt of an effective future occurrence. This would
allow to simulate a rise in the probability of disaster while preventing
the real occurrence of a disaster by accounting for uncertainty in the
model.
As a second step, we will evaluate the model predictions in terms of as-
set pricing, especially the countercyclicality of the risk premium. Some
interactions between price rigidity and the risk of disaster may affect
equity returns. The asset price volatility may in turn have important
consequences on consumption volatility. In particular the perception
of disaster risk may be one of the psychological mechanisms that alter
the reactivity of consumption changes to asset price movements (see
Lynch, 1996, or Gabaix and Laibson, 2002, for instance), in addition to
habit formation (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999, Uhlig, 2007), or ad-
justment costs (Grossman and Laroque, 1990). On practical grounds,
pricing assets requires a few more sophistications in our setup. One is
to go beyond the first-order approximation in the Taylor expansion.
The consensus in the literature is that these higher-order terms do
not matter for the responses of macroeconomic quantities we have fo-
cused on so far but have an important role in the asset pricing in the
presence of a time-varying risk. Another key element will be to add
corporate bonds in the model since leverage is a standard way to make
equity returns more volatile and procyclical — in line with the data
— in the literature, which may be even more relevant in a model in
which firms’ prices are sticky.
Finally, we would like to assess the desirability of monetary policy to
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prevent a (self-fulfilling) recession from a sudden rise in the (perceived)
probability of disaster. Several conventional and unconventional in-
terventions could be compared with one another by incorporating a
welfare function measuring their effectiveness. In particular we think
of adding an extra term in the Taylor-type rule which would represent
a direct response of the monetary authority in the face of a wave of
pessimism. This would be a quasi-conventional intervention, making
changes in the nominal interest rate more reactive but still limited by
the zero lower bound. A more unconventional measure could consist
in purchasing corporate bonds (which may encompass bank debt),
directly affected by the disaster risk, by selling riskfree government
bonds (as far as sovereign default is excluded).
4.6 Conclusion
This paper provides a baseline framework to analyze the business cycle
responses of macroeconomic quantities in the presence of a small time-
varying disaster risk in an otherwise standard New Keynesian model.
While following Gourio (2012) on the description of an economic dis-
aster, we relax the assumption that total factor productivity needs
to fall by the same amount than the capital stock in case of a disas-
ter. By incorporating investment adjustment costs and monopolistic
competition, we show that the magnitude of the recession following
a shock to the probability of disaster may be far increased. As com-
pared with the early papers on rare events, we also account for the
fact that consumption and wages do not rise in distressed economic
times, whether nominal rigidity is time-dependent or state-dependent.
More generally, this paper is a first step towards the introduction of
rare events into the models used to conduct monetary policy, and will
be used to compare the effectiveness of several interventions in the
presence of such a risk.
4.7 Appendix
A1. Households
Given that next period disaster xt+1 is equal to 1 with probability
θt and equal to 0 with probability 1 − θt, the law of accumulation of
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capital can be rewritten as
Kt+1 = [θt(1− bk) + (1− θt)]{(1− δt)Kt + [1− S(It/It−1)]It}
= (1− θtbk){(1− δt)Kt + [1− S(It/It−1)]It}
Therefore the Lagrangian for the households’ problem is
L =Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
{(
(Ct − hCt−1)1−γ
1− γ − χ
L1+φt
1 + φ
)
+λt
(
WtLt + (1 + it−1)
Bt
pt
+ Mt
pt
− Bt+1
pt
− Mt+1
pt
+Rkt utKt + Πt − Tt − It − Ct
)
+ µt
[(
(1− δuηt )Kt +
(
1− τ2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2)
It
)
(1− θtbk)−Kt+1
]}
and the first-order conditions are
• Consumption: λt = (Ct − hCt−1)−γ − βhEt(Ct+1 − hCt)−γ
• Labor: χLφt = wtλt
• Bonds: λt = βEtλt+1(1 + it)(1 + pit+1)−1, with1 + pit+1 ≡ pt+1pt
• Capital: µt = βEt
[
λt+1R
k
t+1ut+1 + µt+1 (1− δuηt+1) (1− θt+1bk)
]
• Capital utilization rate: λtRkt = µtδηu
η−1
t (1− θtbk)
• Investment: λt = µt (1− θtbk)
[
1− τ2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2 − τ ( ItIt−1 − 1
)
It
It−1
]
+βEtµt+1 (1− θt+1bk) τ
(
It+1
It
− 1
) (
It+1
It
)2
With no investment adjustment cost (τ = 0), the FOC on investment
becomes λt = µt(1− θtbk), which in turn implies from the FOC on the
capital utilization rate that Rkt = δ′t. Substituting into the FOC on
capital gives the Euler equation (11) in case τ = 0.
A2. Firms
• Production aggregation
The aggregate of intermediate goods is given by
Yt =
ˆ 1
0
Y
ν−1
ν
j,t dj

ν
ν−1
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so that the profit maximization problem of the representative firm in
the final sector is
max
Yt,j
pt
ˆ 1
0
Y
ν−1
ν
j,t dj

ν
ν−1
−
ˆ 1
0
pj,tYj,tdj
The first-order condition with respect to Yt,j yields a downward sloping
demand curve for each intermediate good j as
Yj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)−ν
Yt
The nominal value of the final good is the sum of prices times quan-
tities of intermediates
ptYt =
ˆ 1
0
pj,tYj,tdj
in which Yt is substituted to give the aggregate price index as
pt =
ˆ 1
0
p1−νj,t dj

1
1−ν
• Cost minimization
Firms are price-takers in the input markets, facing a nominal wage
wtpt and a nominal rental rate Rkt pt (wt and Rkt are in real terms).
Therefore, they choose the optimal quantities of labor and capital
given the input prices and subject to the restriction of producing at
least as much as the intermediate good is demanded at the given price.
The intratemporal problem is
min
Lj,t,K˜j,t
wtptLj,t +Rkt ptK˜j,t
s.t. atK˜αj,tL1−αj,t ≥
(
pj,t
pt
)−ν
Yt
The first-order conditions are
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(Lj,t :) wt =
ϕj,t
pt
(1− α)At
K˜j,t
Lj,t
α
(K˜j,t :) Rkt =
ϕj,t
pt
αAt
K˜j,t
Lj,t
α−1
in which the Lagrange multiplier ϕj,t can be interpreted as the (nom-
inal) marginal cost associated with an additional unit of capital or
labor. Rearranging gives the optimal capital over labor ratio asK˜j,t
Lj,t
∗ = wt
Rkt
α
(1− α)
in which none of the terms on the right hand side depends on j, and
thus holds for all firms in equilibrium, i.e., K˜tLt =
K˜j,t
Lj,t
. Replacing in the
first-order conditions further gives mc∗t = ϕtpt as
mc∗t = w1−αt
( 1
1− α
)1−α ( 1
α
)α (Rkt )α
At
• Profit maximization
Let us now consider the pricing problem of a firm that gets to update
its price in period t and wants to maximize the present discounted
value of future profits. First, the (nominal) profit flow, pj,tYj,t −
wtptLj,t − Rkj,tptK˜j,t, can be rewritten as Πj,t = (pj,t − ϕt)Yj,t, that
is, in real terms, Πj,tpt =
pj,t
pt
Yj,t − mc∗tYj,t. Firms will discount future
profit flows by both the stochastic discount factor, Qt = βsλt+s, and
by the probability ζs that a price chosen at time t is still in effect at
time s. Replacing Yj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)−ν
Yt, the profit maximization problem
is
max
pj,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζ)sQt+s
( pj,t
pt+s
)1−ν
Yt+s −mc∗t+s
(
pj,t
pt+s
)−ν
Yt+s

Given that mc∗t = ϕtpt and factorizing, we can rewrite it as
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max
pj,t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζ)sQt+spν−1t+s Yt+s
(
p1−νj,t − ϕtp−νj,t
)
The first-order condition is
Et
∞∑
s=0
(ζ)sQt+spν−1t+s Yt+s
(
(1− ν)p−νj,t + νϕtp−ν−1j,t
)
= 0
which simplifies as
p∗j,t =
ν
ν − 1Et
∑∞
s=0 (ζ)
sQt+sp
ν
t+sYt+smc
∗
t+s∑∞
s=0 (ζ)
sQt+sp
ν−1
t+s Yt+s
Note that this optimal price depends on aggregate variables only, so
that p∗t = p∗j,t. The gap between the current price and the optimal
aggregate price is thus given by
p∗t
pt
= ν
ν − 1Et
∑∞
s=0 (ζ)
sQt+s
(
pt+s
pt
)ν
Yt+smc
∗
t+s∑∞
s=0 (ζ)
sQt+s
(
pt+s
pt
)ν−1
Yt+s
In order to stress out the recursive price adjustment, let define p∗t as
p∗t =
ν
ν − 1Et
Ξ1t
Ξ2t
in which Ξ1t and Ξ2t can be expressed recursively as
Ξ1t = Qt+spνt Ytmc∗t + ζEtΞ1t+1
Ξ2t = Qt+spν−1t Yt + ζEtΞ2t+1
and rewritten as
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β
Ξ1t
pνt
= Qt+sYtmc∗t + ζβ2Et
Ξ1t+1
pνt+1
(
pt+1
pt
)ν
β
Ξ2t
pν−1t
= Qt+sYt + ζβ2Et
Ξ2t+1
pν−1t+1
(
pt+1
pt
)ν−1
Therefore, we have
p∗t
pt
= ν
ν − 1Et
Ξ1t
pνt
Ξ2t
pν−1t
A3. Aggregation
Bonds Market
Market-clearing requires that:
Dt = Bt
Aggregate Demand
First replace Dt = Bt into the public authority’s budget constraint,
and express Tt as
Tt = Gt + (1 + it)
Bt
pt
− Bt+1
pt
which can be plugged into the household budget constraint as
Ct+It+
Bt+1
pt
= wtLt+(1+it)
Bt
pt
+Rkt K˜t+Πt−
(
Gt + (1 + it)
Bt
pt
− Bt+1
pt
)
This further simplifies to:
Ct + It +Gt = wtLt +Rkt K˜t + Πt
where we have to verify that the RHS is equal to Yt. Total profits
Πt must be equal to the sum of profits earned by intermediate good
firms, that is
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Πt =
ˆ 1
0
Πj,tdj
Real profits earned by intermediate good firms j are given by
Πj,t(real) =
pj,t
pt
Yj,t − wtLj,t −Rkt K˜j,t
Substituting Yj,t, we have
Πj,t(real) =
(
pj,t
pt
)1−ν
Yt − wtLj,t −Rkt K˜j,t
Therefore,
Πt(real) =
ˆ 1
0
((
pj,t
pt
)1−ν
Yt − wtLj,t −Rkt K˜j,t
)
dj =
ˆ 1
0
(
pj,t
pt
)1−ν
Ytdj
−
ˆ 1
0
wtLj,tdj −
ˆ 1
0
Rkt K˜j,tdj
Πt(real) =
ˆ 1
0
((
pj,t
pt
)1−ν
Yt − wtLj,t −Rkt K˜j,t
)
dj = Yt
1
p1−νt
ˆ 1
0
(pj,t)1−ν dj
−wt
ˆ 1
0
Lj,tdj −Rkt
ˆ 1
0
K˜j,tdj
Given that
• - the aggregate price level is p1−νt =
´ 1
0 p
1−ν
j,t dj,
• - aggregate labor demand must equal supply,
´ 1
0 Lj,tdj = Lt, and
• - aggregate supply of capital services must equal demand
´ 1
0 K˜j,tdj =
K˜t,
the aggregate profit is
Πt(real) = Yt − wtLt −Rkt K˜t
Plugging this expression into the household budget constraint finally
gives the aggregate accounting identity as
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Yt = Ct + It +Gt
Inflation
Firms have a probability 1 − ζ of getting to update their price each
period. Since there are an infinite number of firms, there is also the
exact fraction 1 − ζ of total firms who adjust their prices and the
fraction ζ who stay with the previous period price. Moreover, since
there is a random sampling from the entire distribution of firm prices,
the distribution of any subset of firm prices is similar to the entire
distribution. Therefore, the aggregate price index, p1−νt =
´ 1
0 p
1−ν
j,t dj,
is rewritten as
p1−νt =
ˆ 1−ζ
0
p∗1−νt dj +
ˆ 1
1−ζ
p1−νj,t−1dj
which simplifies to
p1−νt = (1− ζ)p∗1−νt + ζp1−νt−1
Dividing both sides of the equation by p1−νt−1
(
pt
pt−1
)1−ν
= (1− ζ)
(
p∗t
pt−1
)1−ν
+ ζ
(
pt−1
pt−1
)1−ν
and defining gross inflation as 1 + pit = ptpt−1 and gross reset inflation
as 1 + pi∗t =
p∗t
pt−1
, we get
(1 + pit)1−ν = (1− ζ)(1 + pi∗t )1−ν + ζ
Finally, from p∗t = νν−1Et
Ξ1t
Ξ2t
, we have
p∗t
pt
= ν
ν − 1Et
Ξ1t/pνt
Ξ2t/pν−1t
Rewritting the left-hand side as p
∗
t
pt
pt−1
pt−1
, and rearranging, we get
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pi∗t = pit
ν
ν − 1Et
Ξ1t/pνt
Ξ2t/pν−1t
Therefore we have
Ξ1t
pνt
= Qt+s
β
Ytmc
∗
t + ζβEt
Ξ1t+1
pνt+1
(1 + pit+1)ν
Ξ2t
pν−1t
= Qt+s
β
Yt + ζβEt
Ξ2t+1
pν−1t+1
(1 + pit+1)ν−1
Aggregate Supply
We know that the demand to individual firm j is given by
Yj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)−ν
Yt
and that firm j hires labor and capital in the same proportion than
the aggregate capital to labor ratio (common factor markets). Hence,
substituting in the production function for the intermediate good j
we get
At
K˜t
Lt
α Lj,t =
(
pj,t
pt
)−ν
Yt
Then, summing up across the intermediate firms gives
At
K˜t
Lt
α ˆ 1
0
Lj,tdj = Yt
ˆ 1
0
(
pj,t
pt
)−ν
dj
Given that aggregate labor demand equals aggregate labor supply´ 1
0 Lj,tdj = Lt, we have
ˆ 1
0
(
pj,t
pt
)−ν
djYt = AtK˜αt L1−αt
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Thus, the aggregate production function can be written as
Yt =
AtK˜
α
t L
1−α
t
Ωt
where Ωt =
´ 1
0
(
pj,t
pt
)−ν
dj measures a distortion introduced by the
dispersion in relative prices.23 In order to express Ωt in aggregate
terms, let decompose it according to the Calvo pricing assumption
again, so that
Ωt =
ˆ 1
0
(
pj,t
pt
)−ν
dj = pνt
ˆ 1
0
p−νj,t
pνt
ˆ 1
0
p−νj,t = pνt
ˆ 1−ζ
0
p∗−νt dj +
ˆ 1
1−ζ
p−νj,t−1dj

pνt
ˆ 1
0
p−νj,t = pνt (1− ζ)p∗−νt + pνt
ˆ 1
1−ζ
p−νj,t−1dj
pνt
ˆ 1
0
p−νj,t = (1− ζ)
(
p∗t
pt
)−ν
+ pνt
ˆ 1
1−ζ
p−νj,t−1dj
pνt
ˆ 1
0
p−νj,t = (1− ζ)
(
p∗t
pt−1
)−ν (pt−1
pt
)−ν
+ pνt
ˆ 1
1−ζ
p−νj,t−1dj
pνt
ˆ 1
0
p−νj,t = (1− ζ)(1 + pi∗t )−ν(1 + pit)ν + p−νt−1pνt
ˆ 1
1−ζ
(
pj,t−1
pt−1
)−ν
dj
Given random sampling and the fact that there is a continuum of firms
Ωt = (1− ζ)(1 + pi∗t )−ν(1 + pit)ν + ζ(1 + pit)νΩt−1
23This distortion is not the one associated with the monopoly power of firms but an additional one that arises from
the relative price fluctuations due to prie stickiness.
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A4. Full set of equilibrium conditions
Kt+1 =
(1− δuηt )Kt +
1− τ2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2 It
 (1− θtbk) (4.26)
log θt = (1− ρθ) log θ¯ + ρθ log θt−1 + σθεθt (4.27)
K˜t = utKt (4.28)
λt = (Ct − hCt−1)−γ − βhEt(Ct+1 − hCt)−γ (4.29)
χLφt = wtλt (4.30)
λt = βEtλt+1(1 + it+1)(1 + pit+1)−1 (4.31)
µt = βEt
[
λt+1R
k
t+1ut+1 + µt+1 (1− δuηt+1) (1− θt+1bk)
]
(4.32)
λtR
k
t = µtδηu
η−1
t (1− θtbk) (4.33)
λt = µt (1− θtbk)
1− τ2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
− τ
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
It
It−1

+βEtµt+1 (1− θt+1bk) τ
(
It+1
It
− 1
) (
It+1
It
)2
(4.34)
1 + it = (EtQt,t+1)−1 (4.35)
174
4.7 Appendix
qt =
µt
λt
(4.36)
logAt = (1− ρA) log A¯+ ρA logAt−1 + σAεAt (4.37)
wt = mc∗ (1− α)At
K˜t
Lt
α (4.38)
Rkt = mc∗αAt
K˜t
Lt
α−1 (4.39)
(1 + pi∗t ) = (1 + pit)
ν
ν − 1Et
Ξ˜1t
Ξ˜2t
(4.40)
where Ξ˜1t =
Ξ1t
pνt
and Ξ˜2t =
Ξ2t
pν−1t
.
Ξ˜1t = λtYtmc∗t + ζβEtΞ˜1t+1 (1 + pit+1)
ν (4.41)
Ξ˜2t = λtYt + ζβEtΞ˜2t+1 (1 + pit+1)
ν−1 (4.42)
it = ρiit−1 + (1− ρi)
[
ψpi(pit − p¯i) + ψY (yt − y¯) + i¯
]
+ σiεit (4.43)
logGt = (1− ρG) log(ωY¯ ) + ρG logGt−1 + σGεGt (4.44)
Yt = Ct + It +Gt (4.45)
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Yt =
AtK˜
αL1−αt
Ωt
(4.46)
(1 + pit)1−ν = (1− ζ)(1 + pi∗t )1−ν + ζ (4.47)
Ωt = (1− ζ)(1 + pi∗t )−ν(1 + pit)ν + ζ(1 + pit)νΩt−1 (4.48)
This is a system of 23 equations in 23 unknowns: {Y,C, I,G,A, L,K, K˜, u, w,
Rk,Ω, pi, pi∗, Ξ˜1, Ξ˜2,mc∗, λ, µ, i, q, Q, θ}.
A5. Steady State
From the FOC on investment (34), we have
λ¯ = µ¯(1− θ¯bk) (4.49)
which implies by (36) that
q¯ = µ¯
λ¯
= 1
1− θ¯bk
(4.50)
Without disaster risk, we would have q¯ = 1 determining the threshold
under which firms invest or disinvest to raise their market value. Here
disaster risk implies that this threshold is greater than unity since, for
a given replacement cost in terms of utility, firms find it less profitable
to invest as the probability that a part of their capital turns out to be
destroyed rises.
Normalizing u¯ = 1, we have ¯˜K = K¯ from (28), and from (33)
R¯k = δη (4.51)
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Moreover (32) implies that
R¯k = 1
β(1− θ¯bk)
− (1− δ) (4.52)
The last two equations imply a parameter restriction of η as
η = 1 +
1
β(1−θ¯bk) − 1
δ
(4.53)
Therefore, with parameter values β = .99, δ = .025, θ¯ = .017, and
bk = .43, we have η = 1.7 (and η = 1.404 in a world without disasters).
Then from (47), and given the target inflation rate p¯i, we have the
steady-state reset inflation rate as
(1 + p¯i∗) =
(1 + p¯i)1−ν − ζ
1− ζ
 11−ν (4.54)
and, since from (40) we have,
(1 + p¯i∗) = (1 + p¯i) ν
ν − 1
¯˜Ξ1
¯˜Ξ1
(4.55)
where, from (41) and (42),
¯˜Ξ1 =
λ¯Y¯ m¯c∗
1− ζβ(1 + p¯i)ν (4.56)
¯˜Ξ2 =
λ¯Y¯
1− ζβ(1 + p¯i)ν−1 (4.57)
we get
(1 + p¯i∗) = (1 + p¯i) ν
ν − 1m¯c
∗1− ζβ(1 + p¯i)ν−1
1− ζβ(1 + p¯i)ν (4.58)
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which gives the steady-state marginal cost m¯c∗ as
m¯c∗ = ν − 1
ν
1
(1 + p¯i)
1− ζβ(1 + p¯i)ν
1− ζβ(1 + p¯i)ν−1
(1 + p¯i)1−ν − ζ
1− ζ
 11−ν (4.59)
Note that we must therefore restrict parameter values so that ζβ(1 +
p¯i)ν < 1.
With the expressions for R¯k and m¯c∗, we can express the steady-state
capital-labor ratio as a function of the steady-state characteristics of
disaster from (39)
K¯
L¯
=
(
m¯c∗αa¯
R¯k
) 1
1−α
(4.60)
Therefore the steady-state wage is given by (38)
w¯ = m¯c∗(1− α)a¯
K¯
L¯
α (4.61)
From (48), we have
Ω¯ = (1− ζ)(1 + p¯i
∗)−ν(1 + p¯i)ν
1− ζ(1 + p¯i)ν (4.62)
From the law of capital accumulation (26) in steady-state, we have
I¯ = K¯
( 1
1− θ¯bk
− (1− δ)
)
(4.63)
and given that from (44),
G¯ = ωY¯ (4.64)
the accounting identity (45) becomes in steady-state
Y¯ = 11− ω
{
C¯ + K¯
[ 1
1− θ¯bk
− (1− δ)
]}
(4.65)
in which 11−ω is the keynesian multiplier of public expenditures. Fur-
178
4.7 Appendix
ther dividing each side by L¯ gives
Y¯
L¯
= 11− ω
C¯L¯ +
K¯
L¯
[ 1
1− θ¯bk
− (1− δ)
] (4.66)
Replacing the left-hand side by the output-labor ratio obtained from
the aggregate production function (46), we have
A¯
Ω¯
K¯
L¯
α = 11− ω
C¯L¯ +
K¯
L¯
[ 1
1− θ¯bk
− (1− δ)
] (4.67)
which can be solved for the steady-state consumption-labor ratio as
C¯
L¯
= A¯(1− ω)
Ω¯
K¯
L¯
α − K¯
L¯
[ 1
1− θ¯bk
− (1− δ)
]
(4.68)
Combining the FOC on consumption (29) in steady-state
λ¯ = [(1− h)C¯]−γ(1− βh) (4.69)
with the FOC on labor (30) in steady-state
L¯ =
w¯λ¯
χ
1/φ (4.70)
we can express L¯ as a function of the steady state consumption-labor
ratio
L¯ =

w¯(1− h)−γ
(
C¯
L¯
)−γ
(1− βh)
χL

1
φL+γ
(4.71)
which gives λ¯ by (69) and therefore µ¯. L¯ also gives Y¯ by (66) and K¯
by (60). Then G¯ is obtained by (64) and I¯ by the accounting identity
or by (63). Then we get ¯˜Ξ1 and ¯˜Ξ2 by (56) and (57).
Finally, from the FOC on bonds (31) we have the standard Fisher
relation between the subjective discount factor, the nominal interest
rate and the inflation rate, 1/β = (1 + i¯)/(1 + p¯i), such that, by (35),
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the one-period stochastic discount factor is
Q¯ = 11 + i¯ =
β
1 + p¯i (4.72)
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A6. Tables
Table 4.1: Baseline calibration parameters (quarterly values)
Utility function
β discount factor 0.99
γ inverse of EIS / risk aversion coefficient 2
h habit in consumption 0.7
φ inverse of the elasticity of work effort to the real wage 1
χ labor disutility weight 4.74
Investment
δ capital depreciation rate 0.025
τ investment adjustment costs 0.5
u¯ utilization rate of capital 1
Production
α capital share of production 0.33
ζ0 Calvo probability 0.8
ν elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods 6
Public authority
ω steady-state G/Y ratio 0.2
ψpi Taylor rule inflation weight 1.5
ψY Taylor rule output weight 0.5
p¯i target inflation rate 0.005
ρA TFP smoothing parameter 0.9
ρG government expenditures smoothing parameter 0.85
ρi interest rate smoothing parameter 0.85
Disaster risk
θ¯ disaster risk 0.01
bk share of capital destroyed if disaster 0.43
ρθ disaster risk smoothing parameter 0.85
σ standard deviation of shocks 0.01
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Figure 4.1: Standard-deviation responses to a shock to the probability of disaster (increase in θ).
Solid line: model with disaster risk and sticky prices (ζ = 0.8). Dashed line: model with disaster risk and flexible
prices (ζ = 0).
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Figure 4.2: Standard-deviation responses to a productivity shock. Solid line: model with disaster risk
and sticky prices (ζ = 0.8). Dashed line: model with disaster risk and flexible prices (ζ = 0). Dotted line: model
without disasters, with sticky prices.
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Figure 4.3: Standard-deviation responses to a public spending shock. Solid line: model with disaster
risk and sticky prices (ζ = 0.8). Dashed line: model with disaster risk and flexible prices (ζ = 0). Dotted line:
model without disasters, with sticky prices.
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Figure 4.4: Standard-deviation responses to a monetary shock. Solid line: model with disaster risk
and sticky prices (ζ = 0.8). Dashed line: model with disaster risk and flexible prices (ζ = 0). Dotted line: model
without disasters, with sticky prices.
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Figure 4.5: Standard-deviation of consumption to a shock to the probability of disaster, for
different values of the risk aversion coefficient γ.
Figure 4.6: Standard-deviation responses to a shock to the probability of disaster, for different
values of the steady-state probability of disaster, θ¯.
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Figure 4.7: Standard-deviation responses to a shock to the probability of disaster, for different
values of the persistence of the shock ρθ.
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Figure 4.8: Standard-deviation responses to a shock to the probability of disaster, for different
values of the destroyed share of capital bk.
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Figure 4.9: Standard-deviation responses to a shock to the probability of disaster, with state-
dependent price stickiness. We assume that ζt = ζ0 − θιt. With ι ≥ 1, the responses are very close to the
Calvo pricing case (ζ = 0.8), thus not included.
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Figure 4.10: Standard-deviation responses to a shock to the probability of disaster. Negative and
positive shocks.
Table 4.2: Correction terms for the second-order approximation, shock to θ
Yˆ Cˆ Iˆ Gˆ Kˆ Lˆ Ωˆ
Constant 0.691892 0.169961 -0.884952 -0.917545 2.644587 -0.281788 0.001777
2nd-order correction -0.000001 0 -0.000004 0 0 0 0
pˆi pˆi∗ mˆc∗ wˆ Rˆk qˆ Qˆ
Constant 0.004987 0.026281 -0.182864 0.387128 -3.232391 0.004307 -0.015038
2nd-order correction 0 -0.000003 -0.000006 -0.000007 -0.000004 -0.000002 0
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General Conclusion
Unconventional monetary policies have become important part of cen-
tral bank strategy to deal with increased uncertainty and risk premia
in financial markets. Yet, the theoretical and empirical evidence does
not allow drawing definite conclusions about the desirability and effec-
tiveness of non-orthodox measures. This thesis contributes to better
understanding of unconventional monetary policies from conceptual,
empirical and theoretical point of view.
In the first chapter, we discussed the different ways of implementing
unconventional monetary policies in Japan (1999-2001) and the United
States (2007-2010) with a particular focus on central-bank balance
sheet management. We showed that the Fed purchased risky assets
much more intensively than the BOJ did putting much more empha-
sis on the credit-easing transmission channels. The BOJ on the other
hand focused on providing excess reserves to commercial banks with-
out getting too much risky assets on its balance sheet getting closer
to pure quantitative easing. The Fed’s “asset-driven” balance sheet
management required large increase in banks’ excess reserves and the
Fed encouraged banks to keep the reserves idle by paying interest rates
on them. On the contrary, the BOJ intended banks to use the excess
reserves to distribute credit to economy. The analysis of the U.S. and
Japanese commercial banks balance sheets shows that country-specific
characteristics mattered for the design and effectiveness of unconven-
tional policies. The U.S. crisis was principally due to bad-security
issue and the Fed had to purchase the assets that private agents did
not want to hold. The aggregate lending diminished to smaller extent
than in Japan. The disruption of interbank market was much stronger
which might be linked to interest bearing excess reserves. Japan on
the other hand had to deal with bad-loan problem and the extensive
liquidity provisions were intended to encourage banks to lend. The
double deleveraging of banks and firms made this strategy unsuccess-
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ful and aggregate lending diminished much more than in the U.S. Fi-
nally, the empirical evidence for two countries confirms the difference
in the strategy of the the Fed and the BOJ: while the Fed government
bond purchases had significant impact on the U.S. long-term interest
rates, the BOJ purchases did not reduce Japanese rates.
The second and third chapter evaluated empirically the effectiveness of
different kinds of unconventional monetary policies. Chapter 2 focused
on non-orthodox measures implemented by the Fed and in particular
on their impact on Libor-OIS spread, long-term interest rates and
long-term inflation expectations. We employed event-based regression
in order to measure the relevant assets responses to unconventional
monetary policy announcements. First, we found that interbank mar-
ket reacts relatively little to unconventional monetary policy news.
This confirms the conclusion of the first chapter on the substitution
of the Fed for interbank market and smaller importance of this mar-
ket for bank refinancing. This result also supports the hypothesis that
credit risk linked to interbank lending was of much greater importance
than liquidity risk and the Fed’s liquidity facilities (TAF in particular)
were unable to reduce it. Second, we provide evidence on different im-
pact of quantitative easing 1 (QE1) and quantitative easing 2 (QE2)
in the U.S. The first government bonds purchasing program dimin-
ished long-term interest rates and did not impact long-term inflation
expectations. The second program increased long-term inflation ex-
pectations but did not reduce long-term interest rates. This reaction
of inflation expectation can be explained if one supposes that eco-
nomic agents perceived QE2 as an indication that the Fed intends
monetary expansion to be permanent. According to Auerbach and
Obstfeld (2005)’s model only permanent quantitative easing can in-
crease inflation. Moreover, the independence of the Fed with respect
to Treasury might be more of an issue as the government bond pur-
chases continued along with fiscal stimulus. The inflationary impact
of rescue operations, often conducted with Treasury, seems to confirm
the agents’ sensibility to that question.
Chapter 3 assessed the impact of the ECB unconventional monetary
policies on market borrowing costs for governments and banks. We
took into account all non-orthodox ECB measures, including the lat-
est sovereign bonds purchasing program (Outright Monetary Transac-
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tions, OMT), and used event-based regression to measure the impact
of each measure. We considered money market and covered bonds
market spreads as a proxy for the banks’ borrowing conditions and
sovereign bonds spreads as a proxy for the euro-zone governments’
borrowing rates. The results of this chapter confirm the earlier conclu-
sions on the Fed’s liquidity measures. The exceptional liquidity facil-
ities did not affect interbank money spreads significantly. The impor-
tant exception however is three-year longer-term refinancing operation
(3Y LTRO) which contributed to significant reduction of the spreads.
Covered bonds purchasing programs (CBPP 1 and 2) also diminished
the money market spreads to some extent. Furthermore, we show
that longer-term banks’ refinancing source - the covered bonds mar-
ket - reacted much more to the ECB unconventional measures. The
long-term sovereign bond purchasing program (SMP) had the biggest
impact as its reduced the country default probability and therefore
improved the business climate. Covered bonds purchases, short-term
sovereign debt purchasing program (OMT) and 3Y LTRO also low-
ered the covered bonds spreads. Finally, we find that the sovereign
bonds spreads in periphery euro-zone countries reacted strongly to
both SPM and OMT, as these programs were supposed to counter the
“bad-equilibrium” outcome, namely default of a member state or its
exit from the euro-zone.
These empirical results provide some positive evidence on the effective-
ness of unconventional monetary policies on market interest rates and
in particular on longer-term interest rates. However, as discussed in
Chapter 1 and 2, the ultimate objective of unconventional policies was
increase in lending to companies and households and these measures
were not accompanied by rise in higher monetary aggregates. More-
over, the Fed encouraged banks to keep excess reserves on its balance
sheet by paying interest on them. The impact of non-orthodox mea-
sures on bank lending in terms of interest rates and quantities, seems
therefore an important avenue of further research. A parallel question
linked to unconventional monetary policies is a welfare distribution
they entail. Central banks provided cheap and almost unlimited liq-
uidity to financial institutions and the maturity of loans reached 3
years. It is important to measure whether these funds were used for
credit distribution or invested in short-term government debt bringing
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“carry-trade”-like profits. In a similar vein, the recent Fed’s mortgage-
backed securities buying program, called QE3, is reported to increase
the profits of few mortgage-originating financial institutions which do
not pass on low interest rates to households24. Again, the pass-through
of lower interest rates induced by unconventional policies to lending
rates to companies and households would be a key element to evaluate
overall effectiveness of these measures.
As far as theoretical results are concerned, we developed in chapter 4
a New Keynesian model that incorporates a small time-varying risk
of disaster. This paper is a first step towards the introduction of rare
events risk into the models used to conduct monetary policy, and will
be used to compare the effectiveness of several unconventional mon-
etary policy interventions in the presence of such a risk. In the first
stage we developed a baseline framework to analyze macroeconomic
quantities in the presence of a small time-varying disaster risk in an
otherwise standard New Keynesian model. A rise in the probability
of disaster creates a recession, a fall in inflation, a flight to quality
in terms of asset demand, depressed investment and labor, as well as
lower consumption. The rise in a probability of a disaster suffices to
generate this recession, without effective occurrence of the disaster.
While following Gourio (2012) on the description of an economic dis-
aster, we relax the assumption that total factor productivity needs to
fall by the same amount than the capital stock in case of a disaster. By
incorporating investment adjustment costs and monopolistic compe-
tition, we show that the magnitude of the recession following a shock
to the probability of disaster may be far increased. As compared with
the early papers on rare events, we also account for the fact that con-
sumption and wages do not rise in distressed economic times, whether
nominal rigidity is time-dependent or state-dependent. As a second
step, we plan to assess the desirability of monetary policy to prevent a
(self-fulfilling) recession from a sudden rise in the (perceived) probabil-
ity of disaster. Several conventional and unconventional interventions
will be compared with one another by incorporating a welfare function
measuring their effectiveness.
This thesis emphasized the diversity of unconventional monetary pol-
icy strategies and the importance of country-specific characteristics for
24“Fears over US mortgage dominance”, Financial Times, October 15, 2012.
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their design and effectiveness. We conclude that direct asset purchases
have important effect on long-term interest rates reduction, especially
in the presence of high country default risk. The government bond
purchases seem to have an impact on inflation expectations as long
as the monetary base is perceived to be permanent. The impact of
quantitative easing on inflation expectations should be however inves-
tigated further taking into account the U.K., the euro-zone data, as
well as the newest evidence from the United States (QE3 and Opera-
tion Twist) in order to determine more precisely the conditions which
allow large-scale asset purchases to have an impact on inflation expec-
tations. We also find that liquidity provisions had only small impact
on interbank market strains. We conclude that the central banks took
the role of interbank intermediation making interbank market less rel-
evant for the bank refinancing. The future research is needed in order
to determine whether liquidity provided to banks was further lent to
companies and households and whether the low interest rates were
further passed on to banks’ customers. Finally, we built a New Key-
nesian model that accounts for agents’ perception of higher disaster
risk which leads to self-fulfilling recession. This is a privileged frame-
work to evaluate efficacy of unconventional monetary policies and we
plan to compare different unconventional measures in term of welfare
gains (losses) in our further research.
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